Rising India needs a Latin America plan

India’s foreign policy debates are often dominated by its immediate neighbourhood, the Indo-Pacific, and relations with major powers. Yet one strategically consequential region continues to sit at the margins of New Delhi’s attention: Latin America.

This neglect is no longer benign. In a global order marked by geopolitical polarisation, supply-chain disruptions, and renewed great-power competition, Latin America has moved from the periphery to the centre of global debates on energy security, critical minerals, food supply chains, and Global South coalition-building.

Today, Latin American countries are actively recalibrating their external partnerships. Seeking to preserve strategic autonomy amid intensifying US-China rivalry, many governments in the region are reducing overdependence and diversifying relations.

This creates a rare opening for India, whose political stability, rapid economic growth, and rising global influence as a non-hegemonic, democratic Global South partner, enhance its appeal across the region.

Economically, the logic for closer ties is straightforward. Latin America possesses vast reserves of lithium, copper, crude oil, and agricultural commodities, resources that align directly with India’s energy transition, manufacturing ambitions, and food security needs. India has already taken initial steps through the FOCUS LAC programme, India-MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement, India-LAC Conclave, free trade negotiations with Chile and Peru, and lithium cooperation with Argentina. Indian pharmaceuticals, oil industries, IT services, automobiles, and engineering goods have also gained footholds across the region. Yet, India-Latin America trade has stagnated at around $35-40 billion, far below New Delhi’s stated ambition of reaching $100 billion by the late 2020s. What is missing is a shift towards deeper diversified integration through investment protection, logistics connectivity, and
sector-specific partnerships.

On defence, Brazil and Argentina have expressed interest in Indian platforms, and India has supplied equipment to several Latin American countries. However, India’s cooperation with Latin American countries remains modest, indicating considerable scope for further expansion.

Culturally, India enjoys a reservoir of goodwill in the region. Diaspora communities in the Caribbean preserve Indian languages, religious traditions, and festivals, many of which are now officially recognised as national holidays. Indian movies, yoga, and Ayurveda have gained widespread popularity. India has also institutionalised its soft power through ICCR scholarships, ITEC capacity-building programmes, and cultural exchanges. However, India’s cultural appeal has yet to be sustained by region-wide institutional presence.

Shared models, fragmented ties

India and Latin America also share scepticism towards global governance institutions that inadequately represent developing-world interests. This shared worldview underpins common positions on upholding the rule of law, climate justice, and inclusivity, thereby leading them to work together under the Global South framework, grounded in shared values, mutual respect, and solidarity. Both camps seek to exchange best practices and reduce over-reliance on traditional partners by expanding South-South trade and cooperation. For instance, with over 87% of its crude oil requirements met through imports, India remains vulnerable to supply chain disruption and hence, is deepening energy engagement with countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Guyana, and Suriname, as part of restructuring India’s energy security architecture.

Other than this, India’s digital inclusive model, exemplified by the Unified Payments Interface and Aadhaar-based systems, has been adopted in countries such as Trinidad and Tobago and is being implemented in Guyana, Peru, Uruguay, and Jamaica. India has also emerged as a hub for governance and capacity-building for several Latin American countries, enabling exposure to India’s experience in managing federalism, state-Centre relations, and democratic governance in a highly diverse society.

Despite this, India’s engagement with Latin America remains fragmented. This is not due to language barriers (as India has built deep partnerships across linguistically diverse Africa). Rather, it reflects long-standing strategic neglect shaped by distance. However, today, these constraints are rapidly eroding. New infrastructure projects across Latin America are reducing the tyranny of distance to Asia (the Port of Chancay in Peru has reduced transportation time from around 40 days to 25-30 days). India should not wait passively for these shifts to mature; it should invest in new connectivity corridors, regional projects, and alternative routes that bypass traditional hubs such as the Panama Canal.

As India’s global profile rises, so must its strategic and economic footprint in the region. The shift is already visible in Delhi; India’s budget allocation for Latin America has steadily increased (Rs 120 crore in 2026-27), reflecting a growing importance of the region to India. What India needs now is a coherent Latin America strategy to integrate into regional supply chains – one that institutionalises engagement by moving it from the margins of multilateral platforms to a structured and regularised mechanism, expands economic and diplomatic presence, pursues observer or active participation in regional institutions including the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and systematically strengthens soft power, including through the promotion of Track 1.5 dialogues. The onus lies squarely on New Delhi to utilise the strategic space created by the US-China rivalry and the trust it enjoys in the region to develop a coherent LAC strategy.

(The writer is a research associate at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, specialising in US-Latin America. Views expressed are personal)