<p>President Donald Trump’s address from the White House yesterday was a calibrated exercise in domestic reassurance. It was a “mission accomplished” narrative, laying the groundwork for a unilateral exit even without a formal agreement — a narrative he had already signalled on March 31. At that time, as Brent crude prices surged past $118 per barrel, his statement that the US would end its military operations within “two or three weeks,” regardless of whether a deal was reached, triggered an immediate correction. Oil prices dropped by $16, settling around $102.</p>.<p>However, the effect was significantly weaker than a similar intervention earlier in the conflict. On the tenth day of the war, Trump had declared that the conflict would end “very soon,” a message that carried greater credibility at that early stage. That statement drove prices down sharply, from approximately $119 to $90 per barrel. The contrast between the two episodes reveals an important shift. Markets initially willing to accept presidential assurances had begun to discount them as the conflict dragged on. In the aftermath of his speech yesterday, oil prices climbed by an additional $2.</p>.<p>For Trump, oil prices are deeply political. Rising crude prices translate directly into higher gasoline costs in the US, fuelling inflation and voter dissatisfaction. With the November midterm elections just seven months away, gasoline prices breaching the $4-per gallon mark represent a serious political liability. The administration’s efforts to stabilise markets — ranging from waivers on oil sales by Russia and Iran to releases from strategic reserves — have failed to produce lasting relief. The core issue of Iran’s effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz remains unresolved.</p>.<p>Domestically, the political warning signs are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. In recent weeks, Democrats have flipped key seats in Florida, including a State House seat in Trump’s own Mar-a-Lago district. Additionally, Republicans lost a Florida Senate seat that had been secured earlier by a margin of 17 percentage points. These developments suggest a shift in voter sentiment that could have broader implications for the upcoming midterm elections. Furthermore, Trump’s net approval rating has fallen significantly. This erosion of public support further constrains the President’s options.</p>.<p>Against this backdrop, can Trump realistically terminate the US operations within the two- to three-week timeframe he has announced? In the early stages of the war, such a move would have been far easier to justify. At that time, the US administration could plausibly have declared victory, citing the decapitation of Iran’s political and military leadership and the near-total destruction of its missile and nuclear capabilities.</p>.<p>Even now, Trump retains the option of declaring victory and withdrawing, effectively shifting responsibility onto other nations dependent on energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz. However, such a move would not necessarily bring immediate stability. Even if the US were to cease operations and persuade Israel to follow suit, Iran is unlikely to alter its course immediately. It would likely continue targeting US-linked assets in the Gulf for some time.</p>.<p>However, Iran’s capacity to sustain such actions indefinitely is limited. Significant international pressure from China and Europe would likely compel Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz eventually. Nevertheless, this would leave Iran with enduring leverage over one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. Gulf countries, in turn, would be forced to negotiate some form of modus vivendi with Iran to ensure the continued flow of oil and other essential commodities. Such an outcome would weaken the position of the US as a reliable partner in the region.</p>.<p><strong>Alternate scenarios</strong></p>.<p>Despite setting a new deadline of April 4, Trump appears unlikely to escalate further by targeting Iran’s power utilities or energy infrastructure, notwithstanding his renewed threats to do so in his address yesterday. Such an escalation would risk severe retaliation against desalination plants and critical infrastructure in Gulf states, an outcome that would be catastrophic not only regionally but globally, especially for South Asian populations heavily represented in these countries.</p>.<p>Military options, such as occupying Kharg Island, through which over 90% of Iran’s oil exports flow, or seizing disputed islands at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, carry even greater risks. These actions would be highly escalatory and could entangle the US in another prolonged and costly conflict. Historical precedents in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam serve as cautionary examples of such entanglements. Trump would also be acutely aware of the far-reaching repercussions of the failed 1980 hostage rescue mission in Tehran under President Jimmy Carter.</p>.<p>Diplomatic efforts have thus far yielded little progress. Recent meetings involving the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey in Islamabad, followed by discussions between Pakistan and China, have failed to produce a breakthrough. The 15-point US proposal, transmitted via Islamabad, has been perceived by Iran as a demand for surrender, while Iran’s own five-point counterproposal remains unacceptable to Washington.</p>.<p>With meaningful concessions from either side absent, the diplomatic stalemate is likely to persist. If the US withdraws without a deal, alternative diplomatic arrangements may emerge. China, Russia, and the four countries that met in Islamabad, along with other Muslim countries, could potentially offer security assurances to Iran in exchange for reopening the Strait of Hormuz. However, such a development would mark a significant shift in the regional balance of power, potentially diminishing US influence.</p>.<p>The conflict reveals a growing disconnect between political messaging and strategic reality. A premature withdrawal may enable Washington to claim victory, but it risks ceding strategic space in the Gulf and allowing Iran to retain leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Conversely, escalation carries prohibitive economic and geopolitical costs. With diplomatic options stalled, the US appears caught between unattractive choices. The likely outcome is not a decisive victory, but an uneasy equilibrium.</p>.<p><em><strong>The writer is a former Governor of India to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Vienna, former ambassador to Egypt, and former permanent representative to the Arab League</strong></em></p><p><em>(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.)</em></p>
<p>President Donald Trump’s address from the White House yesterday was a calibrated exercise in domestic reassurance. It was a “mission accomplished” narrative, laying the groundwork for a unilateral exit even without a formal agreement — a narrative he had already signalled on March 31. At that time, as Brent crude prices surged past $118 per barrel, his statement that the US would end its military operations within “two or three weeks,” regardless of whether a deal was reached, triggered an immediate correction. Oil prices dropped by $16, settling around $102.</p>.<p>However, the effect was significantly weaker than a similar intervention earlier in the conflict. On the tenth day of the war, Trump had declared that the conflict would end “very soon,” a message that carried greater credibility at that early stage. That statement drove prices down sharply, from approximately $119 to $90 per barrel. The contrast between the two episodes reveals an important shift. Markets initially willing to accept presidential assurances had begun to discount them as the conflict dragged on. In the aftermath of his speech yesterday, oil prices climbed by an additional $2.</p>.<p>For Trump, oil prices are deeply political. Rising crude prices translate directly into higher gasoline costs in the US, fuelling inflation and voter dissatisfaction. With the November midterm elections just seven months away, gasoline prices breaching the $4-per gallon mark represent a serious political liability. The administration’s efforts to stabilise markets — ranging from waivers on oil sales by Russia and Iran to releases from strategic reserves — have failed to produce lasting relief. The core issue of Iran’s effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz remains unresolved.</p>.<p>Domestically, the political warning signs are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. In recent weeks, Democrats have flipped key seats in Florida, including a State House seat in Trump’s own Mar-a-Lago district. Additionally, Republicans lost a Florida Senate seat that had been secured earlier by a margin of 17 percentage points. These developments suggest a shift in voter sentiment that could have broader implications for the upcoming midterm elections. Furthermore, Trump’s net approval rating has fallen significantly. This erosion of public support further constrains the President’s options.</p>.<p>Against this backdrop, can Trump realistically terminate the US operations within the two- to three-week timeframe he has announced? In the early stages of the war, such a move would have been far easier to justify. At that time, the US administration could plausibly have declared victory, citing the decapitation of Iran’s political and military leadership and the near-total destruction of its missile and nuclear capabilities.</p>.<p>Even now, Trump retains the option of declaring victory and withdrawing, effectively shifting responsibility onto other nations dependent on energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz. However, such a move would not necessarily bring immediate stability. Even if the US were to cease operations and persuade Israel to follow suit, Iran is unlikely to alter its course immediately. It would likely continue targeting US-linked assets in the Gulf for some time.</p>.<p>However, Iran’s capacity to sustain such actions indefinitely is limited. Significant international pressure from China and Europe would likely compel Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz eventually. Nevertheless, this would leave Iran with enduring leverage over one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. Gulf countries, in turn, would be forced to negotiate some form of modus vivendi with Iran to ensure the continued flow of oil and other essential commodities. Such an outcome would weaken the position of the US as a reliable partner in the region.</p>.<p><strong>Alternate scenarios</strong></p>.<p>Despite setting a new deadline of April 4, Trump appears unlikely to escalate further by targeting Iran’s power utilities or energy infrastructure, notwithstanding his renewed threats to do so in his address yesterday. Such an escalation would risk severe retaliation against desalination plants and critical infrastructure in Gulf states, an outcome that would be catastrophic not only regionally but globally, especially for South Asian populations heavily represented in these countries.</p>.<p>Military options, such as occupying Kharg Island, through which over 90% of Iran’s oil exports flow, or seizing disputed islands at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, carry even greater risks. These actions would be highly escalatory and could entangle the US in another prolonged and costly conflict. Historical precedents in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam serve as cautionary examples of such entanglements. Trump would also be acutely aware of the far-reaching repercussions of the failed 1980 hostage rescue mission in Tehran under President Jimmy Carter.</p>.<p>Diplomatic efforts have thus far yielded little progress. Recent meetings involving the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey in Islamabad, followed by discussions between Pakistan and China, have failed to produce a breakthrough. The 15-point US proposal, transmitted via Islamabad, has been perceived by Iran as a demand for surrender, while Iran’s own five-point counterproposal remains unacceptable to Washington.</p>.<p>With meaningful concessions from either side absent, the diplomatic stalemate is likely to persist. If the US withdraws without a deal, alternative diplomatic arrangements may emerge. China, Russia, and the four countries that met in Islamabad, along with other Muslim countries, could potentially offer security assurances to Iran in exchange for reopening the Strait of Hormuz. However, such a development would mark a significant shift in the regional balance of power, potentially diminishing US influence.</p>.<p>The conflict reveals a growing disconnect between political messaging and strategic reality. A premature withdrawal may enable Washington to claim victory, but it risks ceding strategic space in the Gulf and allowing Iran to retain leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Conversely, escalation carries prohibitive economic and geopolitical costs. With diplomatic options stalled, the US appears caught between unattractive choices. The likely outcome is not a decisive victory, but an uneasy equilibrium.</p>.<p><em><strong>The writer is a former Governor of India to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Vienna, former ambassador to Egypt, and former permanent representative to the Arab League</strong></em></p><p><em>(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.)</em></p>