<p>Nobody on the inside knows, and those of us on the outside—who haven't been privy to discussions between rebel leaders and their western contacts—know less.<br /><br />At least this time around, everyone understands (or should, anyway) that ‘regime change’ marks only the beginning of the story, not the end. And, in any case, this time (a major difference between post-Qaddafi Libya and, say, post-Saddam Iraq), the Libyans will be in charge; it’s been their war, and it will soon be their victory, not ours.<br /><br />In this sense, President Barack Obama’s policy of supporting the rebels only to the extent of doing things that nobody else can do—a policy decried by his critics as either too much or too little—has turned out to be just about right.<br /><br />Without the precision bombing at the start of the conflict, the surveillance-and-attack drones later on, and the command-control networks throughout, the rebellion almost certainly would have been crushed. (My guess is that CIA and other western nations’ special-ops officers also helped train the rebel soldiers on the ground.)<br /><br />At the same time, because the US has kept a low profile compared with other Nato nations, especially Britain, France, and Italy, which have a more vital interest in the fate of Libya, the ‘Pottery Barn rule’—you break it, you buy it—will not apply.<br /><br />If Obama had launched a massive bombing campaign, much less put US infantry troops on the ground as some neoconservatives urged, and if Qadhafi had surrendered or died in the rubble of his palace as a result, the world—perhaps the rebels themselves—would have been incensed by the ‘imperialist aggression’ and would have demanded that the US restore order, then criticised us sharply if our effort fell short.<br /><br />Still, even now, the Libyans cannot restore order or rebuild their country by themselves. Thanks in good part to Qadhafi’s four decades of rule, they have no democratic traditions or institutions, their economy is in shambles, their military and police are in retreat, and it’s an open question how well they'd be able to police that same city.<br /><br />There are lessons to be learned from what was done, and not done, in the early months of the US-led occupation of Iraq. Let’s hope that somebody is figuring out how to apply these lessons to Libya.<br /><br />For example: Impose law and order immediately. If the US-led authorities had shot a few looters in the first days after Saddam Hussein fled Baghdad (instead of heralding the chaos as an exuberant expression of freedom, as Donald Rumsfeld did), the occupation of Iraq might have followed a very different course.<br /><br />After Qadhafi is toppled, the new powers, whoever they are, may declare a curfew, perhaps even martial law, at least for a while. This should not necessarily be cause for alarm; probably it’s essential, not only to prevent pro-Qadhafi holdouts from continuing to fight but also to contain factional and tribal tensions among the rebels.<br /><br />Sharing power<br />As a precondition to imposing order, the rebel commanders will need to figure out a way to share power, at least in the short term. This may not be easy. The ‘rebel forces’ consist of at least a dozen factions, some of which hate one another. (Just a few weeks ago, the top rebel commander was murdered, almost certainly by a rival officer.) One hopes they’ve already settled on some formula. If they haven’t, this may get very messy.<br /><br />Release the money: At the start of this conflict, western nations froze Libyan assets ($30 billion in the US alone), pending the ascent of a new regime. The Obama administration has now recognised the Transitional National Council as the legitimate government (as have most of the other Western nations involved in this), and officials are now saying the freeze will be lifted.<br /><br />A big lesson not only of post-Saddam Iraq but also of Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, and nearly every political upheaval of this magnitude in history, is that revolutions breed high expectations—and, if the expectations aren’t at least somewhat satisfied, tyranny returns or chaos erupts. One way to avoid these ill fates is to provide jobs, and one way to do that is to fund projects. Much in Libya needs rebuilding, or just plain building. <br /><br />Money needs to be funnelled into these kinds of projects as soon as possible. Help set up local elections quickly: It’s naive to expect the new Libya to spring forth as a democracy. But whatever political system emerges or evolves, it is unlikely to take hold peacefully unless a critical mass of the population feels that the new system is theirs and that they have a stake in its success.<br /><br />Perhaps the biggest mistakes the US occupation authorities made in post-Saddam Iraq (besides tolerating looters, disbanding the army, and barring Baathist Party members from holding government jobs) were to install a prime minister and to create a complicated system of caucuses for selecting a national parliament. It would have been better to recognise the tribal and regional nature of Iraq as the basis for creating forums to elect local representatives—in short, to allow government to build up more ‘organically’ from the grassroots.<br /><br />A role for the CIA? It may be serendipitous that Gen David Petraeus is being sworn in as director of the CIA on Sept 6. In the opening months of the Iraq occupation, Petraeus, at the time commander of the 101st Airborne Division, did in northern Iraq (specifically, in Mosul, the capital of Nineveh province) all the things that somehow need to be done in Libya.<br /><br />He imposed law and order through widespread patrols, set up local elections with the help of local leaders, and funded thousands of reconstruction projects with money that Saddam Hussein had stashed away in his palaces. <br /><br />Keep it international: Above all, and I'm sure the White House regards this as a basic premise, whatever kind of government is created in Libya, and whatever kind of reconstruction programmes are offered from outside its borders, the United States will not be in the lead.<br /><br />Nor should it be. President Obama signed up for this mission in a decisive but limited manner, and it is as sure a bet as anything in American politics that ‘decisive but limited’ will remain the scope of his commitment.<br /><br />In his statement on Monday, Obama lauded the operation as, among other things, a demonstration of ‘what the international community can achieve when we stand together as one.’ Ever since the end of the Cold War, Americans have been waiting for the allies to step to the plate, and the allies have been complaining (sometimes disingenuously) about America’s tendency to dominate.<br /><br />All signs suggest that Obama is determined that Libya remain a theatre—through war and peace, conflict and resolution—where players on both sides of the Atlantic (and let’s include the Arab allies in this too) see their wishes come true.<br /><br /></p>
<p>Nobody on the inside knows, and those of us on the outside—who haven't been privy to discussions between rebel leaders and their western contacts—know less.<br /><br />At least this time around, everyone understands (or should, anyway) that ‘regime change’ marks only the beginning of the story, not the end. And, in any case, this time (a major difference between post-Qaddafi Libya and, say, post-Saddam Iraq), the Libyans will be in charge; it’s been their war, and it will soon be their victory, not ours.<br /><br />In this sense, President Barack Obama’s policy of supporting the rebels only to the extent of doing things that nobody else can do—a policy decried by his critics as either too much or too little—has turned out to be just about right.<br /><br />Without the precision bombing at the start of the conflict, the surveillance-and-attack drones later on, and the command-control networks throughout, the rebellion almost certainly would have been crushed. (My guess is that CIA and other western nations’ special-ops officers also helped train the rebel soldiers on the ground.)<br /><br />At the same time, because the US has kept a low profile compared with other Nato nations, especially Britain, France, and Italy, which have a more vital interest in the fate of Libya, the ‘Pottery Barn rule’—you break it, you buy it—will not apply.<br /><br />If Obama had launched a massive bombing campaign, much less put US infantry troops on the ground as some neoconservatives urged, and if Qadhafi had surrendered or died in the rubble of his palace as a result, the world—perhaps the rebels themselves—would have been incensed by the ‘imperialist aggression’ and would have demanded that the US restore order, then criticised us sharply if our effort fell short.<br /><br />Still, even now, the Libyans cannot restore order or rebuild their country by themselves. Thanks in good part to Qadhafi’s four decades of rule, they have no democratic traditions or institutions, their economy is in shambles, their military and police are in retreat, and it’s an open question how well they'd be able to police that same city.<br /><br />There are lessons to be learned from what was done, and not done, in the early months of the US-led occupation of Iraq. Let’s hope that somebody is figuring out how to apply these lessons to Libya.<br /><br />For example: Impose law and order immediately. If the US-led authorities had shot a few looters in the first days after Saddam Hussein fled Baghdad (instead of heralding the chaos as an exuberant expression of freedom, as Donald Rumsfeld did), the occupation of Iraq might have followed a very different course.<br /><br />After Qadhafi is toppled, the new powers, whoever they are, may declare a curfew, perhaps even martial law, at least for a while. This should not necessarily be cause for alarm; probably it’s essential, not only to prevent pro-Qadhafi holdouts from continuing to fight but also to contain factional and tribal tensions among the rebels.<br /><br />Sharing power<br />As a precondition to imposing order, the rebel commanders will need to figure out a way to share power, at least in the short term. This may not be easy. The ‘rebel forces’ consist of at least a dozen factions, some of which hate one another. (Just a few weeks ago, the top rebel commander was murdered, almost certainly by a rival officer.) One hopes they’ve already settled on some formula. If they haven’t, this may get very messy.<br /><br />Release the money: At the start of this conflict, western nations froze Libyan assets ($30 billion in the US alone), pending the ascent of a new regime. The Obama administration has now recognised the Transitional National Council as the legitimate government (as have most of the other Western nations involved in this), and officials are now saying the freeze will be lifted.<br /><br />A big lesson not only of post-Saddam Iraq but also of Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, and nearly every political upheaval of this magnitude in history, is that revolutions breed high expectations—and, if the expectations aren’t at least somewhat satisfied, tyranny returns or chaos erupts. One way to avoid these ill fates is to provide jobs, and one way to do that is to fund projects. Much in Libya needs rebuilding, or just plain building. <br /><br />Money needs to be funnelled into these kinds of projects as soon as possible. Help set up local elections quickly: It’s naive to expect the new Libya to spring forth as a democracy. But whatever political system emerges or evolves, it is unlikely to take hold peacefully unless a critical mass of the population feels that the new system is theirs and that they have a stake in its success.<br /><br />Perhaps the biggest mistakes the US occupation authorities made in post-Saddam Iraq (besides tolerating looters, disbanding the army, and barring Baathist Party members from holding government jobs) were to install a prime minister and to create a complicated system of caucuses for selecting a national parliament. It would have been better to recognise the tribal and regional nature of Iraq as the basis for creating forums to elect local representatives—in short, to allow government to build up more ‘organically’ from the grassroots.<br /><br />A role for the CIA? It may be serendipitous that Gen David Petraeus is being sworn in as director of the CIA on Sept 6. In the opening months of the Iraq occupation, Petraeus, at the time commander of the 101st Airborne Division, did in northern Iraq (specifically, in Mosul, the capital of Nineveh province) all the things that somehow need to be done in Libya.<br /><br />He imposed law and order through widespread patrols, set up local elections with the help of local leaders, and funded thousands of reconstruction projects with money that Saddam Hussein had stashed away in his palaces. <br /><br />Keep it international: Above all, and I'm sure the White House regards this as a basic premise, whatever kind of government is created in Libya, and whatever kind of reconstruction programmes are offered from outside its borders, the United States will not be in the lead.<br /><br />Nor should it be. President Obama signed up for this mission in a decisive but limited manner, and it is as sure a bet as anything in American politics that ‘decisive but limited’ will remain the scope of his commitment.<br /><br />In his statement on Monday, Obama lauded the operation as, among other things, a demonstration of ‘what the international community can achieve when we stand together as one.’ Ever since the end of the Cold War, Americans have been waiting for the allies to step to the plate, and the allies have been complaining (sometimes disingenuously) about America’s tendency to dominate.<br /><br />All signs suggest that Obama is determined that Libya remain a theatre—through war and peace, conflict and resolution—where players on both sides of the Atlantic (and let’s include the Arab allies in this too) see their wishes come true.<br /><br /></p>
