India’s complex quest for Multi-Domain Operations

Military doctrines and concepts are flexible. They change with the introduction of new technologies and ideas. Thus, tracing their evolution and future applicability can be a difficult proposition.

The development of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) as a military construct is no different; it stands entangled in multiple concepts and contradictory debates.

These debates largely concern conceptual interpretations of MDO, organisational primacy and control, resourcing constraints, and inter-service priorities. This situation is quite similar to the unyielding debate that has marred the theatre-isation of India’s armed forces.

In this context, Ran Samvad 2026, the Indian armed forces’ recent conclave aimed at creating a blueprint for MDO, is significant. Barring a few useful articulations, the deliberations were marred by jargon and lofty ideas, on which India is clearly not in a position to deliver.

Not for lack of good intent, but paucity of techno-industrial capacity to produce the effects that presumably constitute MDO. This would call for a serious intellectual exercise that would have to go from a concept to a doable joint war-fighting doctrine, and on to official operating practices.

Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 shocked the West when it realised that ground invasions were still a reality. Military planners soon realised that operational manoeuvres – by land, air or sea – were proving difficult because both sides could easily leverage multiple forms of disruptive ideas and technologies to hit and destroy the conventional forces on a transparent battlefield.

MDO is an outcome of these new ground realities, but more significantly, it results from refashioning earlier concepts to meet current battlefield expectations.

Experts argue that MDO represents an evolution of the erstwhile combined-arms concept, with the incorporation of the newer space, cyber, and cognitive domains. It is essentially an intellectual approach to shape joint doctrines on land, in the air, and at sea.

Some even argue it is a cross-domain concept, where operational concepts of each service are inter-mingled to produce the desired battle effects in a joint war-fighting environment. Others contend that it is a politico-strategic construct, as several operational concepts within the realm of MDO – like targeting of adversaries’ economic infrastructure – are strategically political decisions.

A few aspects stand out. While at inception the idea revolved around the concept of combined arms operations, it has transmuted – in the 1990s and 2000s – into a broader concept of delivering “higher-level” effects.

These are primarily envisaged at three levels: informational superiority, cognitive dominance, and penetrative longer-range strikes. Next, it assumes that technological superiority – in terms of battlefield transparency, accelerated kill-chains, and penetrative strikes – is a sufficient condition to claim victory in war.

In doing so, it misses the importance of “lower-level” effects while pursuing ground operations at the divisional, brigade, and battalion levels.

A doctrinal dilemma

Since the 1990s, India’s operational thinking, its organisational structures, and choices of technology have been overly influenced by its long decades of counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir.

Since the Chinese threat began manifesting in the 2010s, the question arises: what might a conflict with China look like, and what steps might India take to prepare for the next war? Does MDO suit the accomplishment of India’s future roles and missions, when our wars would be rooted in territorial disputes? Ideally speaking, the territorial contexts must drive our doctrinal choices for the 2030s to 2040s.

A few questions are pertinent. First, what does MDO mean to each military service – the Army, Air Force, and Navy? If it still means retaining primacy in respective realms of war-fighting, of land, air, or sea, rooting for MDO is a fallacy.

Second, when integration between the three services is low-key, how do the armed forces operationalise this idea? The United States had decades of integration behind it before it embarked on the idea of MDO. PLA has its own version of MDO. Third, spending too much time and resources on building a higher-level capability will detract from lower-level effects. Tanks, guns, and aircraft will still be needed to shape a land conflict.

Additionally, with the MDO prioritising battle at the highest level, it leaves the lower-level formations – the divisions, brigades, and battalions – with unclear roles and responsibilities. The question then is, what role would frontline commanders have in future MDO-driven wars, and would these lower-level formations that do most of the hard fighting be relevant? These factors carry serious significance in the Indian context.

For MDO to be a reality, the Indian armed forces will require a change in their priorities and even abandon a few. A change of this magnitude is possible only if the leadership is willing to expend political capital, make hard decisions, find resources, and provide strong oversight.

While institutional reforms can set the stage for flourishing new ideas on war-fighting, it still needs to be established what MDO means in the Indian context. Why is it needed, what is needed, and how much of it is needed? Whether it can be realised within a reasonable timeline, and if it takes too long, could it be swamped by newer technologies, concepts, and doctrines that prove to be superior to MDO by the 2040s?

Suffice to say, if resources – in terms of technology, industry, and production capacities – are a constraint and time is not on our side, India must “sub-scale” its idea of MDO to create the right war-fighting layers – of Command and Control (C2), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), deep-strike, close-battle, logistics, and infrastructure – which are both affordable and timely, in context of our future border wars with China or Pakistan.

With limited means at hand, Ukraine and Iran have done well in fielding the right enabling layers, even without subscribing to the idea of MDO.

The writer is a former corps commander.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.)