The Chinese cult of defence

The principle of a ‘just war’ has always been central to China’s outlook towards war and its military and security policy. The just war theory revolves around the following hypotheses, viz., just wars are good wars and unjust wars are bad ones; that just wars are fought by oppressed groups against oppressors; and that unjust wars are waged by oppressors against the oppressed. Though Chinese strategic thinkers tend to believe that its strategic culture is defensive-minded and non-expansionist, this cannot be taken at face value.

From the Chinese perspective, any war fought by it is just. This holds good even for a war where China strikes first. Any understanding of China’s strategic culture is a prerequisite for understanding Beijing’s military and security affairs. Chinese strategic culture is a mix of the Confucian and Realpolitik strands, based on the cult of defence. What is required is a contextual understanding of how China’s strategic culture impacts and influences Chinese decision-making, and an appreciation of how cultural imperatives influence China’s strategic thought and culture.

China’s strategic culture is essentially ‘Confucian’ in nature. Confucianism emphasised ‘five constant virtues namely humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and faithfulness. The Confucian perception of the State has impacted the Chinese strategic culture by emphasising "harmony over conflict’ and ‘defence over offence." The impact of Confucianism on China’s strategic culture is reflected in the following two perceptions: Confucianism provides the foundation of Chinese military thought and culture, and Confucian tradition has been a key determinant of Chinese strategic thinking.

Noted China watcher and researcher Alain Johnston argues that there are two strands of Chinese strategic culture: Firstly, it is a ‘parabellum’ or a realpolitik culture that primarily favours military solutions which is offensive-oriented; and secondly, it is a Confucian-Mencian one which is primarily conflict-averse and defensive-minded. However, he argues that while both strands exist, only the parabellum strand is operative. The other strand was purely for “idealised discourse”. Hence at any point of time, both these strands assume significance individually and/or collectively, which provides a form of rationalisation.

The underlying premise here is that Chinese rulers can launch a just war. This holds good even for a war where China strikes first. Hence, the February 1979 border war with Vietnam was perceived by the Chinese as a just war. This war was one of the largest military conflicts in the post-Mao era.  On the contrary, the Chinese argued that most of the wars fought or initiated by the United States, especially during the Cold War, were unjust wars.

China’s strategic culture exhibits an ‘aggressive’ and ‘expansionist’ preference. The cult of defence is a ‘cultural tendency’ in China to perceive just war and active defence in ways that predispose China to actually use force when it is rationalised as defensive and just. Hence, when it comes to its core interests, China will readily use force and justify it on the basis of the just-war concept. China considers national unification as a ‘sacred trust’ and an important ‘strategic objective’. To quote Deng Xiaoping, “Active defence is not defence per se, but includes defensive offensives.” If this is not juggling with words then what could be?

China’s military strategy gives rise to a strong emphasis on ‘deception’ at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Chinese doctrinal materials define strategic deception as luring the other side into developing misperceptions, and establishing for oneself a strategically advantageous position by producing various kinds of false phenomena in an organised and planned manner with the smallest cost in manpower and materials. Deception is an integral element of China’s strategic culture, and hence India’s strategists and diplomats need to understand this important instrument in China’s strategic toolbox and learn to deal with it appropriately and effectively.

Chinese strategic thought and behaviour is nothing short of hardcore realpolitik. Any military action is perceived as defensive even when it is basically offensive in nature. To understand China’s strategic culture and thinking, an understanding of the historical and cultural factors is a must. Prior to Xi Jinping, the saying was ‘develop capabilities while keeping a low profile’. That’s no longer the case now. China’s footprint and assertiveness, regionally and globally, have elicited a sense of uneasiness, fear and uncertainty. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has argued that China intends to annex Taiwan on a much faster timeline. Of late, there has been an increase in the Chinese military crossings of the median line.

Strategic culture and geopolitical shifts have been an obsession with the Chinese. There is much haziness about how a rising China will use its power base and capabilities, despite Beijing proclaiming to the whole world its peaceful rise. Napoleon had described China as a sleeping giant that would shake the world when it finally awoke. The giant has woken up and the world cannot help but notice.

(The writer is a professor, Dept of International Studies, Political Science and History, Christ (deemed-to-be University), Bengaluru)