Donald Trump in China, Beijing in control

China frames parity with the US during Trump–Xi talks, while India struggles to assert relevance in the shifting regional and global order

United States President Donald Trump landed in Beijing on May 13 for his first State visit in his second term. The three-day visit is taking place at a time that China views as one of “global turbulence and profound changes”. Yet Beijing is grappling not just with global instability but also with difficult domestic economic conditions, exacerbated by rising fuel prices linked to the US-Israel conflict on Iran. Meanwhile, China seeks to both arm and support Iran while opposing US arms sales to Taiwan.

Given such sharp contradictions in their global interests, it is easy to assume that the meeting will achieve little. Whatever Trump’s propensity for cutting deals, any agreements struck during this visit are unlikely to endure. However, his meeting with Communist Party of China General Secretary and Chinese President Xi Jinping offers an important insight into China’s great power diplomacy.

As always in the run-up to bilateral visits, Beijing seeks to downplay negatives and promote approaches that show a way forward. Chinese officials are framing this as an opportunity to stabilise bilateral ties, insisting it is vital for the US and China to “send a clear signal that [they] are capable of managing differences, expanding cooperation and maintaining global stability”. Stable ties are seen as being of “paramount importance not only to the two countries, but to the world at large”.

On the surface, these statements appear routine, but that ordinariness is deliberate. It reinforces the image of China as a peer of the US, when it is not yet one. International reporting increasingly assumes that China has arrived or that its rise is inevitable; but building capabilities is not the same as attaining superpower status. China’s discourse aims to bridge this gap in material capabilities through narrative-building. In bilateral discussions, Beijing shapes language to project parity. Consider Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s October remark to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio: “long-term interactions and mutual respect [between Trump and Xi] have become the most valuable strategic asset in China-US relations.”

With the US, however, over time and particularly since Xi’s ascent to power, this narrative has also turned sharper, with the Chinese also incorporating threats and conveying a willingness to confront and contend directly with the US. For instance, China says that it “understands clearly that competition between major countries is inevitable. But competition does not necessarily lead to confrontation, much less conflict. Managing differences through dialogue is not a sign of weakness; it is the rational choice expected of responsible major countries.”

Two dynamics are at play here. Beyond projecting a readiness for competition, China also seeks to portray itself as a ‘rational’ actor while casting the US as both irrational and unable or unwilling to manage differences through dialogue. There is no consideration given to the possibility that the US (or any other country) might have good reasons to suspect Chinese intentions, view China as a threat, or resist engagement.

When the Chinese foreign minister emphasises the need to reduce misunderstandings and manage differences despite the countries’ distinct political systems and development models, he is making both an ideological and political statement. He asserts China’s right to its own political system, implicitly challenging the US propensity to promote democracy movements in other countries, while also conveying that the US political system is inherently confrontational. The onus, then, for reducing misunderstandings falls on Washington.

The Trump-Xi talks are expected to cover trade, geopolitics, and the broader international order. Xi can be expected to emphasise that China’s economic momentum is strong even though it is under pressure from the Iran conflict and rising fuel prices. Yet he will refer to the conflict only in the context of its impact on global economic development and international peace and stability. He will stress the US’ responsibility to find a diplomatic solution while remaining immovable on China’s support for Iran and for Russia in its conflict with Ukraine.

China is already attempting to pre-empt US pressure on economic issues by saying that “[e]conomic ties between the two countries remain deeply intertwined” and that “China-US cooperation serves the interests of both peoples and the needs of the international community.” But the simple fact remains that while Trump has walked back from nearly all his threats and tariffs against China, since the two leaders met in Busan, South Korea, in October, the latter has only upped its economic pressure against Washington. None of the deals that Trump and Xi struck in the past has fructified, and both countries are likely to renege on any deals that they strike on this trip too — including on Taiwan.

The diplomatic dance, however, will continue because both countries have their own internal and external pressures to deal with. China will, however, fancy its chances of winning something more if nothing else, because Trump’s problems and frustrations are much more out in the open and will allow it the leverage to offer seemingly sweet deals that the US president can use to declare a successful visit, but which Beijing can forget about later.

For India, the problem is that whatever the results of the Trump-Xi summit, the optics will further push it to the margins of regional and global politics. Between Pakistan, which has recovered global standing after Operation Sindoor due to its diplomatic legwork in the Iran conflict and China, which is essentially running rings around the US, New Delhi appears only a side player. India’s bets on the Trump administration appear increasingly untenable even as it has been forced to open its economy once again to China.

Jabin T Jacob is Director, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi NCR. He is currently Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellow, at the National Chung Hsing University, Taichung, Taiwan.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH)