China’s Iran imbroglio

China’s carefully crafted, if contradictory, policy on the current conflict in Iran is coming under increasing strain, threatening to derail its trade, energy flows, its relations with the United States and the Gulf countries, and its ambitions to invade Taiwan.

The flip-flops in the US policies have been taking a toll on China, as with many other countries. President Donald Trump’s avowed policy of restructuring global and regional orders is affecting China. The capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro soon after the visit of a high-level Chinese delegation, the cancellation of a Chinese company’s hold over the Panama Canal, and the increasing scrutiny of Chinese investments in Latin American ports are unnerving Beijing.

So is the current US-Israeli war against Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. China has shifted from its initial pro forma position on the violation of international law and sovereignty to active negotiation. On April 14 and April 20, President Xi Jinping explicitly underscored resolution of the conflict – a stance markedly different from the nuanced earlier position favouring back-channel diplomacy. China’s position is clearly inconsistent here, as seen in its militarisation of the South and East China Seas and the border with India.

On April 20, President Xi called Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as part of efforts to open the Strait of Hormuz. Despite diversification of its energy needs to Russia, Central Asia, and Africa, a surge in renewables, and stronger strategic oil reserves, China is feeling the heat of energy disruptions. Domestic fuel prices are up by 20% – the fifth hike this year – while the uncertainty about the Hormuz blockade is hampering its economic growth prospects.

Also, China has been selectively blocking the South China Sea waterways for vessels from the US, India, and other countries. In 2011, China reportedly harassed the Indian naval vessel INS Airavat. Later, ONGC Videsh Limited rigs came under China’s pressure even though they were located in areas held by Vietnam. The USNS Impeccable incident in 2009 was another instance of harassment.

At the centre of the present crisis, however, is the Iranian nuclear programme, cited by the US and Israel as the “fundamental” issue in the conflict. Russia and China are, separately, toying with the idea of taking away Iran’s enriched uranium. Since the 1990s, Russian and Chinese scientists have helped Iran in developing the programme; both countries have leverage over Tehran on this account. No wonder Trump stated on April 8 that China is contributing towards turning around Iran’s leadership for negotiations.

Meanwhile, China’s reported supply of weapons and dual-use materials, strengthening Tehran’s air defence and navigation systems, and Iran’s strikes on energy, civilian, and technology targets in the Gulf states are straining China-Gulf relations.

China imports more energy from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait—countries targeted by Iran—than the sanctioned oil it imports from Iran, a factor China has been unable to reconcile. Its overall trade with the Gulf countries and Iran decreased sharply in March this year due to the uncertainty in the region and the blockade of Hormuz.

Despite expressions of bravado, China’s dependence on the US has been modulating Beijing’s approach to the war in West Asia. Trump’s expected visit to Beijing on May 14-15, postponed from March, is a crucial variable in the current conflict. Though the President had lowered the tariffs on Beijing, signalled the lifting of the ban on semiconductors in lieu of rare earth mineral supplies, bilateral relations have not reached a balance.

Some analysts argue that the distraction of the US in Iran and the reported depletion of its cruise missile inventory and other war supplies can present an opportunity for China to enter Taiwan. However, this is easier said than done, given the protracted nature of conflicts in recent times (in Gaza, Ukraine, Iran, and other regions) and the geopolitical uncertainties. China is well aware of the dangers involved in such a move.

While China condemns the unilateral military action against Iran and calls for de-escalation and negotiation, it has not stepped back from its ongoing military actions against Taiwan. Notably, it has not initiated de-escalation and de-induction measures on the border with India.

Clearly, China’s positions during the West Asia conflict and its adoption of a “balanced diplomacy” between Iran and the Gulf states have not yielded the desired results. It needs to be seen if its offer to store the enriched uranium will be accepted by the Iranian leadership.

(The writer is the JNU Prof has been Peking behind the Bamboo Curtain for 30 years.)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.