JOIN USThe recent spurt in Naxal attacks on the security forces personnel in Chhattisgarh must be a matter of serious concern for our political masters, state and central civil administration, state and Central police forces hierarchy, intelligence agencies and our responsible media.
Seven State Task Force personnel got killed in the Maoist attack on April 11 at Sukma in Chattisgarh. On April 12 ultras opened indiscriminate fire on a Border Security Force night patrolling team and killed personnel. Twelve Chattisgarh Armed Police personnel in their an anti-mine vehicle were targeted at Dantewada on April 13 in which five personnel got killed and remaining seven seriously injured.
All these incidents, in a span of just three days, indicate an alarming trend. A total of 75 CRPF personnel were also massacred in 2010 and 29 security forces personnel were killed in Dec 2014. These incidents were almost a repeat of the past, wherein naxal pattern of operations has remained unchanged. While the incidents point towards an emboldened approach being adopted by naxalite groups against security forces, failure on the part of higher hierarchy of state police and Central para-military forces in providing actionable intelligence to ground forces operating in affected areas in acceptable time-frame cannot be denied.
The review of functioning of state administration, modernisation and training of state and Central police personnel including their psychological toughening needs to be carried out with seriousness. These forces have no option but to beat back the designs of naxals by resorting to innovations and out of the box methodology for effectively countering the tactics adopted by these terror outfits.
Excessive dependence on local sources and guides, who invariably indulge in double cross, for carrying out operations has to be weighed against its pros and cons and information given by them needs to be carefully re-confirmed before rushing to the troubled spot. This deliberate action will rule out the possibility of getting into their designed trap. Senior officials should avoid rushing to the site of incidence before the spot has been fully searched and cleared. Such rushing invariably results in targeting of seniors and thus provides avoidable mileage to the anti national elements.
Reinforcement, if any, has to be thoroughly rehearsed and meticulously guided to prevent being ambushed. Security forces have to break set pattern in their routes, timings and tactics being adopted. All movements of troops out of their operating bases have to be deliberately planned, coordinated and executed with adequate proactive safety precautions.
The police and para-military forces operating in infested areas have to become proficient in judging the pulse of the environment by reading the change in behaviour of locals before any unusual incident. Indications are visible before any such incidents but eagle’s eyes are essential for such a notice. Such indications have to be carefully read and analysed before getting into any action, only if absolutely essential.
Unsupportive local people
We are likely to find unsupportive local people displaying faith as a matter of public display. They people seem to have perfected the art of treachery over the years due to incompetent and corrupt civil administration. They consider security forces, generally from different cultural milieu, as an outsider and long and cruel hands of the corrupt civil administration.
The civil administration, which knows their political masters well, is ready to accept that they are not epitome of morality, practices corruption as a societal norm and shirks responsibility. The local police in the affected areas is defunct, deep into corruption and plays the role of a 'sleeping partner'. During the process of introspection, it emerges that media (vernacular or
otherwise), resorts to greedy and vetted reportage being ruthlessly competitive.
For obviating precious loss of lives, the security forces must find the enemy and targets. We have a plethora of intelligence agencies but the source of all intelligence is the same. When two and two is put together, a clear picture emerges about network of feeders sustaining intelligence collection economy and their intelligence being outdated cannot be relied upon.
Maoists resorting to violence have a definite number, definite habitat as also a definite clue of what security forces are up to. This is where they are ahead of security forces. In the war of morality for security forces, naxals practice no morality. It is not easy to evict them. If they have to be evicted, their support system which sustains and replaces them has to be targeted.
To minimise precious loss of lives, integrity of political will and attitude of local police and civil administration has to change for good. Intelligence inputs have to be timely and real, and training and operational ethos have to be refined based on past mistakes. Media will have to play its role sincerely without resorting to greedy and vetted reportage. Civil administration needs to take care of population through education facilities, generation of employment for youth and development of far flung areas.
(The writer is former Research Fellow of Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, and currently working in North Kashmir)