Key takeaways from G20 meet in Srinagar

Exercising its rights as a host state on the meetings in the run-up to the G20 Leaders’ Summit, India settled on Srinagar to host the Third Tourism Working Group meeting, the earlier two being non-controversially held at the Rann of Kutch and Siliguri/Darjeeling.

The criteria of selecting scenic venues apt for showcasing India’s tourism potential makes Srinagar a logical choice. Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is a major tourist and pilgrimage destination, notwithstanding the security situation. However, since its long-standing security problem has international connotations, India’s alighting on it as a choice was liable to be taken as politically loaded, and elicited a politicised response.

Consequently, as expected, some countries chose to absent themselves, the most prominent one being China. In the event, though 29 delegations were represented, along with China, absent were G20 member states Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and ‘guest countries’ Oman and Egypt. Indonesia sent an embassy representative.

India’s relations with the latter four countries being cordial, it begs the question if India’s choice — though legal and legitimate — proved good for it, or otherwise. Afterall, even Egypt, whose president was guest at this year’s Republic Day parade, skipped the event.

India’s determination to proceed even in the face of a possible terror threat shows that it believed that the benefits of showcasing Srinagar would outweigh any cons. Implicit in its choice of venue was a reassertion of Indian sovereignty. India was determined not to allow anyone veto its sovereign right, or allow itself to be self-deterred from exercising it.

India rightly assessed China would stay away, which China reflexively did, claiming it was against holding such multilateral meetings in a ‘disputed territory’. In this it echoed its ally, Pakistan, which is not a G20 member. That the argument resonated with more countries than India possibly expected shows that India has been unable to fully persuade even states assumed to be close to India on its case on J&K.

On the security front, Pakistan exploited the opportunity with having its proxy groups conduct terror attacks where the security grid is relatively sparse south of the Pir Panjals. However, closer to the event, hoping to stave off allegations of terrorism, it was careful to target the military and used local groups as fronts.

In the Valley, that two out-of-Srinagar trips — to Gulmarg and Dachigam sanctuary — were cancelled for the delegates indicates that instability persists, a feature that could not have escaped attention of delegates.

Though India might have wished to present a picture of relative quietude, the abiding impression left on visitors is likely that problems continue in J&K. India’s extensive security arrangements serve to betray that the seeming normality that results is only superficial. This implies that India’s completion of integration of J&K through reworking of Article 370 remains a work-in-progress.

India would require working harder or doing things differently. Working harder can only be ‘more of the same’, at most packaged differently. Doing things differently is preferable.

That India ran the risk of holding the G20 meeting in Srinagar shows that India has the best interest of Kashmiris at heart. Kashmir was presented as a tourist destination, with Srinagar all dressed up as a Smart City. This sense of empathy must be taken to its logical conclusion in heeding the truism that insurgency is best tackled politically. India is already on course to holding elections to the assembly. If it is wary of the elections being undermined by political parties insisting that the elections be for a state assembly and not to a legislature of a Union Territory (UT), it could be more forthright with its statehood promises.

Diplomatically, Pakistan, that has been holding out ever since its umbrage at the Article 370 dilution, would likely use the opportunity to re-engage with India. China’s positioning on the issue, largely forged in reference to its relationship with Pakistan, would have to acknowledge the changed facts on ground in Pakistani reconciliation with the change. Though the Ladakh factor remains consequential in relation to China, it could potentially stand separated from the J&K issue.

Since all the pieces are already in place, including delimitation of constituencies and an internally beset Pakistan, elections can be held over the summer. This is the best way to neutralise reservations expressed by the UN Rapporteur on Minority Issues when he opined that India sought to ‘instrumentalise’ the meeting to present a ‘façade of normalcy’.

A return to rule by elected representatives in J&K by the time of the G20 Summit in early September would clinch India’s image as the ‘Mother of Democracy’.

(Ali Ahmed is a freelance strategic analyst. Twitter: @aliahd66.)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.