The recent militant attack at Balajan Tiniali market in Kokrajhar district which killed 13 people is a grim reminder of simmering tensions in the Bodo-dominated districts of Assam. The Bodo pr-oblem involves ethnicity and identity which is in turn linked to land and natural reso-urces because settlers from elsewhere have encroached their territory over the years.
The Bodos, who wish to retain their socio-cultural and linguistic identity, aspire to create a separate Bodo state through their demands for Bodoland – including four districts namely Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baksa and Udalgiri.
The socio-cultural dimensions include land, language and livelihood, and in order to promote these interests, the desire for political power has also taken shape. This explains the earlier clashes which erupted in these districts, especially the major outbreaks of violence in 2012 and 2014.
After armed groups like the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) sprouted during the mid-1980s, political violence accompanied the Bodo movement. The Bodos have since 1947 sought to promote their socio-economic and political aspirations, but faced stiff resistance from other groups, namely Muslims and Adivasis, who competed with them. Moreover, the inertia of the state and intra-Bodo differences have retarded their movement.
These Bodo militants first attacked the Adivasis and then struck “illegal Bangladeshi immigrants” since the 1990s. As a result, the flow of illegal immigrants from neighbouring Bangladesh has a strong bearing on the Bodo problem. The resultant violence and counter-violence led to large-scale killings and displacement of original inhabitants and settlers in these Bodo districts.
The Bodo movement has had several political goals which started with the demand for autonomy and graduated to the quest for a separate state of “Bodoland”. In response, New Delhi and the Assam government attempted to resolve the issue through the 1993 Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC) Accord and later the 2003 Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) Accord. However, the radical Bodo factions did not agree to these autonomous arrangements and made concerted efforts to “prove right of the indigenous over the land” or “Bodoland”.
The failure of the 1993 BAC Accord and the 2003 BTC Accord clearly highlights three problems: ambiguities in demarcation of ‘Bodo areas’, lack of control over transferred subjects and insufficient financial powers. It is vital, therefore, to fix the present BTC Accord with complete clarity and implement it in totality.
Ambiguity in the earlier two Accords led to misunderstandings, opportunistic interpretations and confusion. Any amendment and implementation of the Accord should satisfy both Bodos and non-Bodos in unequivocal terms. It should be realised that any success of the Accord also lies in the cooperation between the Bodos and non-Bodos.
The challenge to curb the influx of Bangladeshi migrants across the densely populated 4,096-km India-Bangladesh border also merits attention. While the border fence has, to a large extent, acted as an obstacle, only 2,760.12 km of the entire length has been secured so far. The remainder of the border should be fenced at the earliest and complemented with floodlights and hi-tech surveillance devices.
Although the Border Security Force (BSF) has done a commendable job, its force levels deployed on the ground are inadequate to monitor such a long ‘human’ border. To that extent, it is important not to divert the BSF personnel for duties other than border management. They also have to be equipped with legal powers to handle situations at borders that include not only illegal migration, but also smuggling, drug-trafficking, counterfeits, and trans-border militant movement.
Deter illegal immigrationNew Delhi, therefore, needs to discourage illegal immigrants through appropriate deterrent legislation. Till recently, illegal migrants in Assam were managed under the Illegal Migration (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, that the Supreme Court in 2005 held unconstitutional because it was “coming to the advantage of such illegal migrants as any proceedings initiated against them almost entirely ends in their favour, enables them to have a document having official sanctity to the effect that they are not illegal migrants.”
So, the larger problem is the absence of an exclusive refugee/migration law that has yet to take shape. It is also vital to hasten the present plan to issue multi-purpose identity cards, at least to curb further illegal migration. In some pockets, Bangladeshis can be issued temporary work permits. At the diplomatic level, New Delhi should take up the issue with Dhaka to address the problem at the source.
Relief camps which house all three categories of displaced communities – Bodos, Muslims, Adivasis – require due attention. Some of the relief camps have been in existence since 1993, as their inmates could not return home for fear of violence. These overcrowded camps suffer from a perpetual lack of food, water, accommodation, medical attention, and sanitation. These concerns should be addressed urgently.
Apart from measures to improve living conditions of the internally displaced persons in relief camps, the government should make sure that these people are rehabilitated without further delay. It must be noted that the youth in these relief camps have the potential to join the ranks of militants.
Today, a disconnect exists between the ground reality in the Bodo areas and the romance of Bodoland. It is important to bridge this gap. The political leadership should rise to the occasion and convince the respective communities to perceive the emergent situation and look ahead, rather than exploit the situation to gain short-term electoral mileage. Appropriate confidence-building measures and reconciliation among the communities concerned – Bodos, Muslims, and Adivasis – are crucial.
For New Delhi, the challenge is to address the grievances of Bodos, without any compromise over the interests of other ethno-religious groups who live in the Bodo-dominated areas. The answer lies in a comprehensive, rather than a segmented, approach to the problem which has been allowed to fester since the 1990s.
(Manoharan is Associate Professor and Ghosh is post-graduate student, Department of International Studies and History, Christ University, Bengaluru)