<p>It is in the interest of both India and Pakistan to correctly read the outcome of their recent hostilities and frame their future policies and conduct based on this reading. Pakistan claims that it won the battle or was about to win it when US President Donald Trump intervened and influenced both countries to agree upon a ceasefire. Pakistan’s view of the conflict and the way it ended is their concern and should not bother India. What is important for India is drawing the right lessons from the conflict. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has reiterated India’s resolve to respond to terrorism and enunciated a new security doctrine that would not distinguish between State and non-State actors and would allow India to take action against Pakistan in the event of a terrorist strike on the country. India will not show restraint as it did after the Pahalgam massacre or earlier acts of terror.</p>.<p>This proposition needs clarification if the action of one terrorist would immediately spark retaliation by India. It can keep Pakistan on tenterhooks and act as a deterrent but it carries risks and may lead to unpredictable consequences. Would the attack by one terrorist on an Indian establishment, civil or military, or on an important personality lead to retaliation and war with Pakistan? This would be problematic because individual terrorists or outfits that may not be sponsored by Pakistan can precipitate a crisis with an act of aggression. It should be noted that even after three weeks, the terrorists who staged the attack in Pahalgam have not been nabbed. Since Pakistan may be in perpetual fear of an Indian action, and this Indian action can happen without a warning, there is always the possibility of misjudgment which may trigger a war.</p>.Four days of fire and fury: The takeaways.<p>The most important takeaway from the latest confrontation is that neither country can win a war or take it to its conclusion. India has strongly denied any role of US President Donald Trump in the ceasefire. However, there are indications that Trump did intervene in the situation and use his influence to effect a truce. There are third-party accounts, supported by satellite images, of the damage inflicted by both sides on each other’s installations. India seems to have inflicted more damage than Pakistan did. Was it serious enough for the Pakistani DGMO to plead for a truce? It is also difficult to explain why Trump first announced the ceasefire if he had nothing to do with it. It is wrong to consider such an intervention as mediation and so, the reason for the Indian denial should be pursued elsewhere.</p>.<p>Beyond conventional warfare</p>.<p>It can happen again in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between the two countries. India has clear superiority over Pakistan in terms of conventional strength of the armed forces. It can win a conventional war but Pakistan will not stop at a defeat and end hostilities. It will consider using nuclear weapons in such a situation. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s demand that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should take control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal may have arisen out of this realisation. A war between two nuclear-armed nations will not be just between the two countries. The world will not stand and watch even if India is in the war for the right reasons and a just cause. There will be persuasion or even coercion to stop the war which the two countries cannot resist. It may also be noted that this time, India did not get the support of the international community as it did during the past conflicts.</p>.<p>India has maintained that Pakistan has learned a lesson from the latest conflict and will not dare to repeat its provocations. From the responses in Pakistan, there is no indication that it has learned any lessons in good conduct. If at all it has, it is that China will support it in times of trouble with India, and importantly, there will be intervention to end the conflict. This raises the question – what can be done to make Pakistan desist from promoting and sponsoring terrorism?</p>.<p>India’s experience with Operation Sindoor shows that the only conceivable option is to give Pakistan a taste of its poison, but there cannot be certainty about the results. Pakistan is not internally stable and it can politically implode from within. Even in such a situation, the core of Pakistan will have nuclear capability and may not be amenable to reason and good sense. Prime Minister Modi asserted this week that India will not succumb to Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail. Such a declaration can serve to underline the government’s commitment to protect the country’s interests and show its determination not to be deterred by anything in doing so. However, in practical terms, it is a difficult proposition to adopt. Amid heightened tensions during a war, there will hardly be any difference between ‘blackmail’ and a threat to use nuclear weapons. This has special significance when India has adopted the doctrine of no first use of nuclear weapons and Pakistan has not.</p>.<p>India is at a dead end in dealing with Pakistan. The new security doctrine will not be able to break the deadlock. Since India has decided on almost total disengagement, there are no diplomatic doors open for either country. The Prime Minister has said that there would be no talks except on terrorism and PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir). That shuts out all chances of mutual contact. When there is no prospect of peaceful engagement and war is no option and when there are serious issues of contention between the two countries, how does the relationship move forward? Will any issue get resolved?</p>.<p><em>(The writer is a former associate editor and editorial advisor of <br>Deccan Herald)</em></p>
<p>It is in the interest of both India and Pakistan to correctly read the outcome of their recent hostilities and frame their future policies and conduct based on this reading. Pakistan claims that it won the battle or was about to win it when US President Donald Trump intervened and influenced both countries to agree upon a ceasefire. Pakistan’s view of the conflict and the way it ended is their concern and should not bother India. What is important for India is drawing the right lessons from the conflict. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has reiterated India’s resolve to respond to terrorism and enunciated a new security doctrine that would not distinguish between State and non-State actors and would allow India to take action against Pakistan in the event of a terrorist strike on the country. India will not show restraint as it did after the Pahalgam massacre or earlier acts of terror.</p>.<p>This proposition needs clarification if the action of one terrorist would immediately spark retaliation by India. It can keep Pakistan on tenterhooks and act as a deterrent but it carries risks and may lead to unpredictable consequences. Would the attack by one terrorist on an Indian establishment, civil or military, or on an important personality lead to retaliation and war with Pakistan? This would be problematic because individual terrorists or outfits that may not be sponsored by Pakistan can precipitate a crisis with an act of aggression. It should be noted that even after three weeks, the terrorists who staged the attack in Pahalgam have not been nabbed. Since Pakistan may be in perpetual fear of an Indian action, and this Indian action can happen without a warning, there is always the possibility of misjudgment which may trigger a war.</p>.Four days of fire and fury: The takeaways.<p>The most important takeaway from the latest confrontation is that neither country can win a war or take it to its conclusion. India has strongly denied any role of US President Donald Trump in the ceasefire. However, there are indications that Trump did intervene in the situation and use his influence to effect a truce. There are third-party accounts, supported by satellite images, of the damage inflicted by both sides on each other’s installations. India seems to have inflicted more damage than Pakistan did. Was it serious enough for the Pakistani DGMO to plead for a truce? It is also difficult to explain why Trump first announced the ceasefire if he had nothing to do with it. It is wrong to consider such an intervention as mediation and so, the reason for the Indian denial should be pursued elsewhere.</p>.<p>Beyond conventional warfare</p>.<p>It can happen again in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between the two countries. India has clear superiority over Pakistan in terms of conventional strength of the armed forces. It can win a conventional war but Pakistan will not stop at a defeat and end hostilities. It will consider using nuclear weapons in such a situation. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s demand that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should take control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal may have arisen out of this realisation. A war between two nuclear-armed nations will not be just between the two countries. The world will not stand and watch even if India is in the war for the right reasons and a just cause. There will be persuasion or even coercion to stop the war which the two countries cannot resist. It may also be noted that this time, India did not get the support of the international community as it did during the past conflicts.</p>.<p>India has maintained that Pakistan has learned a lesson from the latest conflict and will not dare to repeat its provocations. From the responses in Pakistan, there is no indication that it has learned any lessons in good conduct. If at all it has, it is that China will support it in times of trouble with India, and importantly, there will be intervention to end the conflict. This raises the question – what can be done to make Pakistan desist from promoting and sponsoring terrorism?</p>.<p>India’s experience with Operation Sindoor shows that the only conceivable option is to give Pakistan a taste of its poison, but there cannot be certainty about the results. Pakistan is not internally stable and it can politically implode from within. Even in such a situation, the core of Pakistan will have nuclear capability and may not be amenable to reason and good sense. Prime Minister Modi asserted this week that India will not succumb to Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail. Such a declaration can serve to underline the government’s commitment to protect the country’s interests and show its determination not to be deterred by anything in doing so. However, in practical terms, it is a difficult proposition to adopt. Amid heightened tensions during a war, there will hardly be any difference between ‘blackmail’ and a threat to use nuclear weapons. This has special significance when India has adopted the doctrine of no first use of nuclear weapons and Pakistan has not.</p>.<p>India is at a dead end in dealing with Pakistan. The new security doctrine will not be able to break the deadlock. Since India has decided on almost total disengagement, there are no diplomatic doors open for either country. The Prime Minister has said that there would be no talks except on terrorism and PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir). That shuts out all chances of mutual contact. When there is no prospect of peaceful engagement and war is no option and when there are serious issues of contention between the two countries, how does the relationship move forward? Will any issue get resolved?</p>.<p><em>(The writer is a former associate editor and editorial advisor of <br>Deccan Herald)</em></p>