Post-Assad Syria is an unenviable nightmare

Fourteen years after Mohammed Bouazizi, a marginalised Tunisian vegetable vendor, self-immolated and unleashed widespread popular protests in his country and beyond—commonly referred to as the Arab Spring—where are we today? All the republican leaders at the receiving end of the protests were consumed.

Hosni Mubarak of Egypt resigned and was tried, convicted, jailed, and died; Muammar Gadhafi fled but was lynched by a mob; President Abdullah Saleh of Yemen fell to a sniper; Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia enjoyed political asylum in Saudi Arabia until he died in 2019. The latest to fall was Bashar Assad of Syria.

While the initial changes in Tunisia and Egypt were largely peaceful—by Middle Eastern standards—the refusal of the leaders of Libya, Syria and Yemen to hear public cries plunged these countries into civil wars. More than a decade later, there is no end in sight in these countries and old tribal and sectarian divides are too deep to bridge or overcome.

The failure of these states to evolve an inclusive national identity upon independence only complicated the situation. Interestingly, monarchies that also faced public anger over youth unemployment, economic hardship and corruption could manage them better, primarily because they could dovetail policies closer to the citizens, something republican regimes were unable and unwilling to do. Their autocratic and lifetime presidency made them immune to reading the public pulse correctly. They all fell.

The Arab Spring has been leaderless and without a clear alternative socio-economic or political model. Their primary—at times, the only—goal has been the removal of the authoritarian incumbent. This proved costly as there was no day-after strategy. The absence of exposure to democracy and vibrant civil societies, the extensive use of the notorious mukhabarat—intelligence agencies used by the regimes—and the colonial legacy meant that after the dictator's fall, the society plunged into a deeper crisis.

Unlike the monarchies, the republican regimes did not have a smooth succession mechanism or sought to promote republican dynasties, which was unacceptable to the wider public. As a result, the removal of leaders brought more crisis to these countries, akin to a remedy worse than the disease.

The experiment with democracy might have been successful in Tunisia, with a smaller population and a more pragmatic and moderate Islamist Ennahda in the lead. But this was not to be. The hopes of a peaceful and democratic transition after the Jasmine Revolution were quickly put to rest. In 2021, amidst the Covid-19 crisis, academic-turned-politician Kais Saied dismissed the government and reversed all the gains of the Arab Spring. Like Ben Ali, he secured over 90 per cent of the votes in the presidential election held in October 2024.

The same backsliding is visible in Egypt. Domestic unpopularity and authoritarian tendencies saw the demise of the brief experience with democracy when Mohammed Morsi became the first democratically elected Egyptian leader since the Pyramids. Fattah el-Sisi, incidentally Morsi’s handpicked nominee for Defence Minister, turned against him and deposed the Muslim Brotherhood leader in July 2013.

This led to democratic backsliding in Egypt. El-Sisi followed in Mubarak’s footsteps and ‘won’ the presidential elections with over 96 per cent of the popular vote in May 2014 and March 2018, and this number dropped slightly in December 2023, when he secured only 89.6 per cent of the valid votes.

The situation of other Arab Spring-affected countries was less flattering. For example, external players’ exploitation of internal divisions only exacerbated the post-Qaddafi political order in Libya. The same holds for Yemen, which for centuries did not have a stable political order—democratic or republican—due to tribal and sectarian divisions. Syria now joins this uncertain journey.

The challenges facing post-Assad Syria are humongous. Its demography comprises various ethnic and religious minorities, including Christians, Kurds, Druze, Alawites, Shias, etc. The Alawites, who make up about 15 per cent of the population, have dominated Syrian politics, military, and governance since Hafez al-Assad—the father of Bashar—became president in 1971. Puritans question the Islamic credentials of the Alawites, especially when the Syrian constitution demands the head of state to be a Muslim. Assads could govern Syria through a mix of accommodation, of other non-Sunni sects, and brutality.

There are other issues. The Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which played a key role in the capture of Damascus and the overthrowing of Bashar, is a prominent Islamist group with roots in Al-Qaeda. As the media gleefully reminds us, its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa—also known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani—was designated as a terrorist by the US, with a bounty of US$10 million on his head. HTS and several other groups have lineal and ideological links to ISIS.

Since the civil war began in March 2011, Syria has seen a surge in militant groups with diverse ideological, sectarian and political agendas. Several Middle Eastern countries and the US also support various factions. The challenge remains: how can a country torn by such ideological divides and a fragmented society be unified?

If these were insufficient, the prolonged civil war has unleashed a devastating refugee crisis. Out of the 22 million pre-war Syrian population, over six million are refugees, and seven million are internally displaced. In short, over half the Syrian population has been displaced.

In addition, Syria has over 1.3 million Iraqi refugees and 500,000 Palestinian refugees. Türkiye hosts about three million Syrian refugees, while they comprise ten per cent of Jordan's population and a quarter of Lebanon's. Türkiye has already announced its desire for the early repatriation of the Syrian refugees; for Jordan and Lebanon, refugee return is vital for their socio-economic stability.

Despite the secular nature of the Ba’athist rule, Syria has been a highly militarised state under Hafez-Bashar rule. Their unpopularity was genuine and could not be attributed merely to external forces, conspiracies, or Islamist resurgence. In the end, the military support of Russia, Iran and proxies like Hezbollah was unable to save a domestically unpopular regime. Unfortunately, in pursuing the post-Assad political order, Syria has no model to emulate.

(The writer teaches contemporary Middle East at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi)