Power without polarity: Why West Asia won't trigger World War III

Amid the US-Iran standoff in the Arabian Sea following the US naval blockade of Iranian ports, the ongoing conflict in West Asia has stirred fears in some quarters that it could become a catalyst for a third world war. Similar concerns were articulated by several analysts and commentators in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Historically, the world has witnessed numerous interstate conflicts since the establishment of the sovereign state system in 17th-century Europe. Barring the 1914-1918 World War and the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, no other conflicts were truly global in scope. Although many were protracted, lasting several years—such as the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s—the extent of global involvement was limited. Unlike World War II, in which more than 50 countries participated, the current conflict involving Iran remains largely confined to three primary actors. The conflict drags on because Iran’s clerical regime possesses the escalatory capacity unavailable to either Saddam Hussein of Iraq in 2003 or to Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro earlier this year. 

Faced with the world’s most formidable military, Iran has adopted a strategy of cost-imposition warfare, comprising the weaponisation of energy routes, the disruption of oil supplies, the use of low-cost drones and ballistic missiles to target military sites, oil refineries and business centres in neighbouring Arab Gulf states. Iranian retaliation has prolonged the conflict, yet it has failed to widen it by drawing in other countries in the region. Likewise, NATO partners of the United States have chosen not to join the US-Israeli military campaign ‘Epic Fury’, while France and Spain have blocked US warplanes from using key bases and airspace for combat operations against Iran. 

In explaining global conflict causation, international relations experts hold that the shift in the European balance of power following the rise of Germany in 1871 was the foundational cause of the outbreak of the two World Wars in the 20th century. The post-Cold War international system has experienced no global power shift comparable to that of 19th-century Europe, despite the economic rise of China and the resurgence of Russia. The differential growth rates in the past two decades have, doubtless, narrowed the gap between the US and the rising powers, leading to the erosion of the former’s relative power. However, this process has not culminated in a global power transition, as was speculated in the years following the 2008 fiscal meltdown. 

With a vast global network of over 750 military bases in more than 80 countries and nearly 40% of the world’s total military spending, the US has the capability to project power in any part of the world. It is thus arguable that the generic description of the current configuration of power as multipolar does not reflect the complex reality. This flawed perception has, instead, fuelled fears of an impending global conflagration. It assumes that competition among several states with comparable levels of power seeking to maximise their influence renders the contemporary international system prone to fluid alignments and miscalculation.

Global conflict is typically characterised by a confrontation between two main opposing military blocs, as was the case with World War II. It involved the Allied Powers—comprising the United Kingdom, the US and the Soviet Union—and the Axis Powers, led by Nazi Germany, Italy and Japan. Neither of the two contemporary conflicts—Ukraine and Iran—has led to the formation of such rigid military blocs. Conversely, the growing fissures within the 72-year-old NATO following the threat of reduced US commitment would in all likelihood embolden Russia in Ukraine and towards other Eastern European nations. The escalation of the Iran war, particularly the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, has boosted Russia’s oil revenue by over $8 billion a month, potentially deterring Moscow from active entanglement, notwithstanding its close strategic ties with Iran. 

Just as Russia avoids direct confrontation with the US, China persists with its long-standing policy of hiding strength and biding time. The latter, arguably, watches its main adversary deplete military capacity in a protracted regional war, thus debilitating its power projection capability in the Indo-Pacific. In any case, the US-China rivalry is playing out more in the domain of geoeconomics, as both of them are engaged in containing each other’s economic and technological leverage while making compromises that serve their mutual interests. 

Reflective of this, the two countries finalised the $10 billion profit-sharing TikTok deal earlier this year. Similarly, Russia’s recent internal proposals to resume using the US dollar for trade transactions represent a dramatic pivot from its aggressive ‘de-dollarisation’ campaign. Many such instances reveal the empty diplomatic rhetoric surrounding the emergence of the so-called counter-hegemonic bloc, the absence of which undermines the prospects of a third world war in the near future. 

Above all, multilateralism plays a significant role in promoting cooperative behaviour through rules and institutions, even amid intense strategic competition among states. This reduces the chances of a regional conflict becoming a catalyst for a larger war. After all, a third world war, in an age of nuclear weapons on hairpin triggers, would end with no winners, only losers.

(The writer is former Dean, School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.