India’s UNGA vote is a pragmatic embrace of the Taliban reality

India’s shift is neither an endorsement of Taliban rule nor a retreat from its democratic values. Rather, it’s a calculated response to geopolitical realities.

On July 7, India abstained from voting on a draft resolution at the UN General Assembly regarding Afghanistan. ‘The Situation in Afghanistan’ resolution, introduced by Germany, called for ‘greater international support for the Afghan people’ and put the spotlight on the “grave, worsening, widespread and systematic oppression” of all women and girls in Afghanistan.

India’s rationale was that ‘an approach focused only on punitive action’ was unlikely to succeed, and a ‘business as usual’ approach was unlikely to deliver desired results either.

At first, India’s abstention might appear puzzling — after all, New Delhi has been vocal about its opposition to the Taliban’s violent and medieval ways. Also, almost three years ago, on November 10, 2022, India voted in favour of a similar UNGA resolution. What has changed since then? To understand this, it is important to recap the background that prompted New Delhi to recalibrate its view of the dispensation in Kabul.

India-Afghanistan ties

India shares strong ties with Afghanistan, and various governments in New Delhi and Kabul have nurtured close diplomatic and people-to-people relations. Between 1996 and 2001, when the Taliban captured power in Kabul, India chose to back the Northern Alliance. In 2001, the United States overthrew the Taliban, and India doubled down on its aid and outreach. In the two decades till 2021, India contributed about $3 billion through various aid projects in Afghanistan. However, following the humiliating withdrawal of the US on August 15, 2021, and the Taliban takeover, India’s development efforts came to a screeching halt. 

A year later, in 2022, India restarted its mission operations in Kabul and still maintains a technical team to oversee its developmental outreach in Afghanistan. Since then, several meetings have been held, and though India is yet to officially recognise the Taliban government, quasi-diplomatic ties have been restored — there have been meetings at the foreign office level, ministers have held discussions, and the Afghanistan embassy in New Delhi could soon have a Taliban-appointed head.

An enemy’s enemy is a friend

The growing New Delhi-Kabul ties are a testament to India realising that the strategic distancing from a Taliban-led government is a tactical mistake in a geopolitically sensitive region. In reaching out to the Taliban, India is not an outlier — on the contrary, it is late to the party. Between August 2021 and February 2024, the Taliban regime held close to 1,500 diplomatic meetings with about 80 countries. With 215 meetings, China topped the list, closely followed by Turkey (194). Pakistan held 118 meetings.

China was among the first to reach out to the Taliban (even before August 2021) and has built deep economic ties. The Taliban, which was patronised by Pakistan, has not had the best of ties with Islamabad after assuming power in Kabul. This widening chasm between Islamabad and Kabul provides New Delhi an opportunity to fill the void created by Pakistan’s diminished influence there.

Even if India might not be able to match China in tapping Afghanistan’s natural resources, New Delhi will be hoping to maintain (and improve) its goodwill with the people of Afghanistan through its humanitarian efforts. By maintaining good ties, India will also expect the Taliban regime to keep a check on Pakistan-sponsored anti-India forces, like the JeM and the LeT, operating from its soil. Thus, improving ties with Taliban-ruled Kabul could limit Islamabad’s sphere of influence.

New Delhi’s ties with the regime in Kabul, coupled with growing engagement with Tehran, poses a strategic challenge to Islamabad’s influence in the region. India’s investment in the Chabahar port offers Afghanistan an alternative to Pakistan’s ports.

Catch-22

That said, for New Delhi, building ties with the Taliban comes with its own challenges and contradictions. While India has built strong people-to-people connect, in the Taliban’s worldview, it hardly matters. India has a democracy-based governance system with human rights and secular values enshrined in its guiding principles; the Taliban is a hardline, ultra-conservative movement which follows a Deobandi interpretation of Sunni Islam — the two are as different as chalk and cheese.

Yet realpolitik guides the two regimes. For the Taliban, ties with India could be an extension of its quest for international legitimacy. For New Delhi, building ties with the Taliban could further improve its people-to-people ties. These improved ties could also lead to better lives for Afghanistan’s religious minorities, especially the Hindus and Sikhs. But, herein lies the catch — the more importance and recognition the Taliban regime gains, the more it is likely to pursue its anti-women, anti-minority agenda.

India could have continued with its anti-Taliban stance and focused on people-centric developmental projects if the US had a better plan and more patience to see democracy take deeper roots in Afghanistan. Post-2021, none of the global powers were ready to fill the vacuum the US left behind in Afghanistan. Russia, China, and Iran have been quick to swoop in to build ties with the Taliban regime.

It would have been a foreign policy felo-de-se for India not to adjust its sails to this changing wind. This shift in policy, though subtle and nuanced, has earned the displeasure of those who reposed faith in the ‘friendship with India’.

India’s evolving ties with the Taliban and its ‘enduring commitment to meeting [the] humanitarian and developmental needs’ of the people of Afghanistan are a delicate balancing act. It is better to protect and further one's interests rather than grandstand. 

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.