Be part of US, China initiatives

The first ‘Raisina Dialogue,’ an international conference hosted by the Ministry of External Affairs, ended on March 3 after three days of deliberations in New Delhi. The conference focused towards geopolitical and geoeconomic integration of Asia and as well Asia's integration with the larger world. Its aims were realisation of Asia's physical, economic and digital connectivity.

One aspect that came out clearly in the conference was the differing perceptions of India and China over Asian connectivity, particularly with reference to China’s One Belt-One Road (OBOR) initiative. Without na-ming OBOR, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar, during his keynote address, stated that New Delhi will join multilateral connectivity initiatives in Asia, only if they were pursued through a consultative process and not through unilateral decisions. 

Minister for External Affairs Sushma Swaraj echoed similar sentiments and said that India is working out  its own plans for connectivity in Indian Ocean and across Central Asia which are cooperative rather than unilateral. Chandrika Kumaratunga and Hamid Karzai, the former presidents of Sri Lanka and Afghanistan respectively, called for more positive view of China and Chinese investment in the region which should be leveraged as an opportunity.

The Chinese response to Indian concerns was provided by former Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing when he stated that the OBOR is not an exclusive initiative for China alone and that China welcomes participation of various countries and regional organisations.

The main thrust of OBOR is creation of physical connectivity from which flows the economic connectivity. As rightly voiced by India, the initiative lacks policy connectivity and guidelines which must be mutually discus-sed and agreed upon and hence signals a degree of unilateralism.

The OBOR is distinctly different to the Asian RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) and US articulated TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) initiatives in that while the former is heavy on hardware, the latter two are FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) heavy on software sans any significant hardware component.

The ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) with which India has an existing FTA  could also be categorised under software domain. The only comprehensive hardware platform is provided by OBOR which proposes to link the two flaks of Eurasian land mass both throu-gh land and sea cutting through the heart of Asian continent.

The other multilateral agreements in the region relevant to India, though small in scope, but integrate both hardware and software are the Indian initiated BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal) sub-regional project, China initiated BCIM (Ban-gladesh, China, India and Myanmar) corridor, the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) pipeline and many other initiatives of India such as SAGAR (Security and growth for all in the region) and Sagar Mala which proposes to construct various ports along the Indian coastline to improve foreign trade.

Excellent growth prospects

While these projects are welcome with excellent growth prospects, to be able to realise their full potential for regional and global integration, these sub-regional  multilateral components need to be dovetailed into  the overall OBOR architecture and hence is the importance of OBOR for India's geoeconomic strategy.

In terms of scope and magnitude, the India-planned connectivity architecture in Asia may not come any closer to the $1 trillion OBOR initiative of China, given the wide gap in fiscal strengths of both at present. Even the BBIN which is a path braking initiative of India, is yet to be fully fructified and the benefits are yet to be accrued. It suffers from many drawbacks one of which is poor road connectivity in the member countries and harmonisation of funding for construction/up gradation of roads and recurring costs of their maintenance.

Apart from the stated objection to OBOR in terms of its unilateralism, India has many concerns; some real and some perhaps imaginary. New Delhi perceives OBOR as China's attempt at encirclement of India through its strategic assets. Second concern is that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor may lead to legitimisation of Pakistan’s occupation of Kashmir and third is the apprehension that the fructification of China's Maritime Silk Route may nullify India's strategic advantage in Indian Ocean due to increased presence of China's Navy.

India, per se, should not foreclose its options with regard to OBOR. Many of the concerns can be mitigated through dialogue and shedding of some prejudices by both. India should continue to engage China for policy connectivity through consultative process as the only pathway to larger multilateralism and realisation of connectivity objectives. 

India should also view TPP through the lens of positives due to the multifarious opportunities it offers in the Asia-Pacific Region. By pragmatically engaging both Beijing and Washington, India should work towards being a bridge between the two powers and competing versions of geoeconomics using its soft power and goodwill. India cannot repeat the historical blunder of 1980s when it was left out of the second wave of globalisation and must decide on its participation in the Chinese and/or American initiatives while they were still in the formative stages.

(The writer is a retired Brigadier)