History keeps repeating in Pakistan

As if things weren’t already disastrous enough, Pakistan has lurched toward a hung National Assembly (parliament), drawing the country into a deeper abyss of economic and political instability. The Pakistan Army, the real power behind the façade of a fragile democracy, is busy manipulating the situation by goading Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Bhutto-Zardari family’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) to form a coalition. Sheer survival instinct and the greed for power and pelf will make these parties dance to the Army’s tune. But the Pakistan Army’s problems are far from over.

Not without reason is it said of the Pakistan Army that it may lose wars, but it never likes to lose elections. Remember 1971, when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League registered a victory challenging the might of Pakistan Army and Field Marshal Ayub Khan? The Awami League had won 167 seats out of 300 and was eligible to form the government in Islamabad. But PPP leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto refused to support Mujibur Rahman as Prime Minister of Pakistan. The rest is history.

More than half a century later, the Pakistan Army is once again facing a fierce challenge from Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which fielded independents as the party was barred from contesting and its symbol, a cricket bat, was frozen. These ‘independents’ are now the largest block in the National Assembly but cannot form government unless they form a party, which is very unlikely. PML-N leader Khwaja Saad Rafique had reportedly mooted the idea of forming a national government of all parties, including the PTI-backed independents. Nawaz Sharif is believed to have rejected this suggestion.

Needless to say, Sharif has to go by the plans of the Army, which wants to destroy Imran Khan and his political clout. Undaunted by this setback, Khan is understood to have refused to join the political coalition and has instructed his party leaders to announce a country-wide protest. The protest will, in all likelihood, turn anti-Army, and violent.

The Army will have to prepare itself for this popular backlash, which could be fierce not only in Islamabad but also in other PTI strongholds and Sindh and Balochistan provinces. Indeed, except in Punjab, which may see Sharif’s daughter Maryam Nawaz as its first woman Chief Minister, the Army is likely to be confronted all over Pakistan.

The Pakistan Army is walking a tight rope amidst several compulsions. Ideally, the Army would like to step into political boots and feather its nest through the State exchequer. After the Musharraf experiment and strict scrutiny of democratic institutions by the aid-giving West, the Army prefers to use the fig-leaf of a political personality and party to do its bidding, fully aware of the duplicity and redundancy of these so-called democratic leaders.

The Army had projected Nawaz Sharif as the saviour in 2014 and managed his victory. On his part, Sharif had promised to be friendly with India, and the civil society believed him. When he began to take his promise seriously, the Army developed cold feet and decided to replace him. Pakistan Army cannot have a political dispensation in Islamabad that will have peaceful relations with Delhi. That would remove its raison de etre, after all.

In 2018, Khan was the favoured proxy, and he marched to power, until his wings had to be clipped, too. Now, Sharif is back in favour.

The Army needs Nawaz Sharif to reach out to the West and the IMF, whose $3 billion bailout package has to be renewed in March. This will call for a new domestic tax regime which will fuel inflation and shortage of goods and essential services, possibly leading to further mass unrest. Imran Khan is likely to step up protests and his party members will add fuel to the unrest, which could spill onto the streets of Islamabad. The “non-State actors” will expect their pound of flesh, failing which they may join the mercenary armies fighting a war in West Asia. Both Iran and Afghanistan are unhappy with Pakistan. Rawalpindi could barely respond to the recent Iranian attack on a militant group inside Pakistan.

If the Army’s hold over politics weakens in Pakistan, unrest in Sindh and Balochistan could take a new turn. There has to be a negotiated settlement to their issues and a fair amount of autonomy will have to be granted to these provinces. But the military is unlikely to allow this. These fault lines could result in another 1971-like situation. Delhi has both challenges and opportunities amidst the uncertainties in Pakistan.