JOIN USMyanmar in a political minefield
The military has once again captured power in Myanmar in a bloodless coup, to inaugurate another phase of political chaos and uncertainty. The trigger for this political storm is what the military claims to be a “fraudulently” conducted general election of November 8, 2020. It remains to be seen whether the military has bitten off more than it can chew.
The fact that the military leadership has overturned a constitutionally-valid general election, conducted in tune with existing legal provisions, is indeed a regrettable reflection on how Myanmar’s generals view the laws of governance and jurisprudence of the country. Apparently, nothing is sacrosanct for the military junta. The declaration of emergency in the absence of evidence or threats remains very disturbing. There is no explanation for an authority that wielded exclusive powers over the defence services, police, intelligence, security forces, immigration and border areas, to take such a drastic step. There is no evidence of either internal strife or external aggression against the country.
The architect of the coup, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who orchestrated the chorus against the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) and its leadership under Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, could remain in office for a long time. The results of the next general elections, whenever it takes place, will not impact him as he will preside over the country irrespective of who is elected to office. In other words, the military will run the country on its terms in tune with its vision and the mandate it sets. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is here to stay, and presently he controls the narrative.
The NLD is certain to face the wrath of the junta. It is not new to this situation as it went through testing times under the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) for over 26 years (1990-2015). The period between 2015 till November 8, 2020, was the NLD’s “sunshine period,” a rather brief one during which it was expected to do much. The NLD will now have to return to the drawing board to make plans for the battle ahead and, importantly, to stay relevant.
The NLD will now have to weather a new storm as the authorities will certainly move against its leadership, including Suu Kyi. The results of the aborted general election have underlined the popularity of the NLD as the pioneer of multi-party democracy and of Suu Kyi as its leader. It would be unwise to expect that this position will change over 12 months when, according to the junta, the next elections will be held. Suu Kyi will remain a force to reckon with in Myanmar for several more years.
To be objective, the NLD painted itself into a corner by avoidable quarrels and controversies with the powerful junta. The trust deficit between the leaders of the two power centres was not difficult to discern and a major clash was seemingly inevitable. Blame must be apportioned to Suu Kyi also in this context.
A national consensus is required within Myanmar to find a political solution to the Rohingya issue, the military is not in favour, and the statement of Senior General Hlaing on it is categorical. Both sides failed to address two major issues, namely the peace accord and the Rohingya problem. A solution is necessary for rapprochement and reconciliation to begin, and it has to be done within the bounds of Myanmar’s Constitution. International assistance is important. Sanctions cannot help solve the problem of ethnic groups and minorities.
There is no worthwhile opposition to the NLD in the country, and the electorate has repeatedly shown this. The political party of the military, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), was virtually wiped out in the recent elections. The same is the case with the minority parties in the states and regions. The military has to do some serious political engineering to change the equations in the country. It has a Hobson’s choice ahead of it. Will it accept an NLD victory in the next general election? It’s anybody’s guess. General elections in Myanmar have only served to underline the fact that the military’s candidates and affiliate parties cannot win a free and fair election. The reservation in Parliament for military appointees is an insurance against this, at best. It is also a sad commentary on the state of the statutory and constitutional bodies in Myanmar. Neither the Union Election Commission (UEC) nor the Supreme Court rose to the occasion to protect the Constitution.
There are reports of civil disobedience in Myanmar against the military’s unilateral assumption of power. This will fester and remain a major source of discomfort to the authorities. The social media will play a major role in disseminating views and opinions critical of the junta and therefore anti-government protests may have several leverages. There has been exponential development of social media in the country, and the recent elections are an example of its efficacy. There are concerns of economic slippages on account of not only the coronavirus pandemic but also the possibility of sanctions by the international community and international financial institutions.
India’s fundamentals in its bilateral relations with Myanmar are strong and the military coup is unlikely to impact on it. The Indian reaction to the development has been measured in as much as it has conveyed its concerns publicly. India has created its own space in Myanmar in the past decade, which is important from a strategic point of view. The Modi government has invested heavily in Myanmar and will therefore like to ensure that there is no diminution of it. India had earlier supported the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar and its credentials are still strong.
Delhi has a special interest in Myanmar, especially given the extent of Chinese influence there and its backing to the military junta. India has to remain more vigilant than ever. The Tatmadaw, too, has its reservations about China, which it articulates at regular intervals, but it is unable to diversify its dependence due to lack of support from others. Countries like Japan and South Korea have stepped forward to help fill the breach. The moot question now is, will China get a “free pass” in Myanmar from the junta? There are many areas of concern that are worth examining, especially to ensure that China does not misuse the “free pass” against India.
(PM Heblikar is Managing Trustee, Institute of Contemporary Studies, Bengaluru, and a former Special Secretary, GoI)