Trump administration claiming a ‘win’ against Iran – here’s a report card

Christian Emery for The Conversation

Two months into the war in Iran, the reasons the US gave for launching this conflict – and Washington's minimum criteria for claiming success – now appear unintelligible. So much so that US officials are now arguing the war had actually ended in America's favour almost a month ago, when the ceasefire came into effect.

It is hard to think of a more damning indictment of Donald Trump's catastrophic war in Iran than the spectacle of his secretary of state, Marco Rubio, telling reporters on May 5 that the main goal now was to get the Strait of Hormuz "back to the way it was: anyone can use it, no mines in the water, nobody paying tolls".

This, he argued, was an entirely separate defensive and humanitarian operation and would only become a war if US ships came under fire, which they in fact did that same day. Rubio ignored the obvious contradiction that the humanitarian operation had been necessitated by the very war he was simultaneously presenting as already won.

Things took an even more absurd turn later that day. Trump announced he was suspending "Project Freedom", his plan for the US Navy to escort tankers out of the strait, after just one day.

The US president cited "great progress" toward an agreement with Iran. As has happened several times now, global stock markets rallied before falling back again.

While few doubt Trump is desperate to put this disastrous war behind him, particularly before heading to Beijing on May 14, he massively oversold the impression of a breakthrough. The Iranians were merely considering a 14-point proposal for 30 days of negotiations aimed at finding a durable end to the war.

The more convincing reason Trump abandoned Project Freedom is that it was already clear it would not solve the crisis. Most owners of the 1,500 ships currently stranded behind the strait were unwilling to risk passage even with a naval escort.

Iran's response, attacking shipping and launching missiles at the United Arab Emirates, also threatened the ceasefire itself.

Washington's problem is that the Iranians will probably insist talks can only begin, and the Strait of Hormuz reopen, if Trump agrees to end the economic blockade of Iranian maritime trade. The US blockade is inflicting serious damage on the Iranian economy.

Apart from anything else, Iranian officials see ending the blockade as logical reciprocity. But they also understand time is running out before the closure of the strait causes lasting structural damage to the global economy – if it has not already. This gives them enhanced leverage at the moment.

Yet even if negotiations begin, the same problem that prevented a deal before the war remains. Trump lacks the detailed and institutionalised policy apparatus of his predecessor, Barack Obama, whose 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran the current US president so desperately wants to outdo.

Obama's deal took 20 months of intense wrangling to complete. Trump has neither the patience, technical expertise, nor direct diplomatic connections to achieve the same.

Added to this are new conditions created by the war itself. The fragmentation of Iran's decision-making process and the empowerment of elites with an even higher tolerance for military and economic pressure have introduced uncertainty into the equation.

And Iran has now realised the increased leverage it has through its ability to close a critical artery of the global economy.

Colossal failure

The answer to the nuclear issue may lie in a fudge. Iran could well agree to a moratorium on uranium enrichment while not yet agreeing to ship out or dilute its enriched uranium – though without ruling that out in order to prolong negotiations.

If slightly more moderate heads in Tehran prevail – and that remains a very big if – it would be an obvious concession to make. Iran's geographic advantages and ballistic missile capabilities have established a credible deterrent against future attack.

The question is whether anything short of total surrender on the nuclear issue is acceptable to Trump, and whether he is willing to resist inevitable Israeli opposition to blurring this red line. If not, he has already threatened to resume bombing at a "much higher intensity" than before.

Yet there are serious doubts about whether he has the stomach for this. And even if he does, it is difficult to see how any amount of US and Israeli bombing can force the Iranian regime to surrender.

Trump's shifting aims for the war and desperate scramble for an exit underscore that this entire enterprise has been a colossal strategic failure. It will define his legacy, reshape the Middle East and impose further misery on the Iranian people – the very opposite of what he has repeatedly said he wants to do.

The war has shattered confidence among US regional allies that Washington can protect them. It has also alienated traditional US allies who were blamed and then punished for failing to solve a problem they neither created nor could resolve.

The US and Israeli attacks have further entrenched a brutal regime that will now be even harder to negotiate with, while completely marginalising moderate voices inside Iran.

If negotiations can prevail, the successes the US president and his advisers trumpet – the destruction of parts of Iran's military-industrial capacity and navy – are real. Though in the former case, it is probably only temporary and in the latter, demonstrably not critical for maintaining freedom of navigation.

The only positive is that Trump's brief experiment with military adventurism, an aberration even within his own muddled political trajectory, may now be ending.

(Christian Emery is an Associate Professor in International Politics, UCL)