Paradigm shift in perception of political representation of Muslims

The real question is not just who represents Muslims, but how that representation is perceived and politicised

In an age of political messaging, statistics alone can’t explain outcomes, it is interpreted through narratives. The results of the recent Assembly elections across five states signal not merely an electoral shift, but a deeper transformation in how Muslim political representation is viewed and contested in India. What we are witnessing is not just a change in outcomes, but a change in narrative.

In the context of Muslim political representation, the results from West Bengal and Assam consolidate a new discourse in ‘New India’. In Assam, of the 19 MLAs elected from the Indian National Congress, 18 are Muslims. In West Bengal, the Congress secured two seats, both represented by Muslim candidates. These outcomes have added fuel to an already persistent political claim: that the Congress has increasingly come to be portrayed as a ‘modern-day Muslim League.’

This allegation, frequently articulated by leaders of the Bharatiya Janata Party such as Amit Shah and Narendra Modi, has now found unexpected echoes even among regional actors like Badruddin Ajmal of the All India United Democratic Front, whose party survives on Muslim votes. Ajmal’s post-election remarks reinforce how this narrative has permeated across ideological divides, indicating a broader shift in political framing.

Yet, strong Muslim representation is not unprecedented. In 1980, India witnessed its highest-ever Muslim presence in the Lok Sabha, with 49 MPs (9.04% of the House). Between 1952 and 1999, 406 Muslim MPs were elected, of whom nearly 71% won from constituencies where Muslims were not the majority. This historical reality underscores a crucial point: Muslim political success in India has traditionally been embedded within broader, cross-community coalitions, and not confined to identity-based strongholds.

What has changed, however, is the ideological terrain. Since 2014, with the rise of the BJP and the consolidation of Hindutva politics, the grammar of electoral competition has shifted significantly. Parties that once positioned themselves as secular, most notably the Congress, now find themselves navigating a political landscape where secularism is often recast as minority appeasement. In this new environment, secular parties are increasingly caught between a rock and a hard place, losing ground among both majority voters and fragmented minority constituencies.

The data from the recent polls reflects this complexity. Across 823 Assembly seats in four states and one Union Territory, a total of 91 Muslim candidates were elected, constituting approximately 11.06% of the total representation. West Bengal led with 32 Muslim MLAs, followed closely by Kerala with 31, Assam with 22, Tamil Nadu with five, and Puducherry with one.

Beneath these aggregate numbers, however, lies a more consequential trend: the fragmentation of Muslim votes. In West Bengal, particularly in Muslim-majority districts such as Murshidabad, Malda, and North Dinajpur, votes were split among multiple parties rather than consolidating behind a dominant force like the All India Trinamool Congress (TMC). This division significantly weakened the electoral prospects of regional parties.

Murshidabad, with over 70% Muslim population, offers a striking example. Here, electoral competition among five parties diluted the vote share, eroding the dominance of traditional players. Across 43 constituencies in these three districts, the BJP increased its tally from eight to 18 seats, while the TMC saw a decline. The Congress, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), and smaller regional outfits also claimed portions of the Muslim vote.

At the same time, Hindu voters displayed a higher degree of consolidation, amplifying the BJP’s electoral gains. Importantly, this shift was not driven by a significant increase in Muslim support for the BJP, but rather by the asymmetry between a divided minority vote and a consolidated majority vote — a dynamic that decisively altered electoral outcomes.

This phenomenon is not unique to India. Political theorist Hannah Arendt once warned that modern politics often transforms identities into instruments of power, where perception can outweigh reality. Similarly, in the United States during the late 20th century, the Republican Party successfully framed the Democratic Party as the representative of minority interests, thereby reshaping voter alignments along identity lines. The lesson is clear: once such narratives take root, they are difficult to dislodge.

In India today, a comparable shift is underway. The portrayal of secular parties as ‘Muslim parties’ is less about empirical reality and more about political strategy, one that redefines the terms of electoral competition. It narrows the space for inclusive politics and compels parties to constantly defend their legitimacy.

The real question, therefore, is not just who represents Muslims, but how that representation is perceived and politicised. If electoral politics continues down this path, India risks moving from a system of broad-based representation to one of hardened identity silos.

In the end, democracy is not only about counting votes — it is about what those votes come to signify. When perception begins to overshadow participation, the very idea of representation stands on uncertain ground.

Sayed Rashad Ikmal is an independent researcher. X: @rashadikmal.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH)