Pakistan: The Proliferator

The US recently acted against Pakistan’s long-range missile development programme by imposing sanctions on four entities under Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Pakistan's missile programme is a crucial component of its national security strategy. The programme focuses on deterrence and defence against potential threats, particularly from India, and has achieved significant progress. The programme has however faced numerous challenges, principally with regard to international sanctions and concerns over proliferation.

A complex history

Pakistan's history of missile proliferation is complex. The country’s missile programme began in the 1980s, with significant assistance from China and North Korea. In the 1990s, Pakistan developed the Ghauri missile, a derivative of the North Korean Nodong. It also acquired from China M-11 and M-9 missiles, which were deployed in the late 1990s. Ever since, Pakistan's missile programme has continued to evolve, with a focus on improving its inventory's accuracy, range, and manoeuverability.

Today, Pakistan’s missile inventory comprises short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) including Nasr, Abdali, Ghaznavi, Shaheen, Shaheen-I & IA, with ranges between 60-1000 km; medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) to include Ghauri-I & II, Ababeel, Shaheen-II & III, with ranges between 1500-2750 km; cruise missiles Babur 1 & 2, Harbah and Zarb, designed for anti-ship and anti-surface strike capabilities; and air-launched cruise missiles such as Ra'ad and Ra’ad-II, enhancing Pakistan's air power capabilities.

Pakistan's missile programme has received significant support from China, which has been providing technology, components, and design assistance. China has assisted Pakistan in testing and validating its missiles, including the Ababeel and Shaheen-III. This has raised international concerns about regional security, and nuclear proliferation and has in turn adversely impacted regional relationships.

More importantly, Pakistan's missile and nuclear programmes are interlinked. The country conducted its first nuclear test in 1998, in response to India’s nuclear tests, and has developed a range of nuclear-capable missiles on a regular basis. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is estimated at around 170 warheads, with the potential to grow to around 200 by 2025.

US sanctions

The US Department of State, under Executive Order 13382, has imposed sanctions on four Pakistani entities involved in the country’s ballistic missile programme, citing concerns over proliferation and the potential for destabilization in the region. These sanctions are part of a broader pattern of US efforts to curb Pakistan’s long-range missile development. In September this year, the US imposed sanctions on entities in China and Belarus as well, for their alleged involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes.

The recently sanctioned entities include the National Development Complex (NDC), Akhtar and Sons Private Limited, Affiliates International, and Rockside Enterprise. The NDC, a State-owned defence agency, has been working on Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile programme, including the development of the Shaheen series. The other entities have been involved in supplying equipment and materials to support this programme.

Pakistan's foreign ministry, as expected, has criticised the US sanctions calling them "biased and discriminatory" and warning that these could undermine regional stability. Experts warn that these sanctions could fuel anti-American sentiments in Pakistan and undermine mutual trust. Pakistan may accelerate its defence initiatives in response to the sanctions, potentially destabilising the region.

Implications for Pakistan

The US sanctions have significant security implications for Pakistan. The sanctions might delay or disrupt Pakistan's missile programme, affecting its long-term defence and deterrent capabilities. This will limit Pakistan's access to advanced technologies, impacting their range and accuracy, and reducing their overall ability to design, develop, and deploy missiles with advanced guidance systems.

Furthermore, the sanctions might stifle Pakistan’s cooperation with the US on counterterrorism, potentially affecting Pakistan's ability to combat terrorist groups. In any case, this has seen a downward trend after 2018, when the US suspended its security aid to Pakistan, citing concerns that Pakistan was not doing enough to combat terrorism. These will lead Pakistan towards China for military and other technological aid.

In the long run, Pakistan’s missile programme faces several internal challenges that would impact its operational efficacy. First, Pakistan's economic slump limits its ability to invest in research and development, procurement, and maintenance of its missile programme. Second, Pakistan’s reliance on foreign technology, particularly from China and North Korea, can narrow down its technological dependence and supply-chain vulnerabilities. Third, Pakistan's missile infrastructure, including launch sites and command and control systems, may be vulnerable to renegade attacks by terror outfits. Hopefully, the sanctions will be successful in restricting trade, investment, and financial transactions with the targeted entities, thus effectively limiting Pakistan’s ability to expand its ballistic missile arsenal.

On the contrary, India's missile programme has made significant strides in recent years, with a focus on developing indigenous capabilities to counter threats from China and Pakistan. As against Pakistan, India has a more diverse range of missiles, including SRBMs, IRBMs, and cruise missiles. India's missiles generally have longer ranges and heavier payloads than those of Pakistan. Pakistan's missile programme is more focused on MRBMs.

While both countries employ almost similar guidance systems, India's missiles are considered more accurate and reliable. India's programme, however, still falls behind China's advanced capabilities. China's missile programme is focussed on developing hypersonic and stealth capabilities. But then, India’s focus on developing indigenous capabilities and collaborating with other countries is expected to enhance its missile programme in the coming years.

Advantage India!

The US sanctions on Pakistan's missile programme have significant implications for India. The sanctions may slow down Pakistan's missile development, but India must remain vigilant. The sanctions could lead to heightened risks in South Asia. India must be prepared to counter increased mistrust and threats along the border while seeking opportunities to accelerate its missile programme to counter Pakistan's existing arsenal.

While the US sanctions demonstrate commitment to non-proliferation, they may boost the Indo-US strategic cooperation. In the 1980s and 1990s, India had repeatedly expressed concerns about Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes, but the US chose to ignore them, continuing to provide economic and military aid. India could now play a more active role in regional non-proliferation efforts.

Overall, the US sanctions on Pakistan are a strategic advantage for India, as they underscore Islamabad's diminishing relevance for Washington. Therefore, India must seize the moment and continue to modernise its indigenous missile programme to gain a substantive deterrent capacity against regional adversaries.

(The writer is a former corps commander of the Indian Army. He also served as Director General of Military Intelligence and retired as Commandant of the Indian Military Academy.)