An unholy game

Two journalists from Delhi are writing a book on Ashok Khemka, the Haryana cadre IAS officer who is presently serving as Principal Secretary, Haryana Archives and Museums department. When the book hits the stand, Just Transferred: The Untold Story of Ashok Khemka will lay bare before the public the malaise of a corrupt system that got him transferred 53 times in the 27 years of his service. Karnataka cadre IAS and IPS officers do not make public how many times they were transferred in a year or in their careers to date. Otherwise, the information would have put the state to shame.

The transfer of senior IAS officer Munish Moudgil, effected a few weeks back, was shrouded in mystery. So was the transfer of Harsha Gupta, another IAS officer who has been appointed as special officer dealing with IMA cases. Anyone familiar with the style of administration in Karnataka will acknowledge that transfers of government officials is no longer a benign annual exercise meant to tone up the administration. It is a merciless, yet booming, business – perhaps the only sector that has not been hit by the economic slowdown!

Last week, while participating in a debate on the Constitution in the Assembly, Chief Minister BS Yediyurappa himself said that transfers were a big racket.

Government transfers have all along been a part of administration, but it was remodelled to suit ‘democratic principles’ during the late Ramakrishna Hegde’s time. A think-tank comprising the likes of political scientist Rajni Kothari and economist LC Jain gave a report to the government strongly pitching for more powers to elected representatives. The symbol of power should be vested with elected representatives, they said. One of the numerous recommendations was that MLAs should have a say in the transfer or posting of officials in their constituencies. It’s perhaps the best example of how an ideal espoused by a think-tank at one time makes way for the misuse of the system over the years by elected representatives and government officials.

Initially, there were no major digressions from the system following its introduction by the Hegde government or even later when Congress came to power in 1989. But they began soon enough, when an incumbent chief secretary, M Shankaranarayanan, was transferred out in the early 1990s. He went public, saying he was punished for being harsh on corrupt officials; he was issued a show-cause notice. The issue could not reach a logical end as he went on central deputation.

For long, the thumb-rule in government was that not more than 5% of its workforce must be transferred in a year. When Siddaramaiah was CM, he raised it to 7%, for reasons best known to him. Otherwise, in a transfer season between April and June, some 45,000-60,000 transfers take place in Karnataka. What if someone wants a transfer after the ‘season’ is over? That discretionary power is vested with the CM and he can invoke it at any time. Over time, a large number of employees have come to seek these ‘anytime’ transfers. Thus, one no longer knows exactly how many transfers take place during a year.

By the turn of the century, mining lobbies had replaced many other lobbies, and its impact was visible. The influence of these lobbies in government transfers was restricted to departments where their interests matter the most. Elected representatives generally do not take a bribe for transfers. They prefer to use officers of their choice to do their ‘work’ in their constituencies. It is no longer a secret that at least a few who get transfers through this means reciprocate during elections.

Interestingly, the transfer business has evolved over the years and now touts have taken over the role of politicians and elected representatives. The officials in the RTOs or sub-registrar offices have evolved a system whereby they give a list of officials seeking transfers to their higher-ups. This is clever strategy. By doing so, the officials can prevent the government from transferring them out of Bengaluru, which is a ‘revenue-generating’ machine. They interchange their posts with those colleagues seeking transfers and stay put in Bengaluru. Caste, of course, is another big factor in transfers in Karnataka.

In 2010, retired IAS officer T R Raghunandan did a study for Janaagraha on corruption in the land registration wing of the revenue department. First, his team collected information from the public, who admitted to having paid bribes while registering properties. The information was shared by ‘Ipaidabribe’ portal. Later, through RTI, Raghunandan’s team got information from the government on the transfer pattern in the registration wing. As expected, a large number of sub-registrars sought transfers to offices in and around Bengaluru. In the final report, he had observed that transfers to Bidar or Kalaburgi were considered a punishment because the volume of bribe they could rake in there was very less compared to what they could make in Bengaluru’s sub-registrar offices.

In Munish Moudgil’s case, it is apparent that the government came under pressure from a lobby of surveyors who refused to accept a new, transparent system which could have otherwise benefitted society at large. Same is the case with Harsha Gupta, who might well have beaten Ashok Khemka’s record on transfers.

Transfers of honest and dynamic officers from key posts, or punishing good police officers with insignificant non-executive posts, have taken a toll on good governance. The situation has reached a stage now when officers have stopped taking risks, innovating or taking steps to contain corrupt practices. Thus, governance suffers.

It is curious as to why politicians, who are worried about the anti-incumbency factor during elections, do not want to bet on development works. A good number of officers posted in key positions can deliver populist schemes. Two, by bringing in reforms in departments like revenue and PWD, such officers can help political masters win the hearts of the people. Somehow, political leaders are still not sure that development can bring them electoral dividends. So, they adopt other strategies to win elections. It is strongly suspected that revenue generated through transfers is ploughed back into electioneering. So, it is no longer a secret that no political party dares to put an end to this transfer system.

(The writer is a Bengaluru-based senior journalist and political commentator)