Hormuz veto | Is India ready for a new Gulf order?

Iranian strategy centred on control of the Strait of Hormuz could reshape the balance of power in the Gulf — and force countries like India to rethink long-held strategic assumptions

The third Gulf War has not unfolded according to the expectations of the United States and Israel. Even casual observers can sense that the conflict has produced outcomes far more complex than the strategic planners who anticipated it may have imagined.

One reason lies in a development that the US military strategist Andrew F Krepinevich once described as the diffusion of "mature precision strike capabilities" — the growing ability of States with far fewer resources than great powers to deliver accurate long-range strikes using relatively inexpensive technologies.

Over the past decade, Iran has invested steadily in this capability, combining ballistic missiles, armed drones, and an evolving surveillance network. In the current conflict, these systems have allowed Tehran to strike multiple US installations in the region, and reportedly disrupt sophisticated radar systems associated with missile defence — feats that few adversaries of the US have managed in recent decades.

Despite these developments, the dominant view within the strategic community remains that Iran cannot ultimately prevail against the combined military power of the US and Israel. The logic appears straightforward: the gap in technological sophistication, logistical capacity, and overall military strength is too vast to overcome. Yet this assumption may overlook a very different kind of strategic instrument that Iran is now demonstrating — one that is less about battlefield victories and more about economic leverage: the ‘Hormuz missile’.

This ‘missile’ is not a piece of hardware but a strategy rooted in geography. Iran sits astride the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, through which a substantial proportion of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments pass each day. By combining naval mines, drone surveillance, and its precision strike capabilities against shipping or energy infrastructure, Iran has signalled that it can threaten — and potentially influence — the movement of tankers through this narrow waterway.

In a world where energy markets remain acutely sensitive to disruptions in supply, even the credible possibility of interference in Hormuz has consequences far beyond the Gulf itself.

For decades, many analysts dismissed the idea that Iran would seriously attempt to close or control the strait. The reasoning was simple and persuasive: such a move would also choke Iran’s oil exports and, therefore, damage its economy. Yet recent developments suggest that Iranian strategists may believe they have found a way around that dilemma.

Rather than a blanket closure, the strategy appears to rely on selective disruption — the ability to threaten or delay certain shipments while allowing others to pass. In effect, the strait becomes not merely a route for energy flows but a lever of political influence. If Iran can demonstrate that it can intermittently control tanker movement, even without permanently blocking the waterway, it gains something close to a de facto veto over global energy traffic.

Such leverage could fundamentally alter the strategic balance in the Gulf. Even if the US and Israeli forces achieve significant battlefield successes against Iranian assets, Tehran may still emerge with a powerful form of indirect influence if it can sustain its capacity to shape tanker flows through Hormuz.

History offers an instructive parallel. In Afghanistan, the US and its allies spent two decades winning most battles on the ground while investing enormous resources in stabilising the country. Yet the conflict ultimately ended with the Taliban returning to power, demonstrating how tactical victories can coexist with strategic disappointment. The Gulf conflict could produce a similar paradox — though potentially on a much shorter timeline — if Iran succeeds in converting geography and energy dependence into a durable form of leverage.

The implications of such a scenario extend far beyond the immediate participants in the conflict. Countries that rely heavily on Gulf energy imports may find themselves navigating a far more complex geopolitical landscape. India offers an instructive example. In regional strategic circles, New Delhi’s diplomatic posture during the conflict has often been interpreted as broadly aligned with the US and Israel, reflected in the timing of diplomatic engagements, the tenor of official responses to key events, and the broader strategic convergence that has developed in recent years. Yet India’s economic reality is defined by a profound dependence on energy imports from the Gulf, particularly crude oil and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) that underpin everyday economic activity.

When Iranian strikes on energy infrastructure in the region disrupted production and tanker movements slowed through the Strait of Hormuz, the consequences quickly became visible. LPG shipments bound for India reportedly faced delays, raising concerns about supply disruptions that could ripple through households, restaurants, and small businesses across the country. In such moments, geopolitical alignment yields to logistical necessity.

Governments are compelled to rely on quiet diplomacy, back-channel negotiations, and pragmatic bargaining simply to ensure that critical shipments reach their destinations. Reports suggest that Iran allowed some shipments to proceed while simultaneously seeking concessions — including the release of Iranian vessels seized near Indian waters and the provision of medical supplies and equipment. Should such arrangements become routine across multiple importing countries, the strategic implications would be unmistakable: Iran would have successfully translated its geographic position into geopolitical bargaining power.

In that case, the ultimate outcome of the conflict may diverge sharply from the predictions of conventional military analysis. The Iranian State apparatus could emerge from the war intact, perhaps even more consolidated than before. Leadership transitions may occur, but its institutional structure would remain in place. More importantly, Tehran would possess a new strategic instrument — the ability to influence energy flows through one of the world’s most vital chokepoints. Such a development would represent a profound strategic setback for the US and Israel, not because of battlefield defeat but because of the emergence of a durable form of leverage that reshapes the post-war order.

Whether Iran can sustain such influence over the long term remains uncertain. The US and its allies retain overwhelming naval power and will undoubtedly deploy extensive resources to ensure that shipping lanes remain open. Yet the fact that Iran has already demonstrated the capacity to disrupt expectations surrounding the security of Hormuz suggests that the strategic equation in the Gulf may be entering a new phase.

For countries like India, the lesson is less about the immediate outcome of the conflict than about the fragility of assumptions that have governed the global system for decades. Much of the world’s energy trade has long rested on the belief that the US naval power would guarantee the uninterrupted flow of oil and gas through critical sea lanes.

If that assumption begins to weaken, even temporarily, the implications for energy-dependent economies could be profound. The question confronting India is, therefore, not merely who wins or loses the current conflict. It is whether the emerging regional order might be one in which the 'Hormuz veto’ becomes a recurring feature of global geopolitics — and whether India is prepared for the strategic adjustments such a reality would demand.

Srinath Sridharan is a corporate adviser and independent director on corporate boards. X: @ssmumbai. Anand Venkatanarayanan is a strategic security and digital policy researcher. X: @iam_anandv.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.)