<p>In October 1954, barely a week after the Viet Minh marched into a liberated Hanoi, Jawaharlal Nehru became the first foreign head of government to visit the city. He arrived not with arms or aid packages, but with a gesture of solidarity; a wager that a newly independent Asian nation deserved recognition on its own terms.</p>.<p>Seventy-two years on, India and Vietnam have travelled an extraordinary distance from that founding gesture. Vietnamese President Tô Lâm landed in New Delhi on May 5, becoming the first leader on Indian soil to hold both the titles of General Secretary of the Communist Party and State President. He came not with goodwill alone, but with a defence delegation, a business entourage, and a shared reading of the Indo-Pacific that was unimaginable in Nehru’s time.</p>.<p>More recently, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh visited India in 2024, laying the groundwork for the deeper defence and technology ties we see today. This time around, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Tô Lâm upgraded the bilateral relationship to an ‘Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.’ With this upgrade, Vietnam is signalling to the world, and specifically to China, that it views India as a primary balancer in the region, alongside the United States and Japan.</p>.<p>The two nations have agreed to institute a “2+2 Dialogue” involving their respective foreign and defence ministries. This format is reserved for India’s most trusted partners. Their navies conducted an inaugural joint hydrographic survey off Vietnam’s coast in May 2025. A mutual logistics support agreement is already in place, enabling each country’s forces to use the other’s bases for repairs and replenishment.</p>.<p>A potential BrahMos missile deal, valued at approximately $600 million, would make Vietnam the second Southeast Asian country, after the Philippines, to operate India’s flagship supersonic cruise missile, a development Beijing has watched with undisguised discomfort. Both leaders issued a strong joint statement on the South China Sea, advocating for freedom of navigation. Vietnam has officially joined India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). This aligns Hanoi with New Delhi’s vision for maritime security, which focuses on a rules-based order and opposing unilateral territorial claims.</p>.<p>For Vietnam, India offers something the US or Japan cannot quite provide: a large Asian power with no colonial baggage and a shared interest in a multipolar regional order, independent of the binary US-China framework. For India, a strong Vietnam with a credible maritime deterrence capability constrains Chinese freedom of action in the South China Sea and, by extension, in the broader Indo-Pacific waterways through which India’s trade flows.</p>.<p>Both countries have set an ambitious bilateral trade target of $25 billion and signed agreements on digital payments, signalling possible UPI integration in Vietnam. They have also deepened cooperation in critical minerals and rare earths through a new MoU. As the global energy transition accelerates, access to rare earths and critical minerals will increasingly shape geopolitical power. Vietnam holds significant deposits, and India has ambitions for their processing. A partnership could give both countries leverage in a domain currently dominated by a handful of states.</p>.<p><strong>Rising middle powers</strong></p>.<p>Furthermore, culture continues to be an important thread in the relationship. President Tô Lâm’s visit to Bodh Gaya before arriving in New Delhi was a reminder that Buddhism remains a powerful connector across Asia. India is helping Vietnam digitise and preserve ancient Cham Manuscripts. Unlike coercive or transactional forms of diplomacy, civilisational engagement creates long-term political goodwill. In the broader Asian region, where historical memory shapes perceptions of foreign policy, India must use its soft power constructively.</p>.<p>While many Southeast Asian states welcome India as a balancing power, they also recognise that India cannot presently match China’s scale of trade, infrastructure financing, or manufacturing integration. New Delhi should focus on sectors in which it has comparative strengths: digital public infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, maritime domain awareness, and higher education partnerships.</p>.<p>The Indo-Pacific may have been a construct created by great powers, but it is no longer solely defined by their actions. Increasingly, middle powers such as India, Vietnam, Japan, Indonesia, and Australia are shaping the regional order through their strategic partnerships and a shared vision for maritime stability and economic prosperity.</p>.<p>Finally, in a move that affects everyday consumers, India will now export grapes and pomegranates to Vietnam, while Vietnam will export durians and pomelo to India. It is the durian – pungent, polarising, and impossible to ignore once it arrives, that may be the truest metaphor for where this partnership is headed.</p>.<p><em>(The writer is a research analyst, Geostrategy Programme, at the <br>Takshashila Institution)</em></p><p><em>Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.</em></p>
<p>In October 1954, barely a week after the Viet Minh marched into a liberated Hanoi, Jawaharlal Nehru became the first foreign head of government to visit the city. He arrived not with arms or aid packages, but with a gesture of solidarity; a wager that a newly independent Asian nation deserved recognition on its own terms.</p>.<p>Seventy-two years on, India and Vietnam have travelled an extraordinary distance from that founding gesture. Vietnamese President Tô Lâm landed in New Delhi on May 5, becoming the first leader on Indian soil to hold both the titles of General Secretary of the Communist Party and State President. He came not with goodwill alone, but with a defence delegation, a business entourage, and a shared reading of the Indo-Pacific that was unimaginable in Nehru’s time.</p>.<p>More recently, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh visited India in 2024, laying the groundwork for the deeper defence and technology ties we see today. This time around, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Tô Lâm upgraded the bilateral relationship to an ‘Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.’ With this upgrade, Vietnam is signalling to the world, and specifically to China, that it views India as a primary balancer in the region, alongside the United States and Japan.</p>.<p>The two nations have agreed to institute a “2+2 Dialogue” involving their respective foreign and defence ministries. This format is reserved for India’s most trusted partners. Their navies conducted an inaugural joint hydrographic survey off Vietnam’s coast in May 2025. A mutual logistics support agreement is already in place, enabling each country’s forces to use the other’s bases for repairs and replenishment.</p>.<p>A potential BrahMos missile deal, valued at approximately $600 million, would make Vietnam the second Southeast Asian country, after the Philippines, to operate India’s flagship supersonic cruise missile, a development Beijing has watched with undisguised discomfort. Both leaders issued a strong joint statement on the South China Sea, advocating for freedom of navigation. Vietnam has officially joined India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). This aligns Hanoi with New Delhi’s vision for maritime security, which focuses on a rules-based order and opposing unilateral territorial claims.</p>.<p>For Vietnam, India offers something the US or Japan cannot quite provide: a large Asian power with no colonial baggage and a shared interest in a multipolar regional order, independent of the binary US-China framework. For India, a strong Vietnam with a credible maritime deterrence capability constrains Chinese freedom of action in the South China Sea and, by extension, in the broader Indo-Pacific waterways through which India’s trade flows.</p>.<p>Both countries have set an ambitious bilateral trade target of $25 billion and signed agreements on digital payments, signalling possible UPI integration in Vietnam. They have also deepened cooperation in critical minerals and rare earths through a new MoU. As the global energy transition accelerates, access to rare earths and critical minerals will increasingly shape geopolitical power. Vietnam holds significant deposits, and India has ambitions for their processing. A partnership could give both countries leverage in a domain currently dominated by a handful of states.</p>.<p><strong>Rising middle powers</strong></p>.<p>Furthermore, culture continues to be an important thread in the relationship. President Tô Lâm’s visit to Bodh Gaya before arriving in New Delhi was a reminder that Buddhism remains a powerful connector across Asia. India is helping Vietnam digitise and preserve ancient Cham Manuscripts. Unlike coercive or transactional forms of diplomacy, civilisational engagement creates long-term political goodwill. In the broader Asian region, where historical memory shapes perceptions of foreign policy, India must use its soft power constructively.</p>.<p>While many Southeast Asian states welcome India as a balancing power, they also recognise that India cannot presently match China’s scale of trade, infrastructure financing, or manufacturing integration. New Delhi should focus on sectors in which it has comparative strengths: digital public infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, maritime domain awareness, and higher education partnerships.</p>.<p>The Indo-Pacific may have been a construct created by great powers, but it is no longer solely defined by their actions. Increasingly, middle powers such as India, Vietnam, Japan, Indonesia, and Australia are shaping the regional order through their strategic partnerships and a shared vision for maritime stability and economic prosperity.</p>.<p>Finally, in a move that affects everyday consumers, India will now export grapes and pomegranates to Vietnam, while Vietnam will export durians and pomelo to India. It is the durian – pungent, polarising, and impossible to ignore once it arrives, that may be the truest metaphor for where this partnership is headed.</p>.<p><em>(The writer is a research analyst, Geostrategy Programme, at the <br>Takshashila Institution)</em></p><p><em>Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.</em></p>
