<p>United States President Joe Biden’s announcement on April 14 on a final pull- back of troops from Afghanistan by September 11 this year and the multi-party, multinational conference led by the United Nations, Qatar and Turkey slated for the end of next month have surprised many countries, including China.</p>.<p>As a neighbour of Afghanistan, with acute concerns on the controversy about Xinjiang’s internment camps and growing political violence in the region, China has been at the forefront of many initiatives to curb the negative fallout from any US withdrawal of troops. China’s multi-billion investment in the contiguous China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) could also be in jeopardy, as the April 21 bomb attack on a hotel in Quetta indicated.</p>.<p>The immediate response of China, which earlier criticised the presence of US troops in Afghanistan since 2001, is for such withdrawal “in a responsible and orderly manner to ensure a smooth transition” in Afghanistan.</p>.<p>China borders Afghanistan through the Badakhshan province for 76 kilometres in Xinjiang. This region was part of the Qing-British-Russian great game in the 19th century. Its national interests include stability in Xinjiang, which has been plagued by violence and drug trafficking. China concluded a border treaty with Afghanistan in 1963 but remains concerned about cross-border movements.</p>.<p>Given the importance of Afghanistan to its western stability and as a gateway to west and central Asia, China took several measures to cozy up to Kabul. In the 1990s, China began the Western Development Campaign, an effort for infrastructure and strategic domination. This has been transformed into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).</p>.<p>China’s diplomatic interactions with Afghanistan have intensified over the years. In June 2012, the two elevated ties to “strategic cooperative partnership”. President Ashraf Ghani surprised many when he chose China as his first visit abroad in 2014. In May 2016 the two sides signed an MoU on the BRI and in April 2019 the BRI energy partnership agreement was signed.</p>.<p>Secondly, China began activating its security contacts in the region. When the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan, China’s 300-odd military intelligence instructors trained the Mujahideen at Kashgar and Hotan. Later, Beijing made a deal with the Taliban to shield it from international pressure provided the Taliban did not support the Uighur insurgency in Xinjiang.</p>.<p>After the September 11 attacks and Afghan strikes in 2001, China articulated a position for observing the UN Charter, no collateral damage, civilian reconstruction and so on.</p>.<p>Beijing also concluded with Kabul a treaty in 2006 for expanding security and economic relations. However, after six deadly attacks killed several Chinese in different parts of Afghanistan, China began approaching the Hekmatyar Network through its own contacts in the Fata region, assisted by the ISI of Pakistan. China is now pushing the twin policies of making a deal with the Taliban for stability in Xinjiang and supporting a pro-Beijing transitional government.</p>.<p>China is also taking things into its own hands by establishing a military base in Badakhshan-Tajik borders with reports of frequent intrusions into Afghanistan. It is pushing its trilateral, quadrilateral and multilateral efforts to rope in regional actors, sometimes to the exclusion of others. This is seen in its discussions with Pakistan, Tajikistan, Nepal, Iran or Turkey. Its recent “Himalayan Quad” is to counter the other Quad.</p>.<p>China’s Afghan reconstruction efforts have been kept to a minimum, specifically assistance which remains a paltry $156 million (as compared to over $3 billion by India), suggesting that Beijing prefers to have political and security influence in Kabul. Its BRI commitments and bilateral trade and investment in Afghanistan are also minimal.</p>.<p>All in all, China’s approach towards Afghan reconciliation is flawed, self-centric and contradictory in nature with serious consequences to regional security and local well-being.</p>
<p>United States President Joe Biden’s announcement on April 14 on a final pull- back of troops from Afghanistan by September 11 this year and the multi-party, multinational conference led by the United Nations, Qatar and Turkey slated for the end of next month have surprised many countries, including China.</p>.<p>As a neighbour of Afghanistan, with acute concerns on the controversy about Xinjiang’s internment camps and growing political violence in the region, China has been at the forefront of many initiatives to curb the negative fallout from any US withdrawal of troops. China’s multi-billion investment in the contiguous China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) could also be in jeopardy, as the April 21 bomb attack on a hotel in Quetta indicated.</p>.<p>The immediate response of China, which earlier criticised the presence of US troops in Afghanistan since 2001, is for such withdrawal “in a responsible and orderly manner to ensure a smooth transition” in Afghanistan.</p>.<p>China borders Afghanistan through the Badakhshan province for 76 kilometres in Xinjiang. This region was part of the Qing-British-Russian great game in the 19th century. Its national interests include stability in Xinjiang, which has been plagued by violence and drug trafficking. China concluded a border treaty with Afghanistan in 1963 but remains concerned about cross-border movements.</p>.<p>Given the importance of Afghanistan to its western stability and as a gateway to west and central Asia, China took several measures to cozy up to Kabul. In the 1990s, China began the Western Development Campaign, an effort for infrastructure and strategic domination. This has been transformed into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).</p>.<p>China’s diplomatic interactions with Afghanistan have intensified over the years. In June 2012, the two elevated ties to “strategic cooperative partnership”. President Ashraf Ghani surprised many when he chose China as his first visit abroad in 2014. In May 2016 the two sides signed an MoU on the BRI and in April 2019 the BRI energy partnership agreement was signed.</p>.<p>Secondly, China began activating its security contacts in the region. When the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan, China’s 300-odd military intelligence instructors trained the Mujahideen at Kashgar and Hotan. Later, Beijing made a deal with the Taliban to shield it from international pressure provided the Taliban did not support the Uighur insurgency in Xinjiang.</p>.<p>After the September 11 attacks and Afghan strikes in 2001, China articulated a position for observing the UN Charter, no collateral damage, civilian reconstruction and so on.</p>.<p>Beijing also concluded with Kabul a treaty in 2006 for expanding security and economic relations. However, after six deadly attacks killed several Chinese in different parts of Afghanistan, China began approaching the Hekmatyar Network through its own contacts in the Fata region, assisted by the ISI of Pakistan. China is now pushing the twin policies of making a deal with the Taliban for stability in Xinjiang and supporting a pro-Beijing transitional government.</p>.<p>China is also taking things into its own hands by establishing a military base in Badakhshan-Tajik borders with reports of frequent intrusions into Afghanistan. It is pushing its trilateral, quadrilateral and multilateral efforts to rope in regional actors, sometimes to the exclusion of others. This is seen in its discussions with Pakistan, Tajikistan, Nepal, Iran or Turkey. Its recent “Himalayan Quad” is to counter the other Quad.</p>.<p>China’s Afghan reconstruction efforts have been kept to a minimum, specifically assistance which remains a paltry $156 million (as compared to over $3 billion by India), suggesting that Beijing prefers to have political and security influence in Kabul. Its BRI commitments and bilateral trade and investment in Afghanistan are also minimal.</p>.<p>All in all, China’s approach towards Afghan reconciliation is flawed, self-centric and contradictory in nature with serious consequences to regional security and local well-being.</p>