Making China great again? Why G2 resets India’s calculus

Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing on May 13-15 holds special significance for New Delhi because its messaging of renewed United States-China cooperation constrains India’s assiduously built architecture in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Over the next three to four years, the two largest economies of the world are expected to establish a constructive relationship of strategic stability, with “cooperation” – and not “competition” – shaping the ties.

History reveals that Beijing uses such high-value partnerships to consolidate its hold in the neighbourhood, while countering other major regional and global powers (such as the then Soviet Union in 1972). New Delhi’s concern will be Beijing’s zero-sum game posture in light of the emerging collaboration. Bipartisan consensus in the US since the mid-2000s has resulted in New Delhi being seen as a balancing power. Its geostrategic location, rising middle class, and markets became attractive to the US. This period coincided with the US’s assessment of China rising as a “strategic competitor” and a “pacing challenger.”

With President Trump making clear his intentions to resurrect US power in the Western Hemisphere, China has begun eyeing the Indo-Pacific as its sphere of influence. China’s recent forays into the Taiwan Straits, Japan’s Senkaku Islands, the South China Sea, and the India-China borders are likely to be legitimised by the US as a part of the strategic-stability component in its relationship with China.

Given the Trump administration’s transactional ways, China has adopted the 23rd stratagem of Yuan jiao jin gong (befriend the far to counter the near). It adopted this approach with the Clinton administration to control South Korea and Japan. Now, Beijing wants sway over the Indo-Pacific by enticing Trump with trade, investments, and technology deals.

A direct fallout of Trump’s visit is that China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, skipped the BRICS foreign ministerial meeting in New Delhi on May 14-15, ostensibly for scheduling reasons, and an envoy was sent as a replacement.

The emerging US-China cooperation means the marginalisation of New Delhi and other powers in Asia and Europe. First proposed by Brzezinski and implemented by President Barack Obama in 2009, Group-2 (G2) suggests that the US and China rule the rest of the world. The Obama-Hu Jintao joint statement of 2009 even mentioned both countries looking after South Asian security issues. Since then, coordination among the US, China, and Pakistan has increased in the region. In the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, Beijing armed Pakistan, and the US came closer to Pakistan’s Army Chief. China will leverage G2 to scale up its “all-weather” friendship with Pakistan. India needs to brace for further aggression.

Srikanth Kondapalli - The JNU Prof has been Peking behind the Bamboo Curtain for 30 years.

New Delhi comprehends that with the re-emergence of G2, China’s commitment to multipolarity will decline gradually, with consequences on its role in the BRICS+ and the Global South. Policies under Trump 1.0 and the Biden administration encouraged companies in the US and partner countries to diversify supply chains into emerging markets in Mexico, Southeast and South Asia. However, this China+1 strategy has not yielded substantial results and could be jettisoned by the Trump-Xi Jinping talks.

This is likely to impact India, given the recent shift of several multinational companies to the Indian market and concerns over depleting investment and technology flows. China has placed restrictions on India in exporting rare earth minerals and tunnel-boring machines. It may keep its relations with India on the buyer-seller dependency mode and try to generate trade deficits in Beijing’s favour.

In the maritime domain, China has emerged as the world’s largest naval force, displacing the US, and is engaged in far-ocean operations in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Now, following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, it is sending its fleets to the region to provide escort to its oil tankers. China is signalling control of the sea lanes of communications, with consequences for not only Hormuz, but also Bab-el-Mandeb, Red Sea, Suez Canal, Malacca Straits, Sunda, and Lombok. These movements, with American backing, could eventually reduce India’s manoeuvrability in the Gulf region.

However, it must be said that despite the US-China alignment, New Delhi has acquired agency through trade agreements signed with the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and New Zealand.

Besides self-help measures and tie-ups with fellow democracies, India needs to diversify its supply chains and reduce its dependence on China. By convening summits to amplify Global South voices, it can endear itself to many countries, thus limiting the G2’s impact.

The writer is the JNU Prof has been Peking behind the Bamboo Curtain for 30 years.