India’s reset with Dhaka is fraught with caveats

The Modi government must rope in Mamata Banerjee to rebuild the broken ties with Bangladesh

India’s response to the results of the Bangladesh election has been cautious. An inchoate tone of hope is on display, laced with unease. Voters chose to back pro-establishment, conservative parties, rather than the young people, making up a majority of the population, who had taken centre stage. The demonic energy radiating from the ‘Gen Z’ clamouring for reform faced institutional scepticism and political hurdles. Even the United States lost interest.

It signals that overcoming internal hurdles and translating initial protest demands into policy change could prove challenging going forward. The youth parties had a thin grassroots presence compared to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the cadre-based Jamaat-e-Islami, and suffered from a lack of funding and institutional capacity; they failed to present a unified front, and distinguish themselves from established political entities.

The election result reflects an extremely complex matrix of continuity rather than change. This may not be sustainable for long, because the state in Bangladesh is partially in collapse and corruption is a huge problem; and 56 million, 44% of the electorate, are between 18 and 37 years. The exclusion of Awami League further complicates matters  —  although the February 12 election has been Bangladesh’s first truly competitive vote in years. These are pointers to the trajectory of a nation in flux.

Meanwhile, a potentially divisive issue has sailed into view — the rushed trade deal with the US, negotiated in secrecy and signed by Muhammad Yunus’ interim government on February 9. It poses the first crucial challenge to the pivotal role the incoming BNP government has ascribed to its election slogan ‘Bangladesh First’. 

Critics flag that Bangladesh’s economic sovereignty and place in the global order are at risk. The trade agreement offers a marginal reduction in US tariffs but binds Bangladesh to a broad framework covering defence, energy, trade, labour, and digital governance in highly unequal terms. The US has imposed terms similar to those of India.

Geopolitics permeate the trade deal. The agreement mandates that Bangladesh increase its purchases of US military equipment and restricts procurement from certain countries (read China and Russia), and allows Washington to terminate the deal if Dhaka enters trade agreements with countries classified as ‘non-market economies’ (read China).

In many areas, including defence purchases and trade agreements with other countries, Bangladesh may need endorsement from US authorities. The deal emphasises ‘economic and national security alignment’ between the US and Bangladesh. Possibly, Washington rushed the deal once it became apparent that the nationalist BNP might not need the support of the Jamaat to form the next government, or it is payback time for Yunus. But the Tarique Rahman government will now be called upon to navigate the deal. 

The first big statement on India by a top BNP leader has been about the intention to press formally for Sheikh Hasina’s extradition. Indeed, in an oblique reference to Indian hegemony, PM-designate Rahman demanded that “the nation is not turned into a subservient state”. Now, the reality is that Hasina is unlikely to be repatriated. India could have played the role of a mediator, but obviously, that is not possible, having gone overboard on ‘anti-Hindu violence’, which was of course illogical, when the Bharatiya Janata Party government’s own track record is dismal.  

Rahman said the "interests of Bangladesh and its people will determine our foreign policy”. This is in line with the BNP’s ‘Bangladesh First’ policy, which mirrors Washington’s 'America First' policy. But the first BNP government was not an easy time for New Delhi. Yet, the paradox is, the BNP’s win is the best outcome for India. The BNP is not an unknown entity. The BNP-Jamaat coalition years under late Khaleda Zia were marked by turbulence and deep mutual mistrust. Ties with India cooled quickly following the incident of seizure of truckloads of weapons in Chittagong in 2004 allegedly destined for use by Indian rebel groups. Nonetheless, Rahman is open to a transactional relationship.

The road ahead is tricky. For, Bangladesh's election will also significantly shape the political rhetoric in neighbouring Indian states and impact the ongoing debates about cross-border migration, demographic change, and border governance, which in turn will shape the political climate for Assembly elections in West Bengal and Assam between March and May.

Conceivably, the gains by the Jamaat, which doubled its vote share, would get woven into the narrative about the growing electoral salience of religious mobilisation amid economic grievance. In particular, in the West Bengal Assembly polls, Bangladesh is not only a neighbour but also a central reference point — less a foreign policy concern than a domestic political proxy through which citizenship, demography, and belonging are contested.

Without as much as directly naming internal Muslim minorities, the BJP may find it expedient to frame West Bengal as the next frontier in a national project of border control and cultural consolidation. On the other hand, the TMC will strive to recast the BJP’s rhetoric as an unwarranted extrapolation that is out of sync with Bengali culture and detrimental to the region’s social fabric and cultural ethos. Honestly, the TMC narrative is both good politics and honest truth as well. Suffice it to say, Bangladesh becomes a rhetorical lever through which competing visions of Indian nationhood, federal authority, and citizenship are being contested in eastern India.

Thousands of Awami League rank and file have reportedly crossed into India after the 2024 July uprising. Yunus’ information adviser rounded off the figure at 1,00,000. At any rate, as the Guardian reported earlier this month, ‘The proactive presence of Awami League in Kolkata and Delhi has raised increasingly uncomfortable questions for India, particularly its role in allowing the activities of a suspended party to continue from its soil and the safe haven given to some of Bangladesh’s most wanted political fugitives.’ So far, the comeback plan of the exiled leaders hinged on the failure of the upcoming February 12 election. What next? 

Bangladesh voted for moderation, and an appropriate Indian response is called for. But for that, a leap of faith is needed, a sincere assimilation of the message of the 2024 uprising. New Delhi should rope in Mamata Banerjee to rebuild the broken ties. Banerjee congratulated the citizens of Bangladesh as well as ‘Tarique Bhai' and conveyed greetings to the nation ahead of the holy month of Ramzan. The real question is not whether this world is real, but how we choose to live in it.

M K Bhadrakumar is a former diplomat.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.)