Strategic hedging: That road is narrowing for India

The ongoing pandemic has generated a plethora of literature and discourse dealing with likely changes in the polity and economy of states, leading to definitive changes in strategic behaviour of states and global geopolitics. Among them, a calculated reversal of the processes of globalisation, states’ greater control over resources, strengthening nationalism and embrace of ‘total sovereignty’ are likely to be the stand-outs in the post-Covid-19 behaviour of states. For India, this could mean a much narrower path to manoeuvre through freely in its bid to hedge between two states.

If India’s bandwidth to hedge between global powers in different eras were to be compared, the Cold War provided India with the widest spectrum. India’s leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and its ability to navigate between the US and the Soviet Union despite instances of scrimmage with the former and growing proximity with the latter provided a comfortable geopolitical operating space. This space gradually got constricted with the collapse of the Soviet Union. India, like a few other countries, lost its compass to measure its relative movement vis-à-vis what had been two poles. However, there still was enough space for India to stay away from an alliance with the US.

The September 11 terrorist attacks brought with it the narrative of "you're either with us, or against us" in the global fight against terrorism led by the US. This further tightened India’s passage in its inability to stay away from unilateral agenda of the leading global power. Though India’s strong opposition to terrorism largely coincided with the agenda of the ‘coalition of the willing’ led by the US, the latter’s purpose, pretext and method of invading Iraq did not. As the UK’s Chilcot inquiry report on the Iraq invasion would later reveal, the Vajpayee government came under intense pressure from the US to put “boots on the ground” in Iraq. Despite good press domestically, India was criticised for its decision not to send troops supporting the international coalition. This experience certainly reflected that the closer India had got to the world’s leading power, the harder it proved to hedge successfully and get out of the situation without much political cost. If anything, India has only got closer to the US since.

The emergence of China as the other power centre in the 21st century and the competition between the world’s two largest economies, which has only intensified under the Trump administration, again afforded enough hedging space for a middle power like India. Delhi successfully hedged its bets between the US and China, with both countries competing to be India’s largest trade partners. Although evidence would suggest that in the last few years India has become one of the closest partners of the US, it has been careful not to rile Beijing. One of the remarkable attributes of hedging is that it reduces the political or diplomatic cost of a decision, despite the decision being unfavourable to the stronger power. As such, India has avoided having to choose between the US and China.

However, the road to successful hedging between the US and China is becoming narrower for India. In the post-Covid-19 world order, this could be India’s biggest challenge from a grand strategic perspective. Already, there is mounting diplomatic pressure from both Australia and the US, both strategic partners of India and ardently committed members of the Indo-Pacific strategy, for India to join the international chorus on a global inquiry on the origin of the Covid-19 virus, independent of the WHO. Other countries like the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and France have laid down different demands to China, ranging from investigation to compensation.

It is unlikely that India will join a set of countries against China. With the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo doubling down on his call for investigation on the origin of the virus, India’s challenge will lie in successfully hedging to preserve its own national interests. Although an independent investigation into the origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus does not appear far from its interests, India will be looking to avoid the collective Western call for an investigation against China or any move that is directly hostile to China. Instead, it suits its interests to take a more nuanced position, while still reflecting its displeasure with Beijing. This balance was visible in its recent calls for a reform of the WHO in at least two international forums; the G20 and the NAM.

The post-Covid-19 world order will likely mark the third watershed in successive narrowing of the spectrum for India’s strategic hedging. It is also likely that the cost of hedging for India will increase henceforth, even as strategic compulsions from both poles will increase. While an unprecedented halt to economic activities internally and externally will ensure that India’s trade dependence on China would continue, a threateningly realistic US President will mean that India will have to work extra hard on the relationship with Washington.

India’s deft hedging has ensured that hitherto, India’s position in the China-India-US dynamic has balanced itself well. Though India’s growing partnership with the US has acted as strategic feelers for China, Delhi has resisted joining either camp. Strategic thinkers have long held that in the China-India-US dynamic, it would take an unprecedented, dramatic and globally consequential step by China for India to cross over to the US camp avowedly. Is this epidemic that consequential moment? Perhaps not. It still suits India’s interests to walk the tightrope between Beijing and Washington. But China’s assertive behaviour, even as the Covid-19 crisis is unfolding, along with Washington's efforts to find a critical mass of countries to push back against China on its culpability in the outbreak of the pandemic could potentially end India's strategic hedging.