Modi's ambiguity and Nehru's clarity towards Chinese aggression

Nehru asserted civilian authority even in defeat, while Modi blurred responsibility in crisis.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi often uses Jawaharlal Nehru as a foil to define himself. This tactic seems less about history, and more about political theatre.

Nehru is being invoked once again to repair Modi’s image damaged by revelations of his alleged indecisiveness during the Ladakh crisis caused by Chinese incursions in 2020.

When repeatedly asked by then Army Chief General M M Naravane for clear orders on how to deal with Chinese incursions in 2020, Modi conveyed an ambiguous message, “Jo uchit samajho, woh karo (do what you think appropriate).”

Modi’s defenders claim that Nehru bungled the 1962 war. Nehru had ordered the army publicly to “throw the Chinese out”.

In Naravane’s telling, as revealed by Sushant Singh in the Caravan, Modi threw the ball back at the army chief. He claimed he had been handed “a hot potato” and noted, “We were ready in all respects but did I want to start a war?” The political leadership has skirted the responsibility of conducting a war.

Modi acolytes in the media present his indecisiveness as delegation, citing how the Indian Army was given autonomy in taking action against Pakistan in the surgical strikes following the Uri terrorist attack, airstrikes in Balakot, and even during Operation Sindoor. They argue that Modi’s response to the 2020 Ladakh incursions displayed his leadership style of delegating authority without micromanagement. Nehru’s ‘failure’ in 1962 is contrasted with Modi’s ‘success’ in 2020.

What is wrong with this political spin? Nehru’s tone was clear, categorical, and public. It was a direct political order to the Army that showed civilian supremacy. It reassured the Indian public and signalled to China that India would not be coerced. That subsequent events proved the Army was logistically unprepared and lacked appropriate leadership is undeniable. However, no one can doubt Nehru’s political resolve.

Modi’s political indecision is packaged as delegation. Authority can be delegated, but not responsibility — Modi did both. This left political wiggle-room for Modi if things went south. He later even denied Chinese incursions had taken place — telling an all-party meeting, “Na wahan koi hamari seema mein ghus gaya hai aur na hi koi ghusa hua hai, na hi hamari koi post kisi doosre ke kabze mein hai (no intrusion has occurred and no posts have been captured)”.

After Naravane’s repeated briefing of the political leadership, Modi knew that the ground situation was quite different. Yet he gave a clean chit to the Chinese — not only undermining information provided by the Army but also discrediting his own foreign minister’s claims that the Chinese took “pre-meditated and planned action” unilaterally along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Nehru gave a command like a statesman, and took responsibility even though India suffered a humiliating defeat. Modi’s direction was non-committal, even though the Army was prepared to take on Chinese incursions. The Indian Army’s competence was demonstrated by its occupation of the mountain heights at Rezang La and Rechin La. A strong signal was sent to China, and the bold initiative more than made up for Modi’s dithering stance.

Greater operational clarity was needed from the political leadership in dealing with Chinese incursions along the LAC than in attacks against Pakistan. The Army would not have been able to exercise the autonomy to open fire, in effect declaring war, with China because of agreements about the LAC.

There is a host of such India-China agreements on the LAC, which prohibit resorting to force. The 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC, for example, mandates negotiations not using force for resolving disputes. The 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC also prohibits both sides from opening fire, using explosives or guns within two kilometres of the LAC (hence in the Galwan skirmishes, soldiers used stones and clubs). The 2005 Protocol and 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement on the LAC also emphasise the non-use of force and a commitment to diplomacy and dialogue. These agreements make it mandatory that the Indian Army seek political clearance before using firepower.

Although ceasefire agreements also exist with Pakistan (Karachi Agreement of 1949, Simla Agreement 1972, Ceasefire Understanding 2003, and Reaffirmation in 2021), there is no clause forbidding firepower, and violations are frequent. Nor are ceasefire agreements with Pakistan codified in treaties as they are with China, which would make use of firepower a violation of international commitments.

The lapse in Modi’s leadership lies in the fact that any use of firepower against China along the LAC would require political clearance for execution. The Army could not have exercised autonomy to deter the Chinese because political leadership had to have its back by taking responsibility.

The spin that Modi believes in broad brushstrokes while delegating operational details does not stand scrutiny. Recall how he bragged earlier about his role in the air operations in Balakot. In a 2019 interview, Modi claimed he had suggested to the Indian Air Force to use “cloud cover” and rain to evade Pakistani radars during the airstrikes. Modi’s statements were scientifically unsound, and indicated that he had no policy about not directing (or misdirecting) the air force’s operational planning!

The Opposition was not allowed to discuss in Parliament Modi’s indecisiveness described in Naravane’s account, on the technicality that the book had not been ‘published’. An FIR has been filed against unknown persons for criminal conspiracy, and leaking the contents of a book not cleared by the government for publication. This leaves open the threat that names of accused can be added to the FIR at any time during the police investigation.

However, the Opposition has created a golden opportunity to reopen the discussion by moving a motion of no-confidence against Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla, who prevented the Leader of the Opposition from discussing the contents of the book as revealed in Singh’s article. The discussion is scheduled for March 9. They can do more than air their grievances about procedural biases, suspension of MPs, and preventing the Opposition from speaking in the House.

As governments are mostly always in the majority, the motion against the Speaker will naturally be defeated. But public optics will have been created about his partisan behaviour, force a debate on issues that the Modi government finds unpalatable, and symbolically unsettle the Speaker’s authority. Most importantly, they will also have an opportunity to raise the issue of Modi’s indecisive leadership during the Ladakh crisis of 2020.

Bharat Bhushan is a New Delhi-based journalist. X: @Bharatitis

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.