The costs of America’s whimsical war

Unclear objectives, a resilient Iran, and the threat of regional escalation may prolong the conflict

Wars must have a purpose. When leaders easily change their minds, the war’s aims look whimsical. From “destroying the nuclear stockpile” to “changing regimes”, the United States’ strikes speak as much about its shifting priorities in Iran. It draws deep scepticism when they urge the Iranians to rise and overthrow a functional regime. Clearly, a country the size of Iran cannot be transformed from the air, least of all by striking fear into the populace.

The assumption that Iran would quickly fold has proved wrong. Rather, if the war were to prolong, it would put the US military build-up to test, while Iran would continue to undertake slow, significant retaliatory strikes. A protracted conflict might even force the US to commit ground troops or declare a quick victory and exit the region. The question then is, where the war is headed, how long it will last, and at what cost to all.

Three aspects are pertinent. First, there is little doubt that theocratic regimes can be autocratic, but that does not call for decapitation. Besides, the strikes on non-military targets might have come as a shock, even to those who might loathe the regime. No citizenry would want the country to be attacked, its economy destroyed, even if there is visible frustration with the Iranian government.

Second, a regime change is less likely to bring in a more amenable leadership. Instead, the new dispensation, after the brutal lesson in power, is not likely to stop threatening the US and its allies in West Asia. There is also the dangerous possibility of strengthening Iran’s resolve to produce a nuclear weapon. A resurgent Iran will keep the region volatile, with the war lasting at its own pace, causing a spike in oil prices and inflationary trends.

Third, if the war prolongs, Iran’s leaders might be tempted to expand the conflict. This evokes memories of the 1980s tanker war. In this age, a tanker war could be even more lethal. Uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) can strike hard along the waterline to maximise damage to vessels. Besides, Iran has inshore attack-craft and missile boats. They also have a small fleet of submersibles, which can lay mines – placing a few would evoke ample fear. Iran’s new tanker strategy could provoke a massive global outrage to bring in substantial pressure on the US.

The US possibly had three rules of intervention in Iran: strike fast, take no casualties, and avoid a ground campaign. Early success, like targeting Ayatollah Khamenei, can create the belief that escalation will remain controllable. However, in conflicts with no precise aims and objectives, the incentives to escalate a fraught conflict are often stronger. And, if professional advice is shaped by political exigency rather than sound military judgment, the risk of escalation increases.

Next, if the aerial strikes fail, there is a tendency to escalate or add another dimension to the conflict. Putting boots on the ground is the obvious choice. The problem is, when the territorial integrity of a State comes into play, it evokes national emotions. Even if the populace hates the regime, it has good reasons to rally behind it for reasons of national pride. Besides, Iran is not a pushover State and the US can ill-afford a land campaign.

On the contrary, Iran has a clear strategy. They are determined not to replicate last year's war: large barrages that were intercepted, resulting in significant losses. This time, they have shifted to a steadier campaign: to drag out the conflict, expand geographies, and impose real costs. Besides, they are firing fewer missiles – the old ones first – at well-dispersed targets. Smaller salvos can lead to faster depletion of interceptors and prove costly in the long term.

Besides, Iran has decentralised its command and control. It has created multiple power centres, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Artesh, and others, anticipating US action – each one acting without direct instructions, yet aligning to the design of retaliatory strikes. This worked well after the Ayatollah was killed in the initial attacks to coordinate and expand the retaliatory strikes. Iranian intentions are amply clear – to suck the US into a difficult war.

What comes next?

While the US certainly wants a short war, the truth is, it hardly aimed to fight a 20-year-long war in Afghanistan. The longer Iran sustains its missile and drone attacks, the more likely it is to prolong the conflict. Eventually, it turns into a contest of will – of who could hold out longer – in terms of Iran’s ability to retaliate versus America’s capacity to intercept the strikes. The problem of finite resources – air defence interceptors and counter-drone platforms – could put US readiness levels under stress.

With the conflict shifting to the straits of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb, the risks increase manifold. They are vulnerable for three reasons: geographical location, narrow navigable channels, and the ease of targeting predictable shipping routes. Controlling these “marginal seas” will become important. This necessitates high-cost, 24x7 naval operations: escorting ships, securing a favourable area-defence grid, and coping with skyrocketing shipping costs.

For India, the conflict puts its policy of strategic autonomy under severe test. With the war raging at the far edge of its western oceanic periphery, the concern is not only economic, but also geopolitical. Clearly, it must make sharp policy choices on the US or Iran, lest its growing salience as a leader of the Global South is called into question. It could, at least, have looked beyond the laws of neutrality at sea to call out the targeting of IRIS Dena exiting the Indian Ocean Region.

(The writer is a former military officer)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.