New Delhi bends, but Beijing is not pleased

"China is building over a dozen power stations for Pakistan, the largest of which is supplying electricity to tens of millions of Pakistanis," Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi said in Beijing on March 8. He was responding to a query on the progress of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during a press conference on the sidelines of the first session of the 13th National People's Congress of China. "When all of them are completed, power cuts and shortages will be a thing of the past in Pakistan."

What Wang did not tell the journalists was that some of those power stations were located in areas of Jammu and Kashmir state that are under illegal occupation by Pakistan (POK, or Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir).

Wang bragged about the power projects along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) - a key component of the BRI - which India has protested impinges on its sovereignty, just 10 days after Cabinet Secretary P K Sinha issued a note advising "senior leaders" and "functionaries" of the central and state governments to stay away from events attended by the Dalai Lama and held by the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE).

The note reflected New Delhi's keenness to make sure that it does not ruffle feathers in Beijing at a time when both sides are trying to bring the troubled ties back on track. It, however, did not dissuade Wang from bragging about CPEC.

Sinha issued the note after Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale drew his attention to a "Thank You India" event the TGIE planned to hold towards the end of March. The event was to mark the beginning of the 60th anniversary celebrations of the Dalai Lama's escape to India in the wake of the invasion and occupation of Tibet in 1959 by the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

New Delhi, however, prodded the TGIE to scale down the event, which would now be held at Tsuglagkhang Temple in Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh, on March 31.

Gokhale recently visited Beijing and met his counterpart in the Chinese Government, Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou. He also called on Wang Yi and former State Councillor Yang Jiechi, whose position Wang has since been promoted to. The two sides agreed to build on mutual convergences and address differences on the basis of "mutual respect and sensitivity to each other's concerns, interests and aspirations".

New Delhi obviously kept its side of the bargain, as it moved to respect one of the "sensitivities" of Beijing by asking its leaders and officials to stay away from events to be attended by Dalai Lama, who has long been accused by the Chinese government of leading a secessionist movement in Tibet.

The February 26 note by the cabinet secretary did signal a China policy rethink by New Delhi. Around the same time last year, the government was determinedly facilitating the Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh, parts of which China claims as its territory. Beijing cried foul then, too, but New Delhi stood its ground that the Dalai Lama was a "revered spiritual figure and an honoured guest of India" and he was "absolutely free to travel to any part of the country".

Dalai Lama did visit Tawang Monastery, which is close to the Line of Actual Control - the de facto border between India and China - in Arunachal Pradesh from April 4 to April 12, 2017. As New Delhi re-asserted its sovereignty over the frontier state, Beijing retorted by vowing to take "necessary measures" in response.

A few weeks later, Chinese air force choppers intruded into Indian air space near Chamoli in Uttarakhand. And then, of course, in mid-June began the Doklam face-off at the India-Bhutan-China trijunction. The confrontation lasted 72 days, until August 28, when the two sides backed off.

Signalling weak

What's not known is, what was the deal reached under which the two sides backed off then; and, what caused the Chinese army to build up afresh in the vicinity of the Doklam face-off site? The answers to these two questions perhaps hold the key to understanding why New Delhi has, of late, desperately sent out signals that it is ready to walk the extra mile to avoid hurting Beijing's sensitivities.

What is worrying is that China has done nothing to reciprocate. Rather, Beijing chose to brag about CPEC, not address Delhi's concern over infringement of India's sovereignty. Nor has China indicated any departure from its policy of blocking India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group or of shielding anti-India terrorists based in Pakistan from UN sanctions. Even the credibility of reports that China did not back Pakistan at the recent plenary of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) - an inter-governmental organisation coordinating global efforts against terror financing and money laundering - came under doubt after Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lu Kang lauded Islamabad for making "important progress in actively strengthening financial regulations to combat terror financing".

Indeed, contrary to reports in a section of the Indian media, the FATF has not grey-listed Pakistan. It might do so in June, if Pakistan does not by then agree on a timeline to initiate action against money laundering and stop the flow of funds to terrorist outfits. Even if Pakistan is put on the grey-list, it is unlikely to be a big blow to its "deep state."

Intriguingly, on March 8, Wang also said, "The Chinese dragon and the Indian elephant should not fight, but dance together." One can only imagine what that might mean in the absence of any reciprocal moves on the part of China to Delhi's olive branch. Tibet still remains a card in India's hand in managing its complex relationship with China. Instead of throwing that card away, New Delhi must step up preparation to keep it relevant beyond the lifetime of the present Dalai Lama.

DH News Service