Long-running grievances drive violent unrest in Pakistan's Balochistan

Resource-rich province remains mired in poverty, insurgency and contested identity.

The Pakistani province of Balochistan is a tinderbox of contradictions. The largest of the four provinces, with 44% of the landmass, it is also the least populated, with only 6% of the national population. It is the “richest” province in natural resources, contributing an estimated 80% of Pakistan’s minerals, gas and energy resources, yet also the poorest in terms of socio-economic development, with over 70% living below the poverty line.

Despite major foreign and commercial investments linked to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor — including Gwadar Port and Free Zone, the Reko Diq copper–gold project, and the Duddar lead–zinc mine — GDP per capita has consistently worsened. Twenty years ago, it was about 75% of the national average; today, it has regressed to close to 40%. Cold statistics point to the steady diminishment, denial and discrimination shaping the Baloch fate within the Pakistani narrative.

There is a historical context to the disconnect between Baloch identity and the state of Pakistan. The Baloch were never part of the mainstream Pakistani independence movement.

Balochistan’s integration into Pakistan was politically opposed and violently contested from the outset. The largest Baloch state, Kalat, declared its independence on 15 August 1947 and acceded, controversially and unwillingly, as late as March 1948. Ironically, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah — who had earlier served as legal counsel to Kalat — initially supported Kalat’s autonomy, only to retract later. This unsettled disillusionment has given rise to at least five distinct rounds of armed insurgency: 1948, 1958–59, 1962–63, 1973–77, and 2004 to the present.

Yet despite moments of extreme national vulnerability following crippling defeats in the Indo–Pak wars of 1965 and 1971, and even the 1999 conflict, there was no linked support to Baloch insurgents or coordinated uprising in Balochistan to suggest any credible Indian role in the insurgency.

Not only history but geography also ensured minimal contact between mainland India and the distant province of Balochistan, which runs contiguous to Iran. By road, the nearest point is at least 700–800 km from the Line of Control. Unlike the overlapping cultural ties, linguistic links and imagined histories affecting Punjabis, Sindhis or even Pashtuns, the tribal Baloch have had no significant positive or negative affiliation with India. The Baloch insurgency is largely organic, historically grounded — predating the onset of Indo–Pak tensions — and rooted in ongoing discrimination and the resulting disaffection.

Today, the violent Baloch insurgency has escalated significantly. Pakistan’s approach to addressing Baloch issues has been overwhelmingly militaristic, with little focus on societal co-option, development, or meaningful grievance redressal. Reactive measures have included enforced disappearances, bloody operations such as Radd al-Fitna, and increasingly propagandistic narratives aimed at discrediting the movement. As insurgencies cannot survive without local support, the endurance of one of the world’s longest-running insurgencies underscores the spiralling frustrations of the Baloch people.

Recent insurgent attacks have demonstrated unprecedented coordination and sophistication, unlikely without local support in the form of safe havens, intelligence, logistics, recruitment, and, above all, the moral legitimacy of a popular struggle. The symbolic pervasiveness of wounded yet determined Baloch sentiment was demonstrated in the deadliest recent attack, Operation Herof (“Black Storm”), by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which involved two female suicide bombers.

Yet Pakistan prefers to externalise — read, blame India — for the causality of the Baloch insurgency instead of acknowledging the historical and ongoing marginalisation at its core. While blaming India helps justify a militaristic and heavy-handed approach, Baloch anger continues to deepen. Operation Herof was followed by an immediate retaliatory strike by the Pakistani military, reportedly killing over 145 alleged militants, typifying the inefficacious narrative of endless bloodshed. As political, economic and social grievances remain unaddressed by Islamabad, the excessive use of force perpetuates the cycle of violence through fresh recruitment. Beyond the rote, distractive, and unsubstantiated blame game of the so-called “India hand”, local Baloch grievances and alienation continue to accumulate dangerously.

No foreign government — not even China or any Middle Eastern sheikhdom — multilateral forums such as the United Nations, or any credible international news agency has given credence to the “India hand” theory in Balochistan.

The Pakistani government’s rhetorical branding of the insurgency as Fitna-al-Hindustan (India-instigated sedition) further insults the lived experiences of Baloch indignities. Baloch nationalist Mir Yar Baloch stated, “We are not receiving any kind of support from New Delhi,” and added, “The Baloch are not terrorists. They are a nation that has endured 78 long years of state terrorism, economic plunder and brutal occupation by the extremist and artificial state of Pakistan.”Accepting this reality would not only expose Pakistan’s mishandling of an internal issue but also undermine the “two-nation theory”, which fractured in 1971 with the creation of Bangladesh and now shows strain in Balochistan and neighbouring Pashtun areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. India is a mere side-game in these implosive underpinnings.

(The writer is a former lieutenant governor of Puducherry and Andaman & Nicobar Islands)