India’s strategic autonomy faces its acid test in West Asia

Energy dependence and diaspora vulnerability make India’s neutrality harder to sustain.

Does India stand in danger of being indirectly pulled into the ongoing conflict in West Asia? Two recent incidents prompt such worries: a claim by a United States commentator that US Navy ships were using Indian ports for logistics, and the sinking of an Iranian navy ship IRIS Dena, in the international waters of the Indian Ocean, off the coast of Sri Lanka.

These incidents need to be unpacked before addressing other factors that might also pull India into the conflict.

India has dismissed the claim of George MacGregor, a retired US Army colonel who worked as an adviser to the Pentagon, that the US Navy was now using Indian ports for docking and logistics facilities. He had claimed that this had become necessary as US naval facilities in West Asia — such as in Bahrain and Oman — had been damaged.

The Ministry of External Affairs has described MacGregor’s claim on a Right-wing US channel, One America News, as “fake and false”, and “baseless and fabricated.” That India needed to issue such a denial shows how strategically sensitive the optics of this war have become. India did not want to be seen as taking the US-Israeli side in their war against Iran.

This still begs the question: What will India do if the US was to ask it for logistics support under the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) signed between the two countries in 2016? This agreement allows, on a case-by-case basis and with mutual consent, access to each other’s military facilities for logistics support (refuelling, repairs, food, medical aid, port services, etc.) and on a reimbursable basis. It is one of the four ‘foundational agreements’ signed by India and the US to facilitate strategic co-operation. The others are: COMCASA (2018), BECA (2020), and GSOMIA (2002).

LEMOA does not place any automatic obligations on India, and a refusal to provide support will not be a violation of the agreement.

However, will India have the gumption to refuse logistical support if US President Donald Trump were to ask for it? And, would it be able to absorb the consequences of refusing or agreeing to the US request? Either choice would force India to recalibrate its ties with the US as well as its interests in Iran and the wider West Asia.

India’s much-professed policy of multi-alignment will face its acid test. The US may not be very understanding of India’s compulsions. Its strategic takeaway will be that India is not a trusted strategic partner in times of crises. Iran may not be fully reassured, but may accept that diplomatic cover provided by India’s refusal. China may view India’s denial as evidence that India remains cautious and not fully aligned with the US. The upside will be that domestically Indian foreign policy will still be seen as autonomous, which is essential optics for the coming Assembly polls and domestic image of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

One can only hope that since Indian ports are nearly a week’s sailing distance away from the war zone, such an eventuality will not arise. However, the sinking of the Iranian ship by a US submarine shows that the US Navy is already present in India’s backyard. The Iranian naval ship was sunk just after a joint naval exercise with the Indian Navy at Visakhapatnam, and was on its way home. Its destruction so close to Indian maritime space blows to smithereens India’s claims of being a ‘net security provider’ in the Indian Ocean.

India may have been unaware of the US submarine in the Indian Ocean. However, if India was aware of its presence, then the consequences of such knowledge are far too horrific to imagine. In any case, the fact that the US war on Iran has come so close will signal to the smaller Indian Ocean countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives that it is the great powers that shape their security environment and not India.

The US may not have done this to embarrass India deliberately. However, its actions have posed a dilemma for the Indian leadership about whether it should actively deploy its navy to patrol the waters of the Indian Ocean. It would strengthen arguments by the US that India should co-operate with it under LEMOA to protect sea-lanes, especially around the choke-point of the Strait of Hormuz, where India’s energy lifeline is threatened.

India imports 85% of its crude oil, much of which flows through the Strait of Hormuz. India’s energy vulnerability could, thus, easily get translated into strategic pressure to align with the US more openly in protecting the shipping lanes. If Iran continues to threaten shipping through the Strait, then any co-operation with the US could blur the line between strategic autonomy and open alignment — the optics will be that India is in the conflict.

The other strategic pressure will be from the diaspora. Almost one crore Indian immigrant workers live in Gulf countries. If the spreading conflict endangers their lives and they need to be evacuated, even the humanitarian involvement of India in doing so will mean operational co-operation with the US and the security establishments of the Gulf countries.

Even limited, non-combatant co-operation with the US on these issues could be interpreted by Iran as hostile, making Indian assets a target. Equally, the US expectation of India as a ‘strategic partner’ could increase if indeed its regional military bases in the Gulf have been degraded.

India could possibly get a face-saver by calling for an emergency ministerial meeting of BRICS, as its current president, to urge an end to the war. The joint BRICS appeal could emphasise energy security, freedom of navigation, and humanitarian concerns.

BRICS has no power to implement any of this. However, such a statement will show that major non-Western economies are opposed to a prolonged war in West Asia, adding pressure on the US, Israel, and Iran.

This could once again position India as a regional and autonomous power rather than a passive bystander (or US-Israeli collaborator), and shape BRICS as a geopolitical forum rather than just an economic bloc. Although this may be more about optics than materially ending the conflict, it will help India buy time to manage its strategic dilemma.

Bharat Bhushan is a New Delhi-based journalist.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH).