India’s challenges in Maldives

Maldives President Ibrahim Solih visited India earlier this week, with a high-level official and business delegation and met India’s top political leadership as well as business leaders in Delhi and Mumbai. Six agreements were signed on fishing zone forecast capacity-building, cybersecurity, women’s development, disaster management, police infrastructure, and social housing.

Both countries “agreed to further deepen institutional linkages for cooperation in the areas of defence and security, investment promotion, human resource development, infrastructure development, including climate and energy.”

As Jaishankar observed, “India and Maldives share a deep and abiding friendship…It is also a partnership of great consequence and a real force of stability and prosperity for the Indian Ocean Region.”India is considered a “net security provider” by the Maldives. India-Maldives relations have been described as “close, cordial and multi‐dimensional”. Maldives occupies “a very special place in the ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy and ‘SAGAR’ (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision of the Government of India.”

Notably, India’s relationship with the Maldives is free of contentious issues. Proximity with India is a big advantage for the Maldives as evident in how Indian help quickly reached the atoll-State during the 1988 coup attempt, the 2004 tsunami, the 2014 water crisis, and 2020-21 pandemic.

India’s ‘comprehensive strategy of development cooperation’ with the Maldives compliments the ‘national framework for development’ of the latter. The quantum of development partnership is around $3 billion, covering every facet of development in Maldives -- budgetary support, infrastructure development, education, capacity-building, health and sanitation. India is also one of Maldives’ largest trading partners. Indians constitute the second-largest expatriate community there.

However, there are at least two issues that impinge on India-Maldives relations: Islamic radicalisation, and the increasing role of China in the atoll-State. Over the past decade, the number of Maldivians drawn to the ISIS and Pakistan-based madrasas and jihadist groups has risen. Protests by Islamists bearing ISIS flags are frequent on the island. Evidently, political instability and socio-
economic uncertainty are the main drivers that have fuelled Islamic radicalism in Maldives. It is the same fores that are involved in anti-India activities in
the archipelago.

Pakistan-based jihadist groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) have exploited these fault lines through their charitable fronts to establish a foothold, especially in southern Maldives, in the garb of relief operations post-2004 tsunami. Developments in West Asia and the Af-Pak region have also influenced Maldivians toward radicalisation. The youth, who return from religious studies in Pakistani madaris controlled by various jihadist groups, and from Saudi Arabian madaris, return not only with radical ideas, but also with jihadi connections. The madrasa-educated youth are indoctrinated to wage jihad in trouble spots like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Chechnya. These battle-hardened Maldivians help to recruit Maldivian youth for Islamic militant groups in these areas. New Delhi needs to take note of anti-Indian radical groups operating in the archipelago.

Secondly, China’s strategic footprint has lately increased in India’s neighbourhood. Maldives has emerged as an important “pearl” in China’s “String of Pearls” construct. Given Maldives’ strategic location in the Indian Ocean, Beijing has been vying for a naval base in the atoll to secure the flow of energy supplies from Africa and West Asia through the Indian Ocean.

During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit in 2014, Maldives agreed to become a partner in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Accordingly, China has provided grants and soft loans to Maldives to build a bridge from its capital Malé to the airport, named the ‘China-Maldives Friendship Bridge’. Also, Chinese companies were involved in airport development and awarded contracts for resort development. This includes the strategically important Feydhoo Finolhu island near the capital.

During former President Abdullah Yameen’s reign, the Maldivian Constitution was amended to permit foreigners to own land, including investments over a billion dollars for projects on reclaimed land. China was intended to be the beneficiary. Chinese nationals now account for the largest tourist arrivals on these islands. In the process, Beijing’s largesse to Maldives neutralised India’s economic diplomacy, and Maldives did not hesitate to play the ‘China card’ against India. India’s concerns stem from the increasing Chinese strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region. Though the present MDP government is favourably disposed toward India, it may not be in a position to completely avoid Chinese presence and role in Maldives.

India has to respond to the new realities. The major challenge for India’s diplomacy is how to balance its cordial relations with its neighbours, but without compromising its core national interests.

(The writer is Director,
Centre for East Asian Studies, Dept of International Studies, Christ University, Bengaluru)