Introspect before talks

Stalled Indo-Pak Dialogue

Now that a new Congress-dominated government in New Delhi has been formed and is likely to be both stable and capable of doing what it wants, the media is full of speculation that talks between India and Pakistan are about to begin. Since jaw-jaw is better than war-war, the prospect is welcome. But questions arise.

Indian and Pakistani governments have been negotiating with each other since the Jawaharlal Nehru-Liaquat Ali Khan period. Initially the talks led to sensible agreements largely because both had more or less similar limited purposes in view. After that during  the Nehru period, there were several approaches from Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Later there was the Bhutto-Swaran Singh talkathon in early 1960s. The 1965 war changed the mindsets radically on both sides, leaving little scope for agreement.

During 1965 to 1971, mostly rhetoric and invective reigned. There were no serious talks and India-Pakistan relations remained deadlocked. The 1971 India-Pakistan war was a decisive event. Indians were able to defeat the Pakistan army easily enough and the entire Eastern Command of Pakistan army surrendered unconditionally. The agreement signed at Shimla on July 2, 1972 between Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto inaugurated a period of 18 years of peace and quiet. But the period also saw both sides remaining as distant from each other as possible, despite much talk of commonalities.
It was the nukes. Pakistan appears to have made nuclear weapons by or after 1984 and was able to threaten India with a nuclear riposte if the Indians invaded Pakistan under the cover of Brasstacks Exercise. Pakistan’s nuclear programme was in the news for a long while and to one’s knowledge all those stories emanated only from the American CIA. Also, no one knows for sure why India undertook its first nuclear test explosion in May 1974. Probably Indira Gandhi chose to warn

However, that merely served as an incentive to Pakistan’s large and powerful nuclear lobby. This Pakistani ‘success’ changed the Indo-Pak relationship. Those were the days when not many governments disputed the deterrence of nuclear weapons. That presumption had large negative consequences in the Indo-Pak relationship, while the idea of stable good-neighbourliness and, if possible friendship, went out of the window.
After that there has been a mad race for ever more deterrence. What happened in the Soviet-American relationship, viz. non-stop rivalry and unending augmentation of nukes, went on between these countries uninterruptedly. Just as the Soviets and the Americans could never stop at any stage, there seems to be no way of stopping at some point unless both undergo a peaceable kind of change in the mind sets and basic purposes.

While the Indians could be absolutely sure of India’s security through their own nuclear programme and reinforced, of course, by a strong conventional defence, Pakistanis too became cocksure of their own security. They thought and said that Pakistan’s security has become unassailable. It can do anything it likes! After 1989 the Pakistani generals – the governments in Islamabad did not matter in those days – in their own hubris and arrogance decided to inflict a thousand cuts on India, knowing that India cannot retaliate in any big way.

From 1989 to 2002 Pakistanis did whatever they could to harass and hurt India in Kashmir. Earlier the Indians were as convinced of the deterrence of nukes as anyone else in the world; they withstood the Mujahideen activities in Kashmir with the help of their large Indian army acting defensively but could not take any tougher action against Pakistan – until 2002, when Atal Behari Vajpayee threatened a credible large-scale invasion of Pakistan and brought half a million troops on the frontier in an attack mode.

World took it seriously and was frightened by the danger of a nuclear war in South Asia. The Indians, then, claimed they had found a way around the Pakistani nuclear weapons by discovering that nuclear weapons of both cancel each other out. A nuclear war in the populous subcontinent was clearly seen by both sides as utter madness and no one had any stomach for it. One does not know for sure, despite a lot of literature, whether the Americans did actually mediate peace between Pakistan and India in 2002. But Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf had to promise not to allow Pakistan-controlled territory to be used against India in the summer of 2002. This was commonly believed as having resulted from American pressure. What more the Americans did is uncertain, though it is likely that they guided both sides to stay peaceful. Which is where we still are today.
One does not believe that there have been any serious negotiations between India and Pakistan after the Shimla Agreement. In 1997 Indian foreign secretary visited Islamabad and agreed to a new format of eight-committee negotiations between the two. These committees met frequently but could agree on nothing. In the background were the Jihad by Pakistani irregulars in Kashmir as also the nukes. The point one is making is that neither side had any real desire to resile from their stances on different disputes, particularly on Kashmir. There was a hiatus in talks from when the attack on Indian parliament took place till January 2004 when the BJP government agreed to re-launch these negotiations. The eight committees again met, talked and dispersed.

Mindsets unchanged

With this negative record, what hopes can be entertained about the talks that may now ensue? The fact is that mindsets on both sides have remained largely unchanged though Pakistan appears to be far more eager to start talks with India. What appears likely is that, American influence in Pakistan being what it is, Islamabad has bought American ideas wholesale. This would explain their anxiety to start talks again, no matter if the Indians still seem reluctant.

During the last two years and more Pakistan has been in serious crises due to Musharraf’s mishandling and foolish decision-making. No Indian government could have seriously talked to Pakistan during such turmoil.

Even now foreigners seem uncertain as to who is calling the shots in Islamabad and whether the arrangement in Pakistan is stable enough to make far-reaching agreements. Before the two can develop a strong urge for Indo-Pakistan friendship and regional cooperation, they will have to stop hating each other. Until the two countries find a basis for normal good neighbourliness, what is the point in frequent toings and froings of the officials?