Chabahar as India’s strategic lever

India’s passivity on the conflict is untenable. It must use the port as a gateway for pragmatic engagement

The collapse of the recent United States-Iran engagement in Islamabad was not entirely unexpected. Both sides arrived at the table with maximalist positions, and what followed has only reinforced the absence of a viable negotiating framework.

Iran’s foreign minister declined to engage the US delegation during his subsequent visit to Pakistan, while Washington cancelled follow-up discussions at the last minute, citing dissatisfaction with Tehran’s proposals. Islamabad, rather than emerging as a credible intermediary, now appears to have been quietly sidelined. This is not the result of a single failure. Pakistan lacks both the institutional depth and the diplomatic credibility required for a negotiation of this complexity. More tellingly, sections of Iranian media have begun openly questioning its neutrality, even as Tehran signals a preference for Oman.

In Washington, too, Pakistan’s position appears to be evolving – from a legacy security partner to a more transactional, low-trust actor. Its decision to open multiple overland routes to Iran, reportedly to mitigate the impact of a potential US naval squeeze in the Strait of Hormuz, reinforces perceptions of strategic ambiguity.

The real diplomatic movement, however, lies elsewhere. Tehran’s rapid outreach to Oman and Russia marks a recalibration. In Muscat, the focus shifted from the deadlock over uranium enrichment and sanctions to the more immediate question of maritime security in Hormuz. This was not incidental. By reframing the issue around shipping stability, Iran moved the conversation to terrain where incremental cooperation is still possible.

The subsequent engagement with Moscow is even more consequential. Russia’s explicit willingness to “do everything” to support Iran signals a shift in the diplomatic centre of gravity. The crisis is no longer confined to a US-Iran binary; it is becoming part of a wider geopolitical contest. It is in this evolving landscape that India’s continued restraint begins to look less like prudence and more like passivity.

India’s core interests are directly implicated: the stability of the Strait of Hormuz, uninterrupted energy flows, and the viability of the Chabahar port. Yet, New Delhi has chosen to remain on the margins. This is increasingly untenable. Chabahar offers India a rare strategic entry point into the crisis that is neither overtly political nor diplomatically intrusive. Originally conceived as a connectivity project linking India to Afghanistan and Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan, Chabahar has acquired a far broader geopolitical significance.

For Iran, it represents diversification beyond overdependence on China. For the US, it has historically been tolerable through selective sanction waivers due to its stabilising potential in Afghanistan. This triangular convergence makes Chabahar a diplomatic lever.

The immediate question is whether Washington is willing to extend a limited sanction waiver tied specifically to Chabahar-linked activity, which lapsed recently. Such a move would allow the US to sustain pressure on Iran while preserving a corridor that serves broader regional stability. For India, it would create the minimum strategic space required to engage without vulnerability.

A necessary reconfiguration

India confirmed on April 27 that the Chabahar issue is under discussion with both Iran and the US. New Delhi must secure operational assurances from Tehran – both on the continuity of energy flows through Hormuz and on the political insulation of Chabahar from episodic leverage.

But the real strategic innovation lies in expanding the project beyond its bilateral framework. If Chabahar remains an India-Iran initiative, it will be exposed to sanctions pressure from Washington, leverage from Tehran, and encroachment by China. Multilateralising the corridor by bringing in Central Asian partners such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would alter this equation, transforming Chabahar into a shared regional asset, raising the costs of disruption for all stakeholders. Such a configuration would give the US a reason to tolerate it, provide Iran with an incentive to stabilise it, and anchor India within a broader Eurasian framework.

New Delhi need not pursue a comprehensive settlement to the Gulf crisis. Its comparative advantage lies in limited, outcome-oriented engagement, focused on de-escalation measures, maritime safety protocols, and incremental confidence-building steps. In crises of this nature, sustaining dialogue is often more valuable than forcing resolution. Equally important is the need to avoid strategic overreach. Any perception that India is acting as an extension of US policy would erode its credibility with Tehran. India’s utility lies in its ability to engage without alignment.

If approached with discipline, Chabahar can serve not just as a connectivity project, but as a diplomatic instrument – one that allows India to shape outcomes at the margins of a critical regional crisis.

(The writer is a retired Ambassador and a foreign service officer)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.