<p>Reports indicate that the second round of talks between the United States and Iran is set to begin <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/world/pakistan/pakistan-starts-preparing-for-next-round-of-us-iran-talks-report-3971086#google_vignette">soon</a> in Islamabad. Coupled with a temporary ceasefire in Lebanon, this has raised cautious optimism about the prospects for a limited diplomatic breakthrough. Yet, regardless of the outcome, one consequence is already evident: Pakistan’s diplomatic profile has received a significant boost, positioning itself as a relevant interlocutor in a complex regional crisis.</p><p>India’s foreign policy discourse on Pakistan’s role in the US-Iran peace efforts is heavily conditioned by longstanding mistrust, often overshadowing an objective assessment of Pakistan’s current diplomatic engagement. It is being confused with Pakistan’s internal dynamics, including civil-military relations, economic stress, and its past linkages with various terrorist groups. All these issues have their merits and deserve separate analysis, but they should not be conflated with the current role played by Asim Munir and Shehbaz Sharif.</p> .<p>Despite its complex legacy, Islamabad has managed the situation effectively, making well-judged and timely diplomatic moves. Pakistan swiftly condemned the US-Israel attack on Iran as a violation of international law. At the same time, it also criticised Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Gulf countries. Islamabad officially condemned the killing of Ali Khamenei, with Sharif characterising his death as ‘martyrdom’.</p><p>The diplomatic handling of <em>Operation Sindoor</em> in engagement with the US appears to have complicated India-US ties, even as it coincided with a visible improvement in US-Pakistan ties, with Field Marshal Asim Munir gaining prominence in Washington’s strategic calculus under Donald Trump.</p> .<p>Even before the conflict began on February 28, New Delhi visibly aligned itself with one side, assuming it would prevail. As US-Israel assessments of Iranian resilience have proven flawed, this position now appears to reflect a degree of miscalculation.</p><p>As the conflict expanded into the Gulf and began disrupting energy markets and impacting a large number of economies, any actor contributing to a ceasefire was widely seen as providing much-needed relief. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan earned notable recognition and praise for its role. Israel appeared to be the only actor inclined to prolong the conflict, driven by its objective of inflicting maximum strategic damage on Iran.</p> .<p>Given its trade, energy, and diaspora linkages, India would naturally welcome a settlement. Yet, domestic discourse often reveals a reluctance to acknowledge Pakistan’s contribution, with some analysts downplaying its role or questioning the durability of a peace process in which Pakistan is prominently involved. Alongside Israel, parts of India’s domestic discourse may also be inclined to welcome the failure of a Pakistan-mediated peace effort. Such an approach risks allowing entrenched biases to overshadow a clear-eyed assessment of evolving regional dynamics and India’s strategic interests.</p> .<p>As India seeks to position itself as a leading voice of the Global South, including through its BRICS presidency, it will need to engage actively with West Asia’s evolving security and economic architecture. Beyond trade, energy, and diaspora ties, the success of key connectivity initiatives such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) will depend on regional stability.</p><p>India must, therefore, manage its ties with Iran, the GCC countries, and Israel with considerable tact, keeping in mind the region’s long-term strategic order. A lack of careful calibration risks turning India’s close partnership with Israel into a strategic liability — not only in West Asia but also across the wider Global South. Despite the difficulty of reaching consensus within BRICS at this stage, New Delhi can still leverage its position by issuing clear, purposeful statements as chair.</p> .<p>Iran and the United States maintain fundamentally opposing perceptions of each other’s role in the region, rooted in deep strategic mistrust and conflicting visions of regional order. Therefore, even if an agreement on immediate issues—such as a prolonged ceasefire, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and the nuclear issue—is reached through talks in Pakistan, negotiations over the broader regional order are likely to continue. This is where India can play an important role. With its civilisational linkages, economic and military weight, and leadership of the Global South, New Delhi can emerge as one of the leading players in West Asia.</p><p><em>Gulshan Sachdeva is Jean Monnet Chair and Professor at the Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.</em></p><p><em>Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.<br></em></p>
<p>Reports indicate that the second round of talks between the United States and Iran is set to begin <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/world/pakistan/pakistan-starts-preparing-for-next-round-of-us-iran-talks-report-3971086#google_vignette">soon</a> in Islamabad. Coupled with a temporary ceasefire in Lebanon, this has raised cautious optimism about the prospects for a limited diplomatic breakthrough. Yet, regardless of the outcome, one consequence is already evident: Pakistan’s diplomatic profile has received a significant boost, positioning itself as a relevant interlocutor in a complex regional crisis.</p><p>India’s foreign policy discourse on Pakistan’s role in the US-Iran peace efforts is heavily conditioned by longstanding mistrust, often overshadowing an objective assessment of Pakistan’s current diplomatic engagement. It is being confused with Pakistan’s internal dynamics, including civil-military relations, economic stress, and its past linkages with various terrorist groups. All these issues have their merits and deserve separate analysis, but they should not be conflated with the current role played by Asim Munir and Shehbaz Sharif.</p> .<p>Despite its complex legacy, Islamabad has managed the situation effectively, making well-judged and timely diplomatic moves. Pakistan swiftly condemned the US-Israel attack on Iran as a violation of international law. At the same time, it also criticised Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Gulf countries. Islamabad officially condemned the killing of Ali Khamenei, with Sharif characterising his death as ‘martyrdom’.</p><p>The diplomatic handling of <em>Operation Sindoor</em> in engagement with the US appears to have complicated India-US ties, even as it coincided with a visible improvement in US-Pakistan ties, with Field Marshal Asim Munir gaining prominence in Washington’s strategic calculus under Donald Trump.</p> .<p>Even before the conflict began on February 28, New Delhi visibly aligned itself with one side, assuming it would prevail. As US-Israel assessments of Iranian resilience have proven flawed, this position now appears to reflect a degree of miscalculation.</p><p>As the conflict expanded into the Gulf and began disrupting energy markets and impacting a large number of economies, any actor contributing to a ceasefire was widely seen as providing much-needed relief. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan earned notable recognition and praise for its role. Israel appeared to be the only actor inclined to prolong the conflict, driven by its objective of inflicting maximum strategic damage on Iran.</p> .<p>Given its trade, energy, and diaspora linkages, India would naturally welcome a settlement. Yet, domestic discourse often reveals a reluctance to acknowledge Pakistan’s contribution, with some analysts downplaying its role or questioning the durability of a peace process in which Pakistan is prominently involved. Alongside Israel, parts of India’s domestic discourse may also be inclined to welcome the failure of a Pakistan-mediated peace effort. Such an approach risks allowing entrenched biases to overshadow a clear-eyed assessment of evolving regional dynamics and India’s strategic interests.</p> .<p>As India seeks to position itself as a leading voice of the Global South, including through its BRICS presidency, it will need to engage actively with West Asia’s evolving security and economic architecture. Beyond trade, energy, and diaspora ties, the success of key connectivity initiatives such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) will depend on regional stability.</p><p>India must, therefore, manage its ties with Iran, the GCC countries, and Israel with considerable tact, keeping in mind the region’s long-term strategic order. A lack of careful calibration risks turning India’s close partnership with Israel into a strategic liability — not only in West Asia but also across the wider Global South. Despite the difficulty of reaching consensus within BRICS at this stage, New Delhi can still leverage its position by issuing clear, purposeful statements as chair.</p> .<p>Iran and the United States maintain fundamentally opposing perceptions of each other’s role in the region, rooted in deep strategic mistrust and conflicting visions of regional order. Therefore, even if an agreement on immediate issues—such as a prolonged ceasefire, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and the nuclear issue—is reached through talks in Pakistan, negotiations over the broader regional order are likely to continue. This is where India can play an important role. With its civilisational linkages, economic and military weight, and leadership of the Global South, New Delhi can emerge as one of the leading players in West Asia.</p><p><em>Gulshan Sachdeva is Jean Monnet Chair and Professor at the Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.</em></p><p><em>Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.<br></em></p>