Limits of spectacle | Modi’s foreign policy contradictions exposed

Under Modi, India has chosen dependence as a strategic choice. But from Nehru to Manmohan Singh, India displayed a fiercely independent foreign policy and autonomy.

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s global image erodes, he cannot as easily dodge accountability for domestic governance as he did earlier by projecting his larger-than-life capers on the world stage.

Between 2014 and 2019, Modi’s ‘Make in India’, ‘Digital India’, and push for infrastructure development created the global image of a rising India. His carefully orchestrated rallies among the diaspora in New York, Texas, London, and Sydney projected him as a moderniser, drawing admiration from world leaders.

Indian foreign policy projected independence from the big power blocs, and was hailed for its strategic autonomy. This global image-building fed into domestic politics as Modi was projected as a leader who put India on the world stage.

Now, Modi’s optics-driven events have come to bite India. The recent AI Summit, for example, in which a Chinese robot dog was presented to the world as an Indian invention, exposed the country’s tech capabilities to global ridicule. The inconsistency of India’s strategic autonomy is apparent when India criticised Pakistan’s bombing of a hospital in Afghanistan, but kept selectively silent on Israel’s genocide in Gaza and the unprovoked US-Israel bombing of Iran.

At home, the accountability gap is glaring. Modi has centralised foreign policy in the PMO, and has not explained to Parliament what compelled him to suddenly agree to the US trade deal; why he visited Tel Aviv 48-hours before the attack on Iran; why India needed US ‘permission’ to buy Russian oil; why he did not express public condolences on the assassination of Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and why as BRICS president, India remains silent on the unprovoked US-Israel war on Iran, a member state?

The government’s responses to the various diplomatic crises have been limited to official statements or ambiguous diplomatic gestures, rather than parliamentary debates. Unlike his predecessors, Modi has reduced Parliament to merely a stage for polemical speeches, rather than a forum for substantive debates on critical issues. By doing this, he avoids scrutiny and shields himself from the Opposition’s questioning and exposure of the contradictions in his foreign policy.

The US' leverage over Indian foreign policymakers and their policies makes defiance difficult. Therefore, the Russian oil purchase is described as economic pragmatism and the waiver granted by the US is not discussed in Parliament. Partnership with Israel is hailed but the tacit alignment with Tel Aviv’s goals is shielded from parliamentary accountability to prevent any domestic backlash.

Not explaining foreign policy shifts is deliberate to keep it executive-driven, opaque, and insulated from parliamentary contestation. Modi, in fact, hardly ever attends Parliament — he rarely participates in day-to-day debates, intervening only on high-profile occasions such as the Motion of Thanks to the President's address, Budget debates, or landmark Bills. He neither signs the attendance register in Parliament nor takes any direct questions, even on crucial issues such as security. He does not see himself as an elected representative of the people, but as a leader whose appearance in Parliament needs careful choreography. His party predecessor, Atal Bihar Vajpayee, not only had a high attendance record in Parliament but also intervened frequently in debates and was known for his parliamentary oratory and repartee.

Modi’s limited parliamentary presence strengthens the Opposition’s charge that he is more interested in campaigning and propaganda than legislative debate. He wants executive control without accountability.

Modi is also indifferent to public accountability, confident of swaying the masses with his proven cocktail of abusive rhetoric against the Opposition, communal polarisation and welfarism. This, especially his welfare narrative, may be punctured if the US-Israel war on Iran shows no signs of ending soon.

Modi has not addressed the nation on the consequences of the war, especially after the attack on the oil and natural gas facilities in the Gulf by the Israelis and the Iranians. India imports nearly 85% of its crude oil and nearly 50% of its LNG, much of it from the Gulf countries.

The latest damage to Iran’s South Pars gas field and Qatari LNG facilities at its main LNG hub at Ras Laffan Industrial City, would imply higher prices and potential shortages for Indian households and industry. India imports nearly 40% of its LNG requirement from the Ras Laffan facility.

In a bid to keep fuel costs low till the West Bengal, Assam, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Puducherry elections are over, Modi is not preparing Indians to brace for potentially higher fuel prices, inflation, and possibly, fuel rationing. Such silence in times when cataclysmic events are taking place, can erode trust in the political leadership, especially if a leader claims global stature but fails to explain a global crisis to his people.

Modi’s refusal to address the nation on the US-Israel war on Iran and its energy consequences once again reflects his preference for optics over accountability. This will leave Indians unprepared for the hard times ahead. Modi, however, still seems to think that religious polarisation at home will continue to compensate for accountability deficit and ensure electoral victories.

However, the very tactics that currently strengthen him electorally at home, weaken him on the international stage. India is increasingly seen as a dependent power, inconsistent in its foreign policy, and less pluralist than it was.

Under Modi, India has chosen dependence as a strategic choice. Under Jawaharlal Nehru, India was poor and aid-dependent, but fiercely independent in its foreign policy, refusing to be dictated by the US even when reliant on PL-480 wheat aid. Under Indira Gandhi, there was tilt towards the Soviet Union, but India still projected autonomy through the Non-Aligned Movement, and even conducting nuclear tests. Even during economic liberalisation under P V Narasimha Rao, while India accepted IMF conditionalities, it was not a strategic alignment but seen as a temporary measure. Under Manmohan Singh, India signed the civilian nuclear deal with the US, but it was viewed as enhancing autonomy and not dependence.

Today, the optics are different. India has become a subordinate power not because of economic collapse, but as a result of a deliberate strategic choice epitomised in Trump’s boast that Modi acts to “make me happy”. India has faced many crises since Independence, but rarely has it looked more globally helpless than now. Foreign policy is packaged as autonomy, but it is openly acknowledged as subservience by US leaders. It is also visible in India’s selective silences.

Bharat Bhushan is a New Delhi-based journalist.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH)