In Rouhani's victory, Iran votes for reform

The landslide victory of Iran's reformist President Hassan Rouhani in the May 19 election revealed that voters are more eager for change than for reversion to the dictates of conservative clerics.

Since he won 57% of the vote in the first round, Rouhani avoided a run-off against his reactionary rival Ebrahim Raisi, an associate of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the candidate of Iran’s powerful Revolutionary Guards. Voters also elected reformers to all 21 seats on Tehran’s city council in countrywide municipal elections held at the same time as the presidential poll, boosting Rouhani’s prospects.

Iranian elections are carefully choreographed by the dominant clerical establishment which sees a large turnout as a validation of the regime established in 1979. This time, the clerics celebrated the 70% turnout but remained silent on the re-election of Rouhani as they oppose his moderately progressive policies. Hardliners promised a backlash.

The mandate showed that the majority of Iranians do not want to return to the conservative platform of social and political repression, isolation, economic protectionism and hand-outs to the poor. Instead, Iranians demand jobs, fair allocation of goods and services, a crackdown on rampant corruption, and international outreach.

During his first term, Rouhani enjoyed the support of Khame­nei, the ultimate authority, during negotiations for the deal to curb Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for lifting sanctions which had crippled the economy, deprived the population of essentials, and degraded the country’s oil and industrial infrastructure. Once the deal was concluded, Khamenei and the conservatives resisted Iran’s return to the international community and foreign Investment.

Fixing the economy requires foreign participation, major administrative reforms and ending economic sanctions. Therefore, despite his strong popular mandate, Rouhani will have to overcome conservative opposition with the aim of securing growth which benefits the struggling middle class as well as labourers and farmers mired in poverty. He was unable to deliver benefits following the conclusion of the nuclear deal because it only came into effect in January 2016. Realising this, a majority of Iranian voters have given Rouhani time to deliver.

For this, Rouhani has to launch simultaneous political offensives on the domestic and external fronts. On the internal front, he has to challenge the clerics and their allies who rely on the status quo to provide them with power and pelf. He has to fight corruption, and replace ineffective and inefficient managers in key sectors.

Rouhani’s success could depend on who is chosen to succeed Khamenei, a frail and ailing 78. While Raisi’s definitive defeat is likely to put him out of the running, it is certain the conservatives will put forward other candidates. Rouhani’s re-election could give him a chance of attaining this post which, by giving him the deciding voice on all issues, would enable him to secure his reform agenda.


Mustering support
To secure the succession he would have to muster his supporters and marshal his political assets to overcome opposition from the clerical establishment, the Republican Guards, powerful charitable institutions, and those who have enriched themselves at the expense of the populace and the state.

On the external front, he has to defend the nuclear deal and fight for an end to all sanctions. To preserve both the nuclear deal and Iran's international outreach, Rouhani will have to persuade Washington that Tehran is abiding by the terms of the deal. He will also have to press for an end to US restrictions on banks and financial transactions which are impeding European and Asian investment and business.

This could be a difficult task because the Donald Trump administration has joined the Sunni Saudis in blaming Shia Iran for the ills of West Asia although Saudi Arabia’s puritan ideology is largely responsible for this. Saudi Arabia regards Iran as a competitor for influence in the region and the Muslim world. Rouhani also seeks to prevent the US from imposing fresh sanctions in response to its ballistic missile programme and human rights violations.

He has, however, strategic leverage he can use to reduce and check sanctions. The US depends on Iranian-founded Iraqi Shia militia groups in the fight against Islamic State in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, in Syria. Without the coalition of Shia militias, the Iraqi army cannot drive IS from Mosul in northern Iraq.

Once this is accomplished, the cult must be crushed in Hawija to the west of Mosul and in Deir al-Zor in eastern Syria. The US cannot rely on Syrian Kurdish units with only 50,000 fighters to crush IS in both Syria’s Raqqa and Deir al-Zor.
When the war against IS ends, Iraq’s Shia militias will play a major role in Iraqi politics just as the Revolutionary Guards do in Iran. Therefore, Washington will, eventually, have to come to terms with Tehran despite the Trump administration’s love fest with Saudi Arabia on display during the presidential visit to Riyadh.

A forced US reconciliation with Iran would amount to blowback from the 2003 US installation of a pro-Iranian Shia fundamentalist regime in Baghdad following former Republican President George W Bush’s occupation of Iraq.