When tactical successes don’t translate to peace

Diplomacy with Pakistan under Munir will be tough; periodical weakening of its military muscle is an alternative

On June 13, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion with a spectacular attack targeting Iran’s top military commanders and nuclear scientists. In the currently popular Indian parlance, it would be called ghar mein ghus ke maarna (roughly translated as ‘hitting the enemy in his den’) – a policy that has all along evoked admiration among a section of opinion in India and an urge to emulate it.

Earlier in May, India had put up its best yet publicised performance of the above policy by launching Operation Sindoor targeting top symbols of Pakistan’s brazen terror. Both attacks were followed by an aerial war. However, barring a key aspect examined at the end of this essay, the similarity between the two situations ends here.

First, Israel has lived in a perennial state of conflict and spends around 9% of its GDP on defence. In contrast, India spends barely 2%, admittedly with a larger GDP, but also much larger security challenges. Second, there is no parallel between the two situations from the moral and international law angle. India’s legitimate fight has been against Pakistan’s attempts from its inception to change the territorial status quo and destabilise India through overt and covert warfare. On the other hand, Israel’s policy, especially in respect of the Palestinians, has violated all norms of international law.

Third, Israel is up against militarily far weaker adversaries and at best a nuclear threshold state in Iran, but one that is no match for the technological superiority of the US-supplied Israeli war machine. India, on the other hand, faces two nuclear-armed neighbours. Pakistan’s war machine is not much inferior to India’s and its backer – China – possesses formidable military power. This imposes limitations on India’s ability to escalate.

Fourth, the Israeli attacks, combined with the US bombardment of key nuclear facilities, caused considerable damage in Iran after its air defences were largely neutralised. The damage caused by India to Pakistan’s military installations was no match.

According to the information from official sources, India was able to neutralise Pakistan’s air defences sufficiently to be able to successfully attack airbases in the early hours of May 10. Our official discourse also maintains that Pakistan was chastened enough by this stage to ask for a ceasefire.

Why India did not press home this advantage remains unclear. In raising this aspect, I have in mind further degradation of Pakistan’s war machine and not unrealistic expectations generated by our political and strategic discourse, such as taking back PoK or Haji Pir etc. that were voiced in the wake of the ceasefire.

Fifth, in the UN debates and voting on resolutions, Israel appears isolated. But it is militarily the most powerful country in its region and no longer faces any meaningful opposition from the Arab world. It enjoys solid US backing. Other Western countries may disagree with it on Palestine, but share its goal of preventing Iran from going nuclear.

In contrast, we are now pretty much on our own in dealing with the security challenge from Pakistan. While there was widespread condemnation of the Pahalgam terror attack, no country named Pakistan as the perpetrator, and there were multiple calls for restraint from the international community wary of a wider war between two nuclear-armed countries. China’s support for Pakistan was palpable during the conflict, and India’s bugbear Field Marshal Asim Munir was the toast of the White House not too long thereafter.

Clearly, China’s iron brother Pakistan continues to be valuable to Washington too, albeit transactionally, because of its geographic location. Further, if we are aiming at reviving the level of international focus on terrorism that prevailed for a decade plus after 9/11, we may be in for disappointment. The global agenda has moved on. While robust deterrence and coercion are indispensable in dealing with Pakistan, the foregoing provides a reality check for those with the desire to emulate Israel.

A measured deterrence

Finally, over the years, Israel has notched up several brilliant tactical successes against its adversaries, but has no peace. The Palestinian problem continues to fester, and estimates of a setback to Iran’s nuclear programme range from a few months to a few years. Most credible observers believe that only diplomacy can achieve its enduring capping. Israel has shunned diplomacy in dealing with its adversaries for several years now and has followed a policy, euphemistically described as mowing the grass, to degrade their military capabilities periodically.

In our case, notwithstanding the brilliant tactical success of Operation Sindoor, we are nowhere close to putting an end to Pakistan’s terror, much less resolving our larger Pakistan problem. Pakistan’s terror infrastructure is largely intact. Asim Munir’s position has strengthened, at least for now. Following the Mumbai terror attack, we progressively abandoned bilateral diplomacy with Pakistan, castigating it for having failed to change the conduct of the Pakistani state. Pakistan’s hardline posture under Asim Munir, combined with the justified anger of the Indian public at Pakistan’s conduct and Pakistan’s salience in our electoral politics, makes its resumption extremely difficult.

Our security-centric approach over the last few years has also failed to achieve the above goal. But for want of any other instrumentality, we cannot afford to dilute it. Therefore, we too may be faced with the need to mow the grass periodically, albeit in a field strewn with nuclear weapons. This is integral to the new normal announced by Prime Minister Modi on May 12.

(The writer is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan and author of India’s Pakistan Conundrum: Managing a Complex Relationship)