<p>The Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M), along with other left parties, is contesting close to 250 of the 294 total seats in the West Bengal Assembly elections and has projected a young, educated, and highly motivated set of new leaders. Left with not even a single seat in the state Assembly after 2021, the CPI-M perhaps hopes to regain a foothold on the political ladder, rather than return to power. Observations have bordered on the cynical — <em>shunyo theke maha shunyo</em> (from zero to nothing). In politics, however, zero may also hold the power of renewal, although it is unclear whether the party has sufficiently introspected over its mammoth past mistakes -- lost opportunities, arrogant complacency, and an unceremonious exit after a long tenure (1977-2011). In the years since, a rudderless and vaguely defined ideological positioning was no match for a charismatic and opportunistic leadership that came to power.</p>.<p>Today, the average Bengali faces a sense of bankruptcy when it comes to political choice between the ruling party’s alleged corruption and the main opposition’s aggressive religious majoritarianism. The Trinamool Congress’ (TMC’s) welfare guarantees are seen, even by many beneficiaries, as propping up joblessness. The alleged disenfranchisement of lakhs of citizens through the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls has deepened a sense of powerlessness vis-a-vis the political system. This has created a political vacuum that the CPI(M) hopes to fill.</p>.West Bengal Assembly Elections 2026 | Ratna Debnath, mother of RG Kar victim is the BJP candidate from Panihati.<p>Young men and women – the CPI(M)’s sine qua non in this election – who appear committed to clean and secular politics have made a meaningful dent in the political discourse. Remarkably, although they belong to a middle-class generation often dismissive of ideology and enamoured of Western capitalism, they have joined a political party with a leftist ideology, with no promise of immediate power.</p>.<p>Globally, the left is in search of viable constituencies, as its classical backbone, the assembly-line industrial workforce, has diminished significantly. The left has understandably turned to other movements for support and coalitions. In the 21st century, the Latin American Pink Tide and the Second Pink Tide indicate that left parties have emerged as a political alternative on the electoral cycle in several Latin American countries, leaning on non-class social identities and political projects -- environment, gender, sexuality, indigenous peoples, and other minorities-- to put together an alternative social base. Similarly, the European Left has sought alliances with the green and LGBTQ movements.</p>.<p>For the CPI(M), such alliances have proved challenging. Currently, several young, highly articulate women leaders, contesting from key constituencies, have provided an unprecedented feminine face to the CPI(M). The immediate backdrop to the party’s involvement in gender issues is the 2024 rape and murder of a young doctor at Kolkata’s RG Kar Medical College. During the spontaneous public protests and junior doctors’ suspension of work that emerged over this crime, the CPI(M) activists provided leadership from the front. The victim’s mother now opting to contest the elections as a member of the Bharatiya Janata Party may appear to be a victory for the BJP in terms of co-opting the issue of women’s security. The larger question, of course, is, has the CPI(M) built a narrative around the themes of gendered socioeconomic exclusion and violence, including the LGBTQ movement, which would provide a broad mobilisational structure and energy transcending but at the same time incorporate any one particular case? Perhaps there is a long way to go yet.</p>.<p>On other social identity-based alliances, notwithstanding the CPI(M)’s historic connection to the Muslim peasantry through its leadership of farmers’ movements and tenancy reforms, there was a shift of Muslim voters to the TMC during 2006-2011, following incidents such as the Nandigram land acquisition movement. Muslim disenfranchisement through the SIR has brought a new twist to the minority question in West Bengal. The CPI(M)’s recent conversations with leading Islamic groups, the Indian Secular Front (ISF) and the Janata Unnayan Party (JUP) have stumbled, not only on seat-sharing disagreements but also perhaps on the deep discomfort articulated by sections of the left front over seeking political alliances with religiously defined groups. Electoral alliances are matters of shifting strategies. Muslims in West Bengal, however, have remained predominantly rural and poor, with little access to education, political representation and mobility. An effective theory of Muslim political representation would need to balance the question of social identity with the more universal, structural question of economic marginalisation.</p>.<p>In each of these domains, perhaps a historically class-based Marxist party falters in the process of producing theoretical narratives that could transcend class to incorporate social identity-based political constituencies. Perhaps the question also is, has the left in India squarely addressed the economic issues associated with the interests of a diverse working class across the rural and urban, farm and factory, and formal and informal sectors?</p>.<p>While many of West Bengal’s heritage large-scale industries and industrial belts occupy a wasteland of decline and closures, today the state’s industrial structure is dominated by micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). Although the share of workers in manufacturing is 18.8%, higher than the all-India average of 11.4%, 95% of MSMEs employ fewer than six workers, with low capital investment and labour productivity. Workers lack employment security or regulated wages. The female workforce participation rate remains lower at 33.8% against the all-India average of 37% (2022-2023); 66% of women are self-employed, pointing to the crisis of job availability.</p>.<p>While West Bengal’s unemployment rate has been steadily falling (2.2% in 2022-2023 to the national average of 3.2%), the most widely heard statement in villages and small towns is kaaj nei (there is no work). This is reflected in the state’s migration figures over the last two decades. West Bengal is the fourth largest sending-out state. Unskilled workers move to other states to work as informal labour in construction and in low-end services. The low unemployment figures might therefore indicate that the state now leans on other states to provide employment for its people.</p>.<p>It is in that context that the CPI(M) has put jobs at the centre of its election promises. Dipshita Dhar, a vocal member of the young CPI(M) cohort, has said, “Giving allowance to someone is fine, but it shouldn’t arise from unemployment.” (<em>The New Indian Express</em>, April 19). In the opinion of Samik Lahiri, a member of the party’s Central Committee, the party has made job creation a central plank of their campaign. He stated that the Left Front has developed an alternative job creation policy (<em>DH</em>, March 21).</p>.<p>The CPI(M)’s manifesto promises one permanent job in every family and a 100- and 200-day job guarantee for the urban and rural poor, respectively. The manifesto mentions heavy and medium industries, software and hardware parks and so on. But what will be the path towards job creation? How will the state address the contradictions of modern technology-driven industrialisation on the one hand and job creation on the other, particularly for unskilled and semi-skilled workers? While this contradiction has beset the national economic policy paradigm since the 1990s, for the CPI(M) too, the question of a new model of employment-centred industrialisation and development has remained a blind spot.</p>.<p>In India, around 41% of the workforce remains engaged in agriculture, despite its diminishing share in the GDP. Cities do not promise secure livelihoods. Integrating a predominantly rural and unskilled workforce into a globally competent, technology-driven economy is a formidable challenge.</p>.<p>It is perhaps here that expectations rest on the new, dynamic, young leadership of the CPI(M) – to engage with these broader issues in the years ahead.</p>.<p><em><strong>The writer is a visiting professor at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru</strong></em></p><p><em>(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.)<br></em><br></p>
<p>The Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M), along with other left parties, is contesting close to 250 of the 294 total seats in the West Bengal Assembly elections and has projected a young, educated, and highly motivated set of new leaders. Left with not even a single seat in the state Assembly after 2021, the CPI-M perhaps hopes to regain a foothold on the political ladder, rather than return to power. Observations have bordered on the cynical — <em>shunyo theke maha shunyo</em> (from zero to nothing). In politics, however, zero may also hold the power of renewal, although it is unclear whether the party has sufficiently introspected over its mammoth past mistakes -- lost opportunities, arrogant complacency, and an unceremonious exit after a long tenure (1977-2011). In the years since, a rudderless and vaguely defined ideological positioning was no match for a charismatic and opportunistic leadership that came to power.</p>.<p>Today, the average Bengali faces a sense of bankruptcy when it comes to political choice between the ruling party’s alleged corruption and the main opposition’s aggressive religious majoritarianism. The Trinamool Congress’ (TMC’s) welfare guarantees are seen, even by many beneficiaries, as propping up joblessness. The alleged disenfranchisement of lakhs of citizens through the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls has deepened a sense of powerlessness vis-a-vis the political system. This has created a political vacuum that the CPI(M) hopes to fill.</p>.West Bengal Assembly Elections 2026 | Ratna Debnath, mother of RG Kar victim is the BJP candidate from Panihati.<p>Young men and women – the CPI(M)’s sine qua non in this election – who appear committed to clean and secular politics have made a meaningful dent in the political discourse. Remarkably, although they belong to a middle-class generation often dismissive of ideology and enamoured of Western capitalism, they have joined a political party with a leftist ideology, with no promise of immediate power.</p>.<p>Globally, the left is in search of viable constituencies, as its classical backbone, the assembly-line industrial workforce, has diminished significantly. The left has understandably turned to other movements for support and coalitions. In the 21st century, the Latin American Pink Tide and the Second Pink Tide indicate that left parties have emerged as a political alternative on the electoral cycle in several Latin American countries, leaning on non-class social identities and political projects -- environment, gender, sexuality, indigenous peoples, and other minorities-- to put together an alternative social base. Similarly, the European Left has sought alliances with the green and LGBTQ movements.</p>.<p>For the CPI(M), such alliances have proved challenging. Currently, several young, highly articulate women leaders, contesting from key constituencies, have provided an unprecedented feminine face to the CPI(M). The immediate backdrop to the party’s involvement in gender issues is the 2024 rape and murder of a young doctor at Kolkata’s RG Kar Medical College. During the spontaneous public protests and junior doctors’ suspension of work that emerged over this crime, the CPI(M) activists provided leadership from the front. The victim’s mother now opting to contest the elections as a member of the Bharatiya Janata Party may appear to be a victory for the BJP in terms of co-opting the issue of women’s security. The larger question, of course, is, has the CPI(M) built a narrative around the themes of gendered socioeconomic exclusion and violence, including the LGBTQ movement, which would provide a broad mobilisational structure and energy transcending but at the same time incorporate any one particular case? Perhaps there is a long way to go yet.</p>.<p>On other social identity-based alliances, notwithstanding the CPI(M)’s historic connection to the Muslim peasantry through its leadership of farmers’ movements and tenancy reforms, there was a shift of Muslim voters to the TMC during 2006-2011, following incidents such as the Nandigram land acquisition movement. Muslim disenfranchisement through the SIR has brought a new twist to the minority question in West Bengal. The CPI(M)’s recent conversations with leading Islamic groups, the Indian Secular Front (ISF) and the Janata Unnayan Party (JUP) have stumbled, not only on seat-sharing disagreements but also perhaps on the deep discomfort articulated by sections of the left front over seeking political alliances with religiously defined groups. Electoral alliances are matters of shifting strategies. Muslims in West Bengal, however, have remained predominantly rural and poor, with little access to education, political representation and mobility. An effective theory of Muslim political representation would need to balance the question of social identity with the more universal, structural question of economic marginalisation.</p>.<p>In each of these domains, perhaps a historically class-based Marxist party falters in the process of producing theoretical narratives that could transcend class to incorporate social identity-based political constituencies. Perhaps the question also is, has the left in India squarely addressed the economic issues associated with the interests of a diverse working class across the rural and urban, farm and factory, and formal and informal sectors?</p>.<p>While many of West Bengal’s heritage large-scale industries and industrial belts occupy a wasteland of decline and closures, today the state’s industrial structure is dominated by micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). Although the share of workers in manufacturing is 18.8%, higher than the all-India average of 11.4%, 95% of MSMEs employ fewer than six workers, with low capital investment and labour productivity. Workers lack employment security or regulated wages. The female workforce participation rate remains lower at 33.8% against the all-India average of 37% (2022-2023); 66% of women are self-employed, pointing to the crisis of job availability.</p>.<p>While West Bengal’s unemployment rate has been steadily falling (2.2% in 2022-2023 to the national average of 3.2%), the most widely heard statement in villages and small towns is kaaj nei (there is no work). This is reflected in the state’s migration figures over the last two decades. West Bengal is the fourth largest sending-out state. Unskilled workers move to other states to work as informal labour in construction and in low-end services. The low unemployment figures might therefore indicate that the state now leans on other states to provide employment for its people.</p>.<p>It is in that context that the CPI(M) has put jobs at the centre of its election promises. Dipshita Dhar, a vocal member of the young CPI(M) cohort, has said, “Giving allowance to someone is fine, but it shouldn’t arise from unemployment.” (<em>The New Indian Express</em>, April 19). In the opinion of Samik Lahiri, a member of the party’s Central Committee, the party has made job creation a central plank of their campaign. He stated that the Left Front has developed an alternative job creation policy (<em>DH</em>, March 21).</p>.<p>The CPI(M)’s manifesto promises one permanent job in every family and a 100- and 200-day job guarantee for the urban and rural poor, respectively. The manifesto mentions heavy and medium industries, software and hardware parks and so on. But what will be the path towards job creation? How will the state address the contradictions of modern technology-driven industrialisation on the one hand and job creation on the other, particularly for unskilled and semi-skilled workers? While this contradiction has beset the national economic policy paradigm since the 1990s, for the CPI(M) too, the question of a new model of employment-centred industrialisation and development has remained a blind spot.</p>.<p>In India, around 41% of the workforce remains engaged in agriculture, despite its diminishing share in the GDP. Cities do not promise secure livelihoods. Integrating a predominantly rural and unskilled workforce into a globally competent, technology-driven economy is a formidable challenge.</p>.<p>It is perhaps here that expectations rest on the new, dynamic, young leadership of the CPI(M) – to engage with these broader issues in the years ahead.</p>.<p><em><strong>The writer is a visiting professor at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru</strong></em></p><p><em>(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.)<br></em><br></p>