<p>Iran and the United States reopened a diplomatic channel last Friday in Muscat, Oman, with two rounds of indirect talks lasting five hours. Although both parties characterised the exchange as constructive, the negotiations continue to remain fragile, particularly with the presence of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and other US naval assets off Iran’s coast.</p>.<p>The US side included, for the first time, the US Navy Admiral Brad Cooper, Head of Central Command, besides Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, President Donald Trump’s son-in-law. Cooper’s presence, in full military uniform, at the talks was intended as a signal of US military strength and leverage in the region.</p>.<p>The meeting focused primarily on listening and clarifying positions rather than negotiating technical frameworks or specific concessions. Iran insisted firmly that the agenda be restricted to nuclear issues. Earlier, Tehran had successfully pushed to shift the venue from Istanbul to Muscat and resisted expanded regional participation. From the Iranian perspective, a broader format would have tilted the process towards US demands to include limits on Iran’s ballistic missile programme and restrictions on its support for Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias. For Iran, ballistic missiles are vital and non-negotiable, as these missiles are its security insurance against any US military attack.</p>.<p>Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described the talks as a “good start” with a “positive” atmosphere and emphasised the importance of continued consultations. Trump called the discussions “very good” and indicated the next round could take place as early as next week. Simultaneously, Washington reinforced pressure by announcing new sanctions and tariffs on Iran. Trump said US military assets were moving into position, while stressing that the US is “in no rush”, but accusing Iran of building a new nuclear facility.</p>.<p>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is scheduled to visit Washington this Wednesday for talks with President Trump. The trip, originally planned for around the 18th of this month to attend the first meeting of the Board of Peace, was moved forward to focus specifically on the Iran issue amid Israel’s concerns that the US position may be shifting. Netanyahu’s visit is intended to press against any US-Iran agreement that is limited to the nuclear issue while leaving out Iran’s ballistic missile programme and its regional security threats.</p>.<p>Netanyahu played a decisive role in persuading the first Trump administration to withdraw from the 2015 JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Programme of Action) nuclear deal and has consistently supported a hardline approach. He attacked Iran after the IAEA reported non-compliance of Iran with its safeguards obligations, and later pressed for US strikes on Iran’s enrichment facilities. From Israel’s perspective, strategic confrontation with Iran remains unfinished business.</p>.<p>Because Israel does not share a border with Iran, it faces fewer immediate physical spillover risks from a renewed conflict or potential internal destabilisation within Iran. That geographic buffer significantly shapes Israeli threat assessments and tolerance for escalation. The Arab Gulf states, by contrast, operate under far greater proximity risk and, therefore, adopt a more cautious strategic calculus. While they would welcome outcomes that degrade Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and constrain its support for Hezbollah and the Houthis, they are concerned that a large-scale US strike on Iran could trigger region-wide retaliation. Such escalation could threaten critical energy infrastructure, disrupt shipping lanes, and undermine macroeconomic stability.</p>.<p>Although several Gulf governments have publicly stated that their airspace would not be available for offensive operations against Iran, they recognise that strikes could be conducted from maritime platforms in the Arabian Sea or via alternative regional corridors. Iranian officials have repeatedly framed any direct attack as a trigger for broad regional confrontation.</p>.<p>These risk perceptions have been communicated to Washington by multiple regional partners, including Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman, emphasising the systemic costs of escalation. US domestic political factors also shape decision-making. Elements within Trump’s political base have shown growing resistance to further Middle East military entanglements and are increasingly critical of what they see as an “Israel First” policy, especially with mid-term elections due next year. Military action against Iran would almost certainly be messy and prolonged, drawing the US into a never-ending war.</p>.<p><strong>A shift in posture</strong></p>.<p>At the same time, key technical uncertainties remain regarding Iran’s nuclear programme despite claims of severe degradation following strikes on enrichment facilities. Outstanding issues include the disposition of the existing highly-enriched uranium stockpile of 408 kg, the enforceability of a permanent enrichment halt, and the restoration of comprehensive IAEA verification access beyond limited sites.</p>.<p>Economic pressure has altered Tehran’s negotiating posture. Successive rounds of sanctions and resulting domestic unrest, including merchant-led protests that expanded into broader anti-government demonstrations, have increased regime vulnerability. This pressure has contributed to Iran’s renewed willingness to engage in nuclear-focused talks.</p>.<p>The Muscat talks mark not a breakthrough but a carefully managed reopening of dialogue. Given the deep mistrust between the two sides after the 12-day war last June, when the US dropped bunker buster bombs on Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities, the decision to continue the talks itself indicates progress. For now, both sides believe they hold leverage. Forward movement is likely to be slow and incremental.</p>.<p>A deal is achievable if the US sticks to its original red line of nuclear weapons. However, if it is persuaded to adopt Israel's red lines, the negotiations are likely to collapse, potentially leading to military confrontation.</p>.<p><em>(The writer is a former Ambassador of India to Egypt and former Governor of India to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Vienna)</em></p><p><em>Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.</em></p>
<p>Iran and the United States reopened a diplomatic channel last Friday in Muscat, Oman, with two rounds of indirect talks lasting five hours. Although both parties characterised the exchange as constructive, the negotiations continue to remain fragile, particularly with the presence of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and other US naval assets off Iran’s coast.</p>.<p>The US side included, for the first time, the US Navy Admiral Brad Cooper, Head of Central Command, besides Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, President Donald Trump’s son-in-law. Cooper’s presence, in full military uniform, at the talks was intended as a signal of US military strength and leverage in the region.</p>.<p>The meeting focused primarily on listening and clarifying positions rather than negotiating technical frameworks or specific concessions. Iran insisted firmly that the agenda be restricted to nuclear issues. Earlier, Tehran had successfully pushed to shift the venue from Istanbul to Muscat and resisted expanded regional participation. From the Iranian perspective, a broader format would have tilted the process towards US demands to include limits on Iran’s ballistic missile programme and restrictions on its support for Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias. For Iran, ballistic missiles are vital and non-negotiable, as these missiles are its security insurance against any US military attack.</p>.<p>Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described the talks as a “good start” with a “positive” atmosphere and emphasised the importance of continued consultations. Trump called the discussions “very good” and indicated the next round could take place as early as next week. Simultaneously, Washington reinforced pressure by announcing new sanctions and tariffs on Iran. Trump said US military assets were moving into position, while stressing that the US is “in no rush”, but accusing Iran of building a new nuclear facility.</p>.<p>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is scheduled to visit Washington this Wednesday for talks with President Trump. The trip, originally planned for around the 18th of this month to attend the first meeting of the Board of Peace, was moved forward to focus specifically on the Iran issue amid Israel’s concerns that the US position may be shifting. Netanyahu’s visit is intended to press against any US-Iran agreement that is limited to the nuclear issue while leaving out Iran’s ballistic missile programme and its regional security threats.</p>.<p>Netanyahu played a decisive role in persuading the first Trump administration to withdraw from the 2015 JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Programme of Action) nuclear deal and has consistently supported a hardline approach. He attacked Iran after the IAEA reported non-compliance of Iran with its safeguards obligations, and later pressed for US strikes on Iran’s enrichment facilities. From Israel’s perspective, strategic confrontation with Iran remains unfinished business.</p>.<p>Because Israel does not share a border with Iran, it faces fewer immediate physical spillover risks from a renewed conflict or potential internal destabilisation within Iran. That geographic buffer significantly shapes Israeli threat assessments and tolerance for escalation. The Arab Gulf states, by contrast, operate under far greater proximity risk and, therefore, adopt a more cautious strategic calculus. While they would welcome outcomes that degrade Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and constrain its support for Hezbollah and the Houthis, they are concerned that a large-scale US strike on Iran could trigger region-wide retaliation. Such escalation could threaten critical energy infrastructure, disrupt shipping lanes, and undermine macroeconomic stability.</p>.<p>Although several Gulf governments have publicly stated that their airspace would not be available for offensive operations against Iran, they recognise that strikes could be conducted from maritime platforms in the Arabian Sea or via alternative regional corridors. Iranian officials have repeatedly framed any direct attack as a trigger for broad regional confrontation.</p>.<p>These risk perceptions have been communicated to Washington by multiple regional partners, including Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman, emphasising the systemic costs of escalation. US domestic political factors also shape decision-making. Elements within Trump’s political base have shown growing resistance to further Middle East military entanglements and are increasingly critical of what they see as an “Israel First” policy, especially with mid-term elections due next year. Military action against Iran would almost certainly be messy and prolonged, drawing the US into a never-ending war.</p>.<p><strong>A shift in posture</strong></p>.<p>At the same time, key technical uncertainties remain regarding Iran’s nuclear programme despite claims of severe degradation following strikes on enrichment facilities. Outstanding issues include the disposition of the existing highly-enriched uranium stockpile of 408 kg, the enforceability of a permanent enrichment halt, and the restoration of comprehensive IAEA verification access beyond limited sites.</p>.<p>Economic pressure has altered Tehran’s negotiating posture. Successive rounds of sanctions and resulting domestic unrest, including merchant-led protests that expanded into broader anti-government demonstrations, have increased regime vulnerability. This pressure has contributed to Iran’s renewed willingness to engage in nuclear-focused talks.</p>.<p>The Muscat talks mark not a breakthrough but a carefully managed reopening of dialogue. Given the deep mistrust between the two sides after the 12-day war last June, when the US dropped bunker buster bombs on Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities, the decision to continue the talks itself indicates progress. For now, both sides believe they hold leverage. Forward movement is likely to be slow and incremental.</p>.<p>A deal is achievable if the US sticks to its original red line of nuclear weapons. However, if it is persuaded to adopt Israel's red lines, the negotiations are likely to collapse, potentially leading to military confrontation.</p>.<p><em>(The writer is a former Ambassador of India to Egypt and former Governor of India to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Vienna)</em></p><p><em>Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.</em></p>
