Timing of Dulat's revelations needs to be looked into

Former Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) chief A S Dulat’s revelations about some of the hitherto untold stories has kicked up a political storm in the country. But its most grievous fallout has been on the situation in J&K.

Dulat’s book ‘Kashmir: The Vajpayee Years’ talks about how New Delhi had quite often paid for the air fares, medical treatment and general upkeep of even hardened pro-Pakistan separatists like Syed Ali Geelani. From Farooq Abdullah, who had been promised appointment as India’s Vice President to Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir based Hizbul Mujahideen chief Syed Salahuddin, the former RAW chief makes “exposures” about all.

He has claimed that one of India’s most wanted terrorists Salahuddin was obliged when he called the Intelligence Bureau (IB) chief in Srinagar seeking admission for his son to a Kashmir medical college during Farooq Abdullah’s tenure (1996-2002) as chief minister. “In this instance, it was part of what could have been an attempt to lure Salahuddin back, which didn't succeed,” Dulat says.

On PDP president and MP Mehbooba Mufti, the ex-spymaster has said that former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had grave reservations about her and thought she had links with the Hizbul. He also claimed that Vajpayee was wary of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed becoming chief minister (in 2002).

Regarded as one of India’s leading

experts on Jammu and Kashmir, Dulat has termed the ruling PDP as a brain child of Geelani and said that Mufti attained power in 2002 with his help. There are other revelations in the book where Dulat has justified corrupting militants and separatists, saying bribing someone with money is more ethical and smarter than killing him. He has also touched upon Rubaiya Sayeed’s abduction and many other events of that turbulent period.

For a former spy chief to make such an argument in a public forum is clearly an out-of-the-box thinking. In track-II meetings, he is often seen in informal chats with his Pakistani counterparts on the sidelines of the main event, discussing how the bilateral relationship, which has gone sour, can be put back on the right track.

No one can doubt that Dulat has a liberal take on Kashmir resolution and he believes that there needs to be a humanitarian approach to it, just like his former boss Vajpayee. This sets him apart from his other spook-colleagues and members of New Delhi’s security establishment.

Dulat has been passionate about Kashmir and has an unconventional manner of viewing militancy in the state. His book is likely to discuss in great detail about the many missed opportunities in resolving the conflict in Kashmir. 2001 to 2004 was a crucial period in Kashmir’s history, a period when Dulat was advisor on Kashmir in the then Vajpayee’s office.

After the 2000-2001 military stand-off in the wake of the terrorist attack on Parliament, and the failed Agra Summit of 2001, it would have taken extraordi-nary courage for anyone to think of restarting the India-Pakistan peace process. Vajpayee had the courage, with sound counsel from Dulat.

A convenient narrative

However, Dulat’s whole narrative seems to be framed in a convenient way while glossing over some key elements. The timing of these revelations is what needs to be looked into. Why now and why not earlier? Why did he remain silent all these years and whom does he want to benefit through these exposures now. Some people in the Valley have termed the same as a ‘ploy to divide Kashmiris’, and make them ‘quarrel and create bad vibes against one another.’

Some of the dramatic exposures have already been contested on factual grounds. Salahuddin’s son has challenged Dulat’s version that his MBBS admission was a government favour. According to him, the only favour he got was his transfer from a Jammu college, where he felt threatened, to the Srinagar medical college. Salahuddin too has scoffed at the charges as a “Himalayan lie”.

Dulat is known to have enjoyed a close proximity with former J&K chief minister Farooq Abdullah. His closeness to the Abdullah family makes the revelations at this juncture a biased account. The Abdullahs-led National Conference was rejected by the people of the state in last year’s Parliament and Assembly elections. Is Dulat’s revelation about Mufti a tactic to resurrect Abdullahs’ image: that is the million dollar question.

Dulat is well known in Kashmir’s political and media circles. He is known to have rubbed shoulders with anyone who matters, anyone who could have even the slightest bearing on the Kashmir situation. And even after he left the RAW, he has on his own or on advice of powers that be, maintained contact with across the board Kashmiri leadership. Obviously the effort is geared to keep mainstream in tune with Delhi designs, and to lure resistance formations with accommodative offers within Indian constitutional parameters.
But more than the startling allegations against Kashmir’s diverse political and militant dramatis personae, some of which stretch the belief, the book is about the short-term, unplanned approach of the Centre towards the state. An approach which looks more to tide over the symptoms than curing the festering disease.

And an approach where engagement with the stakeholders is undertaken more to discredit them than to seek their cooperation in search for a larger political resolution that ushers real peace in the state.

From B N Mullick to A S Dulat, Kashmir has been managed by spy rings with spymasters managing scores of intelligence operatives. Dulat’s memoir comes at a time when there is indeed an urgent need for New Delhi to take a re-look at its recent policy towards J&K and Pakistan.