JOIN USWhy does Modi not take Oppn into confidence on foreign policy issues?
The late Satinder Kumar Lambah’s memoirs In Pursuit of Peace: India-Pakistan Relations Under Six Prime Ministers is a valuable resource for anyone interested in our bilateral ties with our neighbour over the past 75 years. His book underlines how previous Indian Prime Ministers took Opposition leaders into confidence on foreign policy matters. From Narasimha Rao and Atal Behari Vajpayee to Manmohan Singh, every PM instructed Lambah to go and personally brief Opposition leaders on any major foreign policy deal, initiative, agreement or shift that the government was planning. These leaders often included not just the leaders of the main Opposition party but all parties with a significant presence in parliament.
This practice is also evident from former NSA Shiv Shankar Menon’s 2016 book, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy. When the government decided to take major decisions to sign agreements with China in the early 1990s, Menon was tasked with briefing Opposition leaders. Other diplomats have recounted similar experiences at other times – including senior figures from the Opposition being invited for unpublicised informal meetings by the PM and brought up to speed on foreign negotiations or policy shifts.
In 1994, Rao had deputed Vajpayee as leader of the Indian delegation to the special session of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, where a Pakistan-sponsored resolution to censure India on its human rights record in Kashmir was successfully thwarted. After becoming External Affairs Minister in 1977, Vajpayee told the Pakistani Ambassador, Lambah recounts, that there would be no change in policy towards Pakistan as the existing foreign policy “was based on more or less a national consensus”. Those were not exactly cosy times – Indira Gandhi had put Vajpayee and Janata Party leaders who came to power in 1977 behind bars during the Emergency, but on the nation’s foreign policy, government and Opposition were on the same page.
What could not be done even by the Emergency in 1975 has been accomplished by the current regime, a period many critics call “an unofficial Emergency”. The ongoing border crisis with China in Ladakh has lasted nearly three years now, with 17 meetings between senior military commanders, 11 diplomatic meetings of the WMCC, and some meetings at the ministerial level. Modi himself walked up to President Xi Jinping at Bali last year after an official dinner to shake his hand and have a brief conversation.
The crisis has already forced the Indian Army to reorient its forces from Pakistan to the China border and made Delhi visibly more enthusiastic in embracing the Quad. Last week, Army Chief Gen Manoj Pande publicly said, “It is important to recognise that infirmities in border management can lead to wider conflict. Therefore, the first imperative that comes across is that possession of ‘strategic deterrence instruments’ is essential.” Never before has an Indian military chief spoken openly linking the possession of nuclear weapons with the Chinese threat.
These are major shifts in security and foreign policies but no question on the China border crisis has been admitted in parliament; a debate is ruled out. In 1962, in the midst of the India-China war, parliament had spent days discussing it. Jawaharlal Nehru was present throughout the debate, took criticism, admitted failures, answered questions and provided clarifications. Even in the parliamentary standing committee on defence, which meets in-camera, the BJP MP heading the committee has not allowed any discussion on the subject. Parliament represents the people of India. By denying information to parliament, 140 crore Indians are being kept in the dark.
An all-party meeting on the Ladakh border crisis was held on June 19, 2020, four days after India lost 20 soldiers in the clash at Galwan. No worthwhile information was shared by the government, but an attempt was made to score political points by putting forth its own version of the history of the border dispute. The meeting is remembered, however, for Modi’s infamous claim -- “Na koi hamari seema mein ghus aaya hai, na hi koi ghusa hua hai (No one has intruded into our side of the border, nor is any intruder still on our territory)”. This meant that the Chinese claim of Indian soldiers having been killed for intruding into Chinese territory was correct.
There have been no more meetings with Opposition leaders since. No informal briefings of the main Opposition leaders either. It seems that the Opposition is not seen as representing the voice of a significant section of Indians, but as an enemy of the State. The ruling party may like to tag the Opposition as anti-national but those at the highest levels of government are expected to know and behave better. The government is not the sole repository of knowledge and wisdom on any issue. Those in the treasury benches could be in the Opposition tomorrow, while those in the Opposition could be in power. In a democracy, there are no permanent landlords, all rulers are but temporary tenants.
The corps of Indian diplomats is not Modi’s foreign service; it is the Indian Foreign Service. The foreign policy is India’s foreign policy which, despite Amrit Kaal, draws heavily from all the governments that ruled India before 2014. It is the vision of a consensus-driven foreign policy, which transcends Prime Ministers and parties, that has served India best. The consistency and continuity ensure that India presents a united face to its adversaries and gets the best deal from its friends and partners. This can only happen when everyone on the political spectrum is taken into confidence on major foreign policy decisions. That used to be the difference between India and its neighbours like Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Unless India wants to emulate these failed neighbours, it must revert to the practice that had held it in good stead for over six decades. It would also be a step to start the resuscitation of Indian democracy.