DH ILLUSTRATION
India’s quest for military theatre-isation looks elusive. Each time we seem close, some old and new arguments tend to stymie this exercise. While the land and sea forces have reconciled to theatre-ise, the Air Force continues to reassert its stance. In a recent dialogue at the Army War College in Mhow, the Air Chief plainly argued about the ubiquitous nature of its own force, and the lack of a strong rationale to theatre-ise India’s armed forces.
The Air Force is both right and wrong. Right in as far as India’s military leaders are unable to offer an inspiring rationale to theatre-ise in concert with the Army and Navy. And wrong, because in the absence of a strong rationale, the Air Force cannot drag itself, particularly in the context of our northern borders. Clearly, the issue seems more doctrinal than structural. In the absence of a persuasive military doctrine, the argument is not gathering the right momentum.
If India’s military theatre-isation project is more doctrinal than structural, then why is its military shying away from addressing the issue? The answer is simple. Structural ideas are easy to conceive, visualise and propagate, but difficult to operationalise. Any form of theatre-isation – bi-service or tri-service – along India’s extended land borders, or the peninsular region, requires a doctrinal basis for it to be accepted and flourish. If that logic is missing or reduced to equitable distribution of turf, the experiment is unlikely to be durable enough to endure the high pace of future combat.
Theatre-ise for what? – is precisely the question that the Air Chief seems to be hinting at asking. As a case in point, PLA’s expansive reforms that commenced in 2017 were predicated on two years of intense doctrinal reformation, now referred to as the Integrated Joint Operations (IJO) concept. The PLA’s structural reforms to reorganise and re-theatre its forces – referred to as ‘above’ and ‘below’ the neck reforms – then followed. By firmly aligning its leadership on the IJO concept, it was made possible to quickly theatre-ise its joint forces. Similar contexts can be found in other militaries across the world.
At another level, when technology is evolving at a breakneck pace, the technological context becomes ever more important, if not any less, than the doctrinal or structural contexts. Globally, modern militaries are struggling to contextualise this relationship between technology, doctrine, and structures. And how they are prioritised within the strategic-planning framework, i.e., what comes first – technology, doctrines, or structures – and how to make the right military choices.
The Chinese case is, again, instructive. Having first put in place a vibrant civil-military industrial complex, the PLA’s doctrinal imperatives clearly converge with its evolving technological might, which provides the impetus for its military transformation. On the contrary, India, in the absence of a strong defence-techno base, is caught chasing a bouquet of technologies partner-countries have to offer, apart from its recent efforts to ramp up its defence needs indigenously. This leaves India’s structural realignment in a bit of jeopardy.
Several decades of collegiate planning between the three Services have led to rigid mindsets, which tend to reflexively seek low-ball consensus and limit mutual accommodation of views. The Air Force’s apprehensions seem to be a direct fallout of Operation Sindoor, but the next conflict could be profoundly different. India’s policymakers need to ask the right questions before they choose to undertake serious and lasting theatre-isation in the armed forces.
Rethinking readiness
Three aspects are pertinent. First, the political leadership needs to spell out what its military has to be ready for on a decadal basis (ready for what threats?). Our threats, which seem more territorial or littoral as of now, might soon mutate into complex multi-domain threats. Newer technologies can create pacing threats, which are difficult to predict. Early breakthroughs in quantum computing, robotics, and hypersonics point in this direction. We have to invest deeply into visualising these new-age threats, which seemingly lie beyond the realm of our service-oriented thinking.
Second, the Indian military has to be sure of what it needs to fight on a decadal basis (ready for what capabilities?). Today, capability development is much more than simple budgetary allocations, as there is enough evidence to prove that more money does not buy you more firepower. Often monetary allocations tend to heighten our confidence superficially – platforms that are essential today might not be as useful tomorrow. What is important is to understand which capabilities are ageing or providing diminishing returns, and which ones are more revolutionary than others, to tilt the balance on the battlefield.
Therefore, investing in expensive, large-signature and long shelf-life items such as tanks, fighter aircraft, and warships has to be weighed out against more precise, lethal, and agile technologies of the future. In Ukraine, the use of these platforms has considerably reduced and is restricted. It increasingly puts into doubt the relevance of platforms which were traditionally the sword-arm.
And third, policymakers have to appreciate the importance of acquisition timelines (ready by when?). Acquisition plans with delivery timelines lying in another technological era could make projected acquisitions look irrelevant or less useful. This is a serious challenge. India’s defence ministry recently promulgated its technology roadmap. Largely focused on identifying the type of platforms and other technical parameters, the document does not address this timeline and resourcing issue. This might need a reassessment to ascertain what is relevant and what is not against the global technology curve, and its military utility.
Building coherence across the war-fighting spectrum – from concepts to technologies – and India’s military theatre-isation is the key. This necessitates a joint doctrine, where threats, capabilities, and timelines are tightly coupled towards the development of a joint force. Perhaps a National Security Strategy (NSS) with strong strategic guidance to the three Services could help solve this impasse.
(The writer commanded the Leh Corps during the Eastern Ladakh crisis in 2020)
Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.