Today, coastal security remains as vulnerable to sea-borne threats as when Ajmal Kasab and his cohorts landed ashore and threatened Mumbai eight years ago on November 26, 2008.
While the Indian Navy (IN), the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) and the state police forces handle operations at sea, a multiplicity of agencies like the Department of Fisheries, mercantile marine departments of the coastal states, Director General Lighthouses, Ministry of Shipping and the Department of Ports among a host of others are stakeholders. Therefore, coastal security is a shared responsibility not limited solely to the IN, ICG and state police.
Coastal security straddles both the military and police roles and therefore needs a force that can operate both like the navy as well as the police. Globally, the coast guard is the force of choice that carries out this role being inferior to the navy in war-fighting capabilities but superior to the police in training and firepower, besides airborne and marine platforms.
However, today, both the ICG and IN lack the legal powers to arrest and hold boats and personnel at sea. Operationally, the powers to file a First Information Report (FIR) from the sea, as well as to seize and detain personnel and boats are essential to fulfil the police function of this role. There is also a need to streamline the process to hand over the FIR, personnel, boats and contraband/ material from the IN or CG to the police for further action under the Indian Criminal Procedure Code.
After the 26/11 sea-borne terrorist strike, though the IN is designated as the nodal coastal security agency, it is not operationally oriented to take up this task. The IN is primarily oriented and equipped for a war-fighting role. Its professional expertise is to sail the high seas beyond 200 nautical miles and engage hostile vessels either during war or peace. On the other hand, coastal security also requires intensive patrolling from the coastline to 12 nautical miles where the waters are dense with smaller craft which sail in this marine space.
It is estimated that around 2.5 lakh small boats and vessels ply these waters for fishing and transport. The state police forces are supposed to patrol these coastal waters to pre-empt illegal activities as well as the movement of terrorists.
Unfortunately, the state police is a land-oriented force and unable to cope with the marine environment. The police are dependent on the IN and ICG who have adequate exposure at sea and the capability to cope with eventualities there. The ICG has a charter to concentrate on the sea between 12 to 200 nautical miles and therefore cannot constantly check the large volume of smaller boats that ply between the coastline and 12 nautical miles that have the potential to transport terrorists or contraband.
To manage coastal security operations across peninsular India, it is necessary to establish state-level operations rooms with cross-functional teams from all agencies involved which will prove a force multiplier for the ICG. There is also a ne-ed to supplement the existing infrastructure for logistics, technical support and training as well as optimise the use of existing boats and assets. Experience with the IN and ICG can be used to improve procurement of equipment with an indi-genous focus which can be supported in the country. This will help alleviate problems with equipment maintenance and spares those coastal police forces face.It seems logical that boat movement into and out of Indian waters needs to be regulated to ensure coastal security. However, no progress has been made towards tracking fishing boats. This remains a contentious issue and a political hot potato since large fishing fleet owners contribute to party election funds.
In itself, this single lacuna nullifies pro-gress made on every other front. It needs to be understood that every fishing boat that is tracked becomes part of the coast-al security system. Every boat logged into the system amounts to a pair of eyes and ears at sea. Conversely, every boat not in the system remains a potential threat.
Information sharingThe problems of information sharing and maritime domain awareness can be solved with technologies like Geographic Information Systems and knowledge management systems which would help share operations plots and specialised knowledge currently with each agency.
They would also provide common platforms to bring together operational and support agencies, besides creating synergy, to enable free flow of information and enhance transparency. Today, much more needs to be done in the areas of ‘information and plot sharing’ among various agencies which continue to remain isolated from each other.
The technology and capability to do so is available within the country and must be used as far as possible to avoid reliance on foreign vendors. New breakthroughs in technology make fishing boat tracking and communications at the national scale an exciting field. While costs remain a concern, making this field a focus area for startups through provision of tax breaks should help to produce breakthroughs.
Over the last eight years, there has been considerable progress on coastal security over intelligence sharing and inter-agency communication at the national level. Today, coastal security remains New Delhi-centric where the cabinet secretary annually chairs a few meetings of the National Committee on Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security.
However, the nine coastal state governments and four Union Territories relate to coastal security with varying degrees of seriousness. This is evident from the reports of the audits of Comptroller and Auditor General that highlight unspent budgets. Moreover, the state of boats, equipment and police organisational structure does not inspire confidence that security cannot be breached along the country’s 7,516-km coastline.
(Chandel is involved with technology development for coastal security and Chengappa is a Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Christ University, Bengaluru)