<div>On August 3, 2015, the NDA government signed an agreement with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland/Isak-Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) to find a negotiated settlement of one of the oldest insurgencies of India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted that the “landmark” agreement marked “not merely the end of a problem but the beginning of a new future.” Two weeks later, he referred to the agreement during his UAE visit and noted that “however complicated a problem might be, it can be solved through dialogue.”<br /><br />The initial publicity was followed by silence about the contents of the agreement. While the government refused to share the contents, it admitted that this was merely a Framework Agreement that laid down the perimeter of the final agreement. It was signed because the critically ill NSCN-IM Chairman Isak Swu wanted to see some progress. The agreement’s first anniversary and Swu’s death (June 28) allow us to reflect on the progress made so far.<br /><br />It was hoped that the agreement would narrow down the differences between the government and the NSCN-IM, promote reconciliation between stakeholders, and arrest, if not reverse, the process of fragmentation of insurgent groups. With one egregious exception, the contrary seems to have happened.<br /><br />Last November, all Congress legislators joined Nagaland’s ruling alliance leaving behind no opposition. All other legislators, including the BJP’s, were already part of the Democratic Alliance of Nagaland. In the opposition-mukt Assembly, sessions last for barely 15 minutes. The legislators have unanimously supported the agreement, whose contents have not been made public, and also offered to step down in favour of an interim government. Such selflessness goes hand in hand with rampant corruption and breakdown of public services and infrastructure.<br /><br />The “unanimity” within the Assembly contrasts with divisions outside. The gulf between insurgent groups is growing. In addition to the NSCN-IM, there are about a dozen Naga insurgent groups in Nagaland, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh that are not party to the agreement. The civil society’s efforts to reconcile the groups have failed as the NSCN-IM wants others to accept its leadership.<br /><br />It was hoped that the government would try to make the dialogue more inclusive. On the contrary, in the run-up to the agreement, the NSCN/Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) walked out of a longstanding ceasefire. The NSCN-K had waited for a decade and a half to be invited to join the dialogue. Until recently, the exclusion did not matter as the talks were going nowhere. However, that changed after the new government expedited the negotiations.<br /><br />The NSCN-K chose to occupy the mo-ral high ground by resuming the armed struggle. A faction deserted the NSCN-K and promptly signed a ceasefire. Earlier this year, a new insurgent group was launched in the areas where the NSCN-K claims primacy. Each and every faction matters as their support bases do not overlap with that of the NSCN-IM’s and they believe that the latter is securing a deal for the Tangkhul tribe of Manipur at the expense of others.<br /><br />There is growing resentment among Nagas of Nagaland who fear that they will have to share their hard won privileges in, say, public employment with Nagas from other states, while their state will be effectively reduced to a district council under the proposed Pan-Naga body. They are challenging pan-Naga organisations such as the Naga Hoho dominated by the NSCN-IM. Six Eastern Naga tribes of Nagaland that left the Hoho are demanding a separate Frontier Nagaland state. Sections of eight other Naga tribes of Nagaland have launched the Nagaland Tribes Council to challenge the Hoho and to protect their interests. Against Corruption and Unabated Taxation (ACAUT) and others are campaigning against extortion carried out by insurgent groups.<br /><br />The NSCN-IM has responded to this efflorescence of dissent with threats. This has only hardened the resolve of Nagaland-based organisations. Amidst growing concerns about its competency to represent Nagas of Nagaland, Swu’s death robbed the NSCN-IM of its only leader held in high esteem in the state. The growing division between Nagas and Meiteis in Manipur and between Nagas of Nagaland and Manipur have cast further doubt over the acceptability of an exclusive agreement between the Tangkhul-dominated NSCN-IM and the government.<br /><br />Differences continue<br />On the other hand, the differences between the government and the NSCN-IM remain unresolved. Union ministers and the government interlocutor have contradicted almost every claim of the NSCN-IM regarding the agreement. One suspects that the negotiations have been stalled because some of the far-reaching demands of the NSCN-IM, or at least its public rhetoric, are repugnant to the Constitution’s basic structure, while others are repugnant to the sentiments of Nagas of Nagaland. <br /><br />Moreover, the government does not have the numbers to amend the constitution to create a new type of administrative entity between the Centre and districts that cut across state boundaries. In addition, the BJP may not want an agreement before elections in Manipur, where a majority is opposed to the NSCN-IM’s irredentism.<br /><br />Under these circumstances, if the government persists with exclusive negotiations with one faction, the Framework Agreement will end up like the Shillong Accord (1975) that exacerbated the Naga insurgency. This possibility can be averted if the national media and the Parliament discuss the agreement taking into account the views of different stakeholders. Otherwise Nagaland’s youth will be condemned to live an agreement signed by octogenarians.<br /><br />Unfortunately, our media is reminded of Nagaland only when insurgents or natural calamities strike or when “dignitaries” visit the state, while the Opposition is reminded of the agreement when it needs an issue to embarrass the government. More stories from the grassroots need to appear in the national media. Also, an all-party parliamentary delegation must reach out to all stakeholders in the region including Nagas of Nagaland, Nagaland’s indigenous non-Naga minorities, and neighbouring states of Nagaland.<br /><br />(The writer teaches at Azim Premji University, Bengaluru)</div>
<div>On August 3, 2015, the NDA government signed an agreement with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland/Isak-Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) to find a negotiated settlement of one of the oldest insurgencies of India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted that the “landmark” agreement marked “not merely the end of a problem but the beginning of a new future.” Two weeks later, he referred to the agreement during his UAE visit and noted that “however complicated a problem might be, it can be solved through dialogue.”<br /><br />The initial publicity was followed by silence about the contents of the agreement. While the government refused to share the contents, it admitted that this was merely a Framework Agreement that laid down the perimeter of the final agreement. It was signed because the critically ill NSCN-IM Chairman Isak Swu wanted to see some progress. The agreement’s first anniversary and Swu’s death (June 28) allow us to reflect on the progress made so far.<br /><br />It was hoped that the agreement would narrow down the differences between the government and the NSCN-IM, promote reconciliation between stakeholders, and arrest, if not reverse, the process of fragmentation of insurgent groups. With one egregious exception, the contrary seems to have happened.<br /><br />Last November, all Congress legislators joined Nagaland’s ruling alliance leaving behind no opposition. All other legislators, including the BJP’s, were already part of the Democratic Alliance of Nagaland. In the opposition-mukt Assembly, sessions last for barely 15 minutes. The legislators have unanimously supported the agreement, whose contents have not been made public, and also offered to step down in favour of an interim government. Such selflessness goes hand in hand with rampant corruption and breakdown of public services and infrastructure.<br /><br />The “unanimity” within the Assembly contrasts with divisions outside. The gulf between insurgent groups is growing. In addition to the NSCN-IM, there are about a dozen Naga insurgent groups in Nagaland, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh that are not party to the agreement. The civil society’s efforts to reconcile the groups have failed as the NSCN-IM wants others to accept its leadership.<br /><br />It was hoped that the government would try to make the dialogue more inclusive. On the contrary, in the run-up to the agreement, the NSCN/Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) walked out of a longstanding ceasefire. The NSCN-K had waited for a decade and a half to be invited to join the dialogue. Until recently, the exclusion did not matter as the talks were going nowhere. However, that changed after the new government expedited the negotiations.<br /><br />The NSCN-K chose to occupy the mo-ral high ground by resuming the armed struggle. A faction deserted the NSCN-K and promptly signed a ceasefire. Earlier this year, a new insurgent group was launched in the areas where the NSCN-K claims primacy. Each and every faction matters as their support bases do not overlap with that of the NSCN-IM’s and they believe that the latter is securing a deal for the Tangkhul tribe of Manipur at the expense of others.<br /><br />There is growing resentment among Nagas of Nagaland who fear that they will have to share their hard won privileges in, say, public employment with Nagas from other states, while their state will be effectively reduced to a district council under the proposed Pan-Naga body. They are challenging pan-Naga organisations such as the Naga Hoho dominated by the NSCN-IM. Six Eastern Naga tribes of Nagaland that left the Hoho are demanding a separate Frontier Nagaland state. Sections of eight other Naga tribes of Nagaland have launched the Nagaland Tribes Council to challenge the Hoho and to protect their interests. Against Corruption and Unabated Taxation (ACAUT) and others are campaigning against extortion carried out by insurgent groups.<br /><br />The NSCN-IM has responded to this efflorescence of dissent with threats. This has only hardened the resolve of Nagaland-based organisations. Amidst growing concerns about its competency to represent Nagas of Nagaland, Swu’s death robbed the NSCN-IM of its only leader held in high esteem in the state. The growing division between Nagas and Meiteis in Manipur and between Nagas of Nagaland and Manipur have cast further doubt over the acceptability of an exclusive agreement between the Tangkhul-dominated NSCN-IM and the government.<br /><br />Differences continue<br />On the other hand, the differences between the government and the NSCN-IM remain unresolved. Union ministers and the government interlocutor have contradicted almost every claim of the NSCN-IM regarding the agreement. One suspects that the negotiations have been stalled because some of the far-reaching demands of the NSCN-IM, or at least its public rhetoric, are repugnant to the Constitution’s basic structure, while others are repugnant to the sentiments of Nagas of Nagaland. <br /><br />Moreover, the government does not have the numbers to amend the constitution to create a new type of administrative entity between the Centre and districts that cut across state boundaries. In addition, the BJP may not want an agreement before elections in Manipur, where a majority is opposed to the NSCN-IM’s irredentism.<br /><br />Under these circumstances, if the government persists with exclusive negotiations with one faction, the Framework Agreement will end up like the Shillong Accord (1975) that exacerbated the Naga insurgency. This possibility can be averted if the national media and the Parliament discuss the agreement taking into account the views of different stakeholders. Otherwise Nagaland’s youth will be condemned to live an agreement signed by octogenarians.<br /><br />Unfortunately, our media is reminded of Nagaland only when insurgents or natural calamities strike or when “dignitaries” visit the state, while the Opposition is reminded of the agreement when it needs an issue to embarrass the government. More stories from the grassroots need to appear in the national media. Also, an all-party parliamentary delegation must reach out to all stakeholders in the region including Nagas of Nagaland, Nagaland’s indigenous non-Naga minorities, and neighbouring states of Nagaland.<br /><br />(The writer teaches at Azim Premji University, Bengaluru)</div>
