<p>In the fierce geostrategic tussle between India and China for influence in the Maldives, New Delhi seems to have the upper hand in Malé, for now. Else, New Delhi would not have planned the state visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the strategically located Indian Ocean archipelago to participate in its Independence Day celebrations on July 26.</p>.<p>Modi has been invited as a ‘guest of honour’ by Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu after some initial hostility and turbulence in bilateral ties. It will mark Modi’s first visit to the neighbouring country in six years, the last one being in June 2019 when an India-leaning government under President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih was in place. He will be the first head of government to be hosted by Muizzu, who took over in November 2023.</p>.<p>The visit’s symbolic significance is noteworthy. To the world at large, it will signal that New Delhi, and not Beijing, remains the archipelago’s preferred development partner. Muizzu, in turn, will be able to convey to his domestic audience that he’s an able administrator who can deliver outcomes and draw benefits from his country’s biggest neighbour.</p>.<p>India’s renewed outreach to the Muizzu government indicates a growing confidence that the Maldives, a key maritime neighbour, will remain mindful of its strategic interests. Battling strong competition from China in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), New Delhi has faced a tough diplomatic challenge to ensure it does not cede strategic space to Beijing. Like many of India’s neighbours, the Maldives has joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a vital component of its Maritime Silk Road ambitions. Leaders of IOR island nations have become adept at playing the two Asian giants against one another to leverage benefits, further queering the pitch for India.</p>.<p>India’s alignment with the Quad nations – the US, Australia, and Japan – in <br>the wider Indo-Pacific is part of its strategy to counter Beijing’s expanding footprint in the IOR and beyond. India has even recast its earlier doctrine of Vision Sagar (Security and Growth for All) in the Global South as Vision Mahasagar (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) to widen its ambit of cooperation.</p>.<p><strong>Relief and realpolitik</strong></p>.<p>Modi’s visit serves as a marked indicator of this shifting tide in India’s favour. There is an unmissable irony in Muizzu’s invite, given that he rode to power fuelling anti-India sentiments. This campaign culminated in Muizzu forcing India to pull out its 80 military personnel in the archipelago, within a few months of becoming President. However, a little over a year later, bilateral relations are on the mend, with Modi’s impending visit signalling the final reset. Muizzu was in India twice last year – for the Modi 3.0 government’s inauguration and a bilateral visit. While the closeness witnessed during Ibu Solih’s tenure may not be there, India has little cause for complaint. Despite Muizzu’s perceived pro-China leanings, Beijing hasn’t been able to make a comeback in the archipelago as was expected during his presidency.</p>.<p>The Maldives could not secure the anticipated financial assistance from China, its largest external creditor, and some Islamic countries. Consequently, Muizzu had to turn to India to navigate a debilitating economic crisis. Muizzu has also been seeking investments to promote his country as a business and financial hub. Even if this does happen, it will take time to fructify.</p>.<p>For now, the Maldives is under debt distress. Under the risk of defaulting on its external debt repayments, Muizzu’s anti-India sentiments have given way to pragmatism and realpolitik as he now has to deliver results in his economically beleaguered country.</p>.<p>India has played its cards skilfully. It initially stepped in to assist the Solih government after the Maldives reeled under a dire economic situation during the pandemic, with its tourism-dependent economy taking a huge hit. Then, it decided to continue with its financial assistance to the Muizzu government despite initial bilateral tensions, which has helped the Maldives avoid a default on its external debt repayments.</p>.<p>However, the Maldivian economy is not yet out of the woods. Muizzu still has to find ways to service an external debt of $1 billion in 2026. While India has helped out through currency swaps and rolling over of treasury bills worth $100 million, China has held back in the fear that other debt-distressed countries might also seek similar relief.</p>.<p>Despite this seemingly positive outlook for New Delhi, it cannot afford to slacken its outreach to Malé. China is keenly waiting in the wings to usurp India’s strategic space. India has to ensure that the Muizzu government can be relied upon to be a loyal friend in the long run.</p>.<p><em>(The writer is a senior journalist)</em></p>
<p>In the fierce geostrategic tussle between India and China for influence in the Maldives, New Delhi seems to have the upper hand in Malé, for now. Else, New Delhi would not have planned the state visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the strategically located Indian Ocean archipelago to participate in its Independence Day celebrations on July 26.</p>.<p>Modi has been invited as a ‘guest of honour’ by Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu after some initial hostility and turbulence in bilateral ties. It will mark Modi’s first visit to the neighbouring country in six years, the last one being in June 2019 when an India-leaning government under President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih was in place. He will be the first head of government to be hosted by Muizzu, who took over in November 2023.</p>.<p>The visit’s symbolic significance is noteworthy. To the world at large, it will signal that New Delhi, and not Beijing, remains the archipelago’s preferred development partner. Muizzu, in turn, will be able to convey to his domestic audience that he’s an able administrator who can deliver outcomes and draw benefits from his country’s biggest neighbour.</p>.<p>India’s renewed outreach to the Muizzu government indicates a growing confidence that the Maldives, a key maritime neighbour, will remain mindful of its strategic interests. Battling strong competition from China in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), New Delhi has faced a tough diplomatic challenge to ensure it does not cede strategic space to Beijing. Like many of India’s neighbours, the Maldives has joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a vital component of its Maritime Silk Road ambitions. Leaders of IOR island nations have become adept at playing the two Asian giants against one another to leverage benefits, further queering the pitch for India.</p>.<p>India’s alignment with the Quad nations – the US, Australia, and Japan – in <br>the wider Indo-Pacific is part of its strategy to counter Beijing’s expanding footprint in the IOR and beyond. India has even recast its earlier doctrine of Vision Sagar (Security and Growth for All) in the Global South as Vision Mahasagar (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) to widen its ambit of cooperation.</p>.<p><strong>Relief and realpolitik</strong></p>.<p>Modi’s visit serves as a marked indicator of this shifting tide in India’s favour. There is an unmissable irony in Muizzu’s invite, given that he rode to power fuelling anti-India sentiments. This campaign culminated in Muizzu forcing India to pull out its 80 military personnel in the archipelago, within a few months of becoming President. However, a little over a year later, bilateral relations are on the mend, with Modi’s impending visit signalling the final reset. Muizzu was in India twice last year – for the Modi 3.0 government’s inauguration and a bilateral visit. While the closeness witnessed during Ibu Solih’s tenure may not be there, India has little cause for complaint. Despite Muizzu’s perceived pro-China leanings, Beijing hasn’t been able to make a comeback in the archipelago as was expected during his presidency.</p>.<p>The Maldives could not secure the anticipated financial assistance from China, its largest external creditor, and some Islamic countries. Consequently, Muizzu had to turn to India to navigate a debilitating economic crisis. Muizzu has also been seeking investments to promote his country as a business and financial hub. Even if this does happen, it will take time to fructify.</p>.<p>For now, the Maldives is under debt distress. Under the risk of defaulting on its external debt repayments, Muizzu’s anti-India sentiments have given way to pragmatism and realpolitik as he now has to deliver results in his economically beleaguered country.</p>.<p>India has played its cards skilfully. It initially stepped in to assist the Solih government after the Maldives reeled under a dire economic situation during the pandemic, with its tourism-dependent economy taking a huge hit. Then, it decided to continue with its financial assistance to the Muizzu government despite initial bilateral tensions, which has helped the Maldives avoid a default on its external debt repayments.</p>.<p>However, the Maldivian economy is not yet out of the woods. Muizzu still has to find ways to service an external debt of $1 billion in 2026. While India has helped out through currency swaps and rolling over of treasury bills worth $100 million, China has held back in the fear that other debt-distressed countries might also seek similar relief.</p>.<p>Despite this seemingly positive outlook for New Delhi, it cannot afford to slacken its outreach to Malé. China is keenly waiting in the wings to usurp India’s strategic space. India has to ensure that the Muizzu government can be relied upon to be a loyal friend in the long run.</p>.<p><em>(The writer is a senior journalist)</em></p>
