In Iran, China's strategic advantage meets strategic vulnerability

India’s positions in West Asia appear to privilege legacy US power and to ignore the increasing diplomatic and material influence being exercised by China

The US-Israel attacks against Iran and the perceived likelihood of this now turning into a prolonged conflict both confer advantages to China as well as raise concerns for it.

The advantages are obvious.

One, China can paint the US in poor light and show itself as the comparatively wiser, more benign power. The Communist Party of China (CPC)’s official daily, the People’s Daily, in an editorial declared US “negotiations are not genuine efforts to bridge differences [but] ultimatums for war wrapped in diplomatic language.” It expressed “willingness to keep playing a constructive role in promoting de-escalation” and warned against “unilateral bullying and threats of force in international relations.” Having highlighted the violation of international law and of the “fundamental norms of international relations” by the US, China must believe that its new projects, like the Global Governance Initiative, will gain some traction, and greater credibility.

Two, given that China is a major energy importer and trade partner to both the Iranians and Arabs, and given also its role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China will likely have a say in how the situation develops going forward, while also having the ability to stay out of or above the fray if it chooses to. Also, the longer the conflict drags on and the more distracted the US is, the better it is for China in terms of being able to deal with or counter the US and its allies in its neighbourhood.

While simplistic, there is an element of truth to the notion that China appears to save its energies and yet exercise influence, while the US weakens itself by imperial over-reach and involvement in conflicts around the world.

Complications

However, the complications that arise from the US-Israel actions are likely to singe China, too.

First, there is the impact on global energy prices. However, China is probably better placed than most to handle them, given its strategic reserves and the fact that its oil imports from Venezuela and Iran formed very small proportions of its overall imports.

Second, US diplomacy is now beginning to look a lot like Chinese diplomacy in its duplicitous intent — the US and Israel had already decided to strike Iran even as negotiations were underway between American and Iranian negotiators in Geneva for a potential new deal over the Iranian nuclear weapons programme.

US President Donald Trump is expected to visit China at the end of April in his first visit there in his second term — he is likely to come with a long list of expectations as is his wont, but it is not certain how much of his own promises he will deliver on. Until now, it was the Chinese that took advantage of the good faith of those it negotiated with, but with Trump the odds are more even.

Third, there is the impact on China-Iran relations themselves. In 2021, China signed a 25-year strategic co-operation agreement with Iran with deals amounting to $400 billion. While this allowed China to buy oil at discounted rates, the flow of investment into Iran has been limited by Western sanctions. By contrast, Xi Jinping’s visit to Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia, the following year, for the China-Gulf and China-Arab summits in Riyadh resulted in over 30 agreements in energy, tech, and infrastructure worth about $30 billion, which has also driven an expansion of Sino-Saudi bilateral trade. China’s trade with Saudi Arabia, at about $110 billion in 2024, outstrips the reported trade with Iran of just over $13 billion.

This economic reality also explains why China has taken a fine line in its statements since the outbreak of the conflict. While China declared, “The US-Israeli strikes have no UN Security Council authorization and violate international law”, it also stated immediately, “the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the Gulf states should likewise be fully respected.” A readout of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s call with his Iranian counterpart also put forward China’s expectation that “Iran will… take seriously the legitimate concerns of neighboring countries, and ensure the safety of Chinese citizens and institutions in Iran”, and there has been criticism of Iran’s plans to block the Strait of Hormuz. These constitute forms of Beijing’s pressure on Tehran. It should be evident that despite its rhetoric, and despite its involvement in mediating the normalisation of Iran-Saudi Arabia diplomatic ties in 2023, China is not exactly siding with the Iranians. Further, a Trump visit to Beijing while the conflict is still raging, or Iran still picking up the pieces afterwards, makes the optics a lot worse for China.

Third, however, in terms of concrete security issues, China’s long-running support for Iran’s military development, particularly its ballistic missiles programme, is now well-known. Hundreds of these missiles have been launched at the Gulf nations in the past week, highlighting how China’s desire to support the Iranian regime against the US has had consequences for its other relationships in the region. This said, Chinese security interests dictate support for the US’ adversaries, and so military support for Iran will resume or pick up in due course.

Conclusion

China’s clear-eyed view of the US as an adversary has set the terms of its engagement in West Asia, and allowed it to maximise its benefits from the region’s many conflicts. Its rhetorical support for the Palestinians in Gaza has won it the Arab vote, and by supporting Iran when it could, it also created the conditions to constrain the US and its allies in the region.

India’s positions in West Asia, meanwhile, appear to privilege legacy US power and to ignore the increasing diplomatic and material influence being exercised by China. New Delhi appears to have chosen sides in the conflict, and whether it has done so because of domestic political considerations or because it lacks the capacity to think and act for the longer term, it has limited itself to a side role in its own neighbourhood.

Jabin T Jacob is Associate Professor, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, and Director, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi NCR.

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.