How Congress-JD(S) defeated itself

More coalitions are formed post-elections than pre-election and that has been the case throughout the world. It’s neither an apology nor a justification.

The Congress–JD(S) coalition government in Karnataka was a result of ideological compulsion, especially for the Congress as a national party one of whose foundational principles is secularism. To those involved in the freedom struggle, that seemed to be the only viable principle to sustain a new republic of India.

The Supreme Court subsequently declared secularism as a ‘basic feature’ of our Constitution and that it couldn’t be tampered with. Unable to get the required majority in the 2018 state elections, Congress decided it was inevitable to go in for a coalition with the JD(S). It even offered the chief minister’s post to JD(S).

Congress also wanted to ensure social justice with political stability in Karnataka by combining the Siddaramaiah government’s pro-people welfare measures with similar progressive promises made by JD(S). To move forward from thereon required a joint articulation of governance and an ideological campaign against Hindutva and the BJP’s scheme to polarise Hindus and Muslims.

Secondly, it was most essential for Congress to take the issue of compulsions of the coalition to the rank and file of the party and not take the workers for granted. It required channels of personal communication by KPCC leaders to the block and booth-level party workers. It is the leaders who should create a stake for the workers, perhaps even to the second and third-level leadership.

Grassroots workers should not be asked to simply obey the decisions made at the top level. But that is what happened. A ‘top down’ approach tends to be bureaucratic and not democratic and motivational.

There is a bottom line marking out certain minimum features of a coalition that is workable and also that is accountable to the electorate. Congress and JD(S) failed to work out a politically acceptable say in what, how and where decisions are made and with what consequences. That would necessarily involve a ‘give and take’ mindset. However, from day one there was a regrettable deficit of restraint on the part of senior leaders of the coalition in their public postures.

A coalition, by its very nature, demands issues and subjects that ought to be considered in detail before any decision. For example, a prior list, at least in terms of generic categories, would have avoided the unseemly media-reported controversies regarding appointment of university syndicate members, or the designation of ‘district ministers’ and so on.

Two committees

All of the above, in my view, needed a structure of two committees; one to consider the principles and factors behind issues calling for decision, and the other to direct consequential action points. The first one would enable continuing consultations between the chief minister, the deputy chief minister and senior party leaders who might not be part of the government.

The other body could well be the ‘co-ordination committee’, excluding the chief minister and the deputy CM. In such an institutional set-up, the first body would also double up as the appellate authority for final resolution of disputes, if any. It would closely monitor the action/implementation points.

We might recall that the United Front government at the Centre led by HD Deve Gowda in 1996 lacked both the platforms mentioned above, thus depriving the prime minister of valuable advice and, as important, a certain commitment from the coalition partners to various proposals.

The VP Singh coalition before that also suffered from a lack of clarity on what and how issues could be discussed and decided. The coalition could also do with a spokesman or two who would speak with one voice in sharing information with the media and public.

Finally, the centrality of a peaceful campaign against the BJP should have been obvious since that was the fundamental justification for the coalition. Let’s recall that in 2014, while the BJP won 282 out of 543 parliamentary seats, no less than 57 seats were the result of the efforts of BJP’s coalition partners in Maharashtra, Bihar and Haryana.

Congress, the coalition partner in Karnataka, should have beneficially leveraged the coalition and the recently established booth committees for a formidable campaign in the Lok Sabha elections. The party failed to assess Narendra Modi’s changing content and styles of campaign. That took a back seat.

In Karnataka, “Who should be the next CM?” took centre stage with quite a few, including sitting ministers, chipping in with their own claims or naming one of the Congress leaders for the post. Such unwarranted self-promotion was on display even within the first weeks of formation of the coalition in June 2018.

Some of our leaders were not mature enough to realise that they were defying the high command’s decision to keep BJP out of power or that they were making it very awkward for Chief Minister HD Kumaraswamy to function.

(The writer is former chairman, Karnataka Legislative Council)