Who among us is safe?

In the lengthening shadow of terror

The most appalling part of the horror of July 13’s twilight terror attack on Mumbai is the lack of a face or a name, the lack of meaning, the lack of reason. It came without a trace of a warning, on multiple targets chosen for their symbolic value, and designed to cause the maximum damage, the highest possible number of casualties, and the greatest achievable degree of terror.

Yet, the statements made by the government post-attack is rhetorical: the security agencies had no clue, no warning; it is not an intelligence failure; the people of Mumbai are resilient because, after the fourth such attack, life scrambled back to normal the very next morning. 

True, terrorism has never been a rational activity. It is by definition a negation of humanity, the opposite of life. Even America was plunged into a state of war after the 9/11 coordinated attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, by an enemy it could not see.

But if the attackers on Wednesday could reach out to Mumbai’s crowded business districts and wreak havoc with such apparent impunity, using well known modus operandi, then who among us is safe? That is merely one of the many questions that now come to the fore with an urgency borne of grief and a rising tide of anger. Another is whether the government could have prevented the attacks.

Persistent disease 

However unpredictable terrorist behaviour might be, as maintained by security officials, it is a persistent disease. And there has to be a continuous, definite method of tracking a chronic condition, which is here to stay and take on newer forms given the rapidly changing technological environment in which terrorism is operating. Online technology such as Google Earth is being increasingly used for attack planning.

It is not as though the governments are altogether unaware of the growing problem; it is not a question of complacency. The anti-terrorism squads (ATSs), going by their different names in different states, have long charted and plotted the numerous terrorist groups that inhabit all corners of the globe and their sleeper cells on home ground. The ATSs  have coordinated federal intelligence gathering, investigated specific acts of terror and evaluated emergency responses. They have successfully arrested terror suspects and bust sleeper cells. A senior counter-terror police official said this is the only area where he felt all agencies, the whole country was working together, denying political interference at least in operational matters.

But on Wednesday, none of this worked in Mumbai. There was not a sniff of what was coming, not a single security response as the three serial blasts took place within ten minutes of each other. Not a bomber was seen, let alone caught. Once again, the lesson is clear. Suicide terrorism against civilian targets is all but unstoppable, and our intelligence and surveillance networks are yet to come of age to thwart every remote-controlled attack.

That is not to say that terrorism cannot be curbed, or that its perpetrators cannot be found and punished. As Julio Reibeiro, former Mumbai Police Commissioner, has said, a terrorist cannot operate in isolation. He needs local support to hide, identify targets, chart his plan, store his weapons and bide time till the actual strike. Hence, it is an imperative to take the local community into confidence and bring them on board. As for the jihadis, they are essentially of two types -- the normal, God-fearing ones and the half-baked variety misled by their rabid mentors. So, identifying the real threat is critical.
 
This brings to the fore major governance issues. The police force, for instance, is a pyramidal structure of which roughly 10 per cent are qualified, trained officers but not necessarily with enough experience in areas such as running a police station, investigation and prosecution. The remaining 90 per cent are untrained, unempowered lower ranks, including the constabulary, who are disassociated from the mainstream. A constable, by definition, is a policeman but does not enjoy even a basic facility such as a chair and desk in police stations. And if he is conspicuously low profile in law and order situations, it is the result of a persecution complex cultivated over time.

Ad hocism

As for counter-terror agencies, they are bogged down with multiple responsibilities of fighting terror, Naxalism and extremism of every other hue. The internal security division of the Karnataka police, an equivalent of the ATSs, is  equipped with Central Armed Reserve (CAR) police trained and strike-fit, but does not have a separate police station, which would facilitate better investigation, infiltration of terror modules, cultivation of informers, prosecution of terror suspects and a myriad other jobs associated with tracking terror 24/7. The situation is no different in other states.

As for modernisation of interception techniques to enable security forces and the police to have access to communication data and track the use of mobile phones, email and other such data transfers by terrorists, they are still a far cry.

In the context of so much ad hocism in governance, the hurt that all Mumbaikars must feel today cannot be underestimated. Nevertheless, two immediate dangers must be fought. One is the loss of people’s faith in the political leadership and elected government of the day. The other, which is an even greater danger, is a growing siege mentality among people which is to be avoided at all costs. It would be a victory for the terrorists.